

# philippine studies

Ateneo de Manila University • Loyola Heights, Quezon City • 1108 Philippines

---

## **Sorsogon's Principalia and the Policy of Pacification, 1900-1903**

Stephen Henry S. Totanes

*Philippine Studies* vol. 38, no. 4 (1990) 477–499

Copyright © Ateneo de Manila University

---

Philippine Studies is published by the Ateneo de Manila University. Contents may not be copied or sent via email or other means to multiple sites and posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's written permission. Users may download and print articles for individual, noncommercial use only. However, unless prior permission has been obtained, you may not download an entire issue of a journal, or download multiple copies of articles.

Please contact the publisher for any further use of this work at [philstudies@admu.edu.ph](mailto:philstudies@admu.edu.ph).

<http://www.philippinestudies.net>  
Fri June 27 13:30:20 2008

## Sorsogon's Principalia and the Policy of Pacification, 1900-1903

STEPHEN HENRY S. TOTANES

In the light of the increasing number of studies on the Philippine revolution of 1896-1902 and the Philippine-American War, Fr. John Schumacher, S.J., made the observation that "it is no longer tenable to advance a monolithic explanation for the adherence to, sympathy for, participation in, or betrayal of a revolution . . . [o]ne would apriori expect vast differences in response to a call for revolution."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, there was a complexity of motives, factors and forces at work which no monolithic framework could adequately explain.

Since the 1960s the standard account of Filipino participation in the Philippine-American War has been Teodoro Agoncillo's *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* which celebrates the role of the Filipino masses in the second phase of the revolution and criticizes the collaboration of the Manila-based *ilustrados* with the new colonizers. In the mid-seventies, Renato Constantino in his *A Past Revisited* pursued and elaborated upon Agoncillo's interpretation, emphasizing the fact that the masses continued to resist the Americans even after the *ilustrados* had been coopted into the new regime and General Emilio Aguinaldo had surrendered to the Americans. Both interpretations however are heavily based upon the events and characters in the centers of the revolution—Manila, Malolos, and Cavite—and do not sufficiently cover the events in the other provinces.<sup>2</sup>

This article was originally delivered as a paper at the First National Conference on the Philippine-American War, 1899-1914 at the University of the Philippines, Quezon City, on 3-4 July 1989.

1. John N. Schumacher, S.J., "Recent Perspectives on the Revolution," *Philippine Studies* 30 (1982): 484.

2. Teodoro Agoncillo, *Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1960); Renato Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited* (Manila: Tala Publishing House, 1975).

Recent studies of the revolution in the different provinces modify some of the generalizations made by Constantino and Agoncillo. The works of Glenn May, Norman Owen, and Milagros Guerrero on the provinces of Batangas, Albay and parts of Luzon and the Visayas have shown that there was a wide range of responses, from collaboration and accommodation to resistance, among the different levels of the Filipino population, whether *principales* or belonging to the masses. In fact, Guerrero says that one of the most significant features of the political situation during the years 1898–1902 was “the emergence of these local elites (provincial and municipal) as the real victors of the Philippine Revolution,” as they managed to entrench themselves in positions of power and steer the revolution in a direction which would benefit their interest.<sup>3</sup>

This article hopes to add to the growing number of local studies made on Filipino participation in the Philippine-American War and confirm Guerrero’s observation by focusing on a province which was only peripherally involved at the outbreak of hostilities between the two sides—Sorsogon, on the southeasternmost coast of Luzon. Sorsogon was drawn slowly into the war, having been left unoccupied by American troops for the first ten months of the war in 1899. But in 1900, the American presence was felt and a pacification campaign was conducted, to which the native response evolved from accommodation, to resistance, to collaboration. It was a response best reflected by Sorsogon’s *principalia*.

#### THE SETTING

Sorsogon lies on the extreme southeast end of the island of Luzon, in the Bicol region. It has sixteen municipalities, all of which are coastal towns except for Irosin, which lies at the center of the province. The capital, Sorsogon, is around 600 kilometers from Manila via the South Road, a national highway completed in the postwar period. Before this, Sorsogon was relatively isolated via the land route. The most convenient means of transport was the sea route, from Ragay Gulf to

3. Milagros C. Guerrero, “The Provincial and Municipal Elites of Luzon During the Revolution, 1898–1902,” in *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*, Alfred McCoy and Ed de Jesus, eds. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1982), p. 155; see also Guerrero, “Luzon at War: Contradictions in Philippine Society, 1898–1902,” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1977); Glenn May, “Resistance and Collaboration in the Philippine-American War: The Case of Batangas,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 15 (March 1984): 69–90; and Norman G. Owen, “Winding Down the War in Albay, 1900–1903,” *Pacific Historical Review* 48 (November 1979): 557–89.

Bacon, nine kilometers from the capital, or through Sorsogon Bay on the west coast.<sup>4</sup>

During much of the Spanish regime, Sorsogon fell under the jurisdiction of Albay, having become an independent province only in October 1894, not because of any petition from its inhabitants, but due to a bureaucratic decision made in Madrid. From then until the arrival of the Americans in 1900, it had its own Spanish governors who were eventually replaced by civil and military officials under Aguinaldo's revolutionary government.<sup>5</sup>

In describing revolutionary activity in the Bicol region, one journalist commented: "revolutions might end in Bicol but they will certainly not begin there."<sup>6</sup> The description is apropos to the region and even to Sorsogon. During the entire Spanish colonial period, there was only one serious challenge to the Spanish regime in the region. That was an offshoot of the Sumuroy rebellion of 1649-50 which began in Samar and spread to the nearby provinces. While there may have been dissatisfaction against the imposition of Spanish rule, there is little evidence that the Bicolanos or the Sorsoguenos ever mobilized themselves on a large scale to challenge the Spanish regime.<sup>7</sup>

The new province of Sorsogon was barely two years old when the revolution led by the Katipunan broke out in Manila in August 1896. Liberal ideas may have circulated among some of Sorsogon's educated citizens but these were never transformed into action. Immediately, the Spanish governor, Don Guillermo Monte Allende Salazar, denounced several citizens in a secret report to the Governor-General because of their alleged anti-Spanish and anti-religious views. Intent on stemming the tide of revolutionary fervor which was now spreading all over Luzon, he arrested some liberal-minded individuals and cooperated with the governor of Albay in raising a volunteer army of 500 men which left for Manila in February 1897 to support the Spanish drive against the rebels in Central Luzon.<sup>8</sup>

4. Francisco G. Salazar, "Geography of Sorsogon with Particular Emphasis on Soils and Crops," *Philippine Geographical Journal* (January-March 1956) 4: 22; *A Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902): p. 589.

5. Luis C. Dery, "From Ibalon to Sorsogon: Prehistory to 1905," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of the Philippines, 1987), pp. 277-79 (Hereafter, to be cited as Dery, "Sorsogon").

6. Teresa Castro, "The Bicolano," *Graphic*, 28 September 1966, p. 29.

7. Norman G. Owen, *Prosperity Without Progress: Manila Hemp and Material Life in the Colonial Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1984), pp. 218-19.

8. Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 341-46. See also Elias M. Ataviado, *The Philippine Revolution in the Bicol Region*, trans. Juan T. Ataviado, (Manila: Encal Press, 1953), pp. 46-48; 56.

The end of the Spanish regime in Sorsogon began with the successful revolt of the Guardia Civil of Nueva Caceres in September 1898. By then, a large expeditionary force led by General Ananias Diokno, representing the victorious revolutionary forces of Aguinaldo, was headed for the Bicol region. This prompted the Spanish authorities to consider abandoning these provinces. On 21 September 1898, the Spanish officials of Sorsogon and their families, led by Governor Leandro Villamil, left the province and turned over some funds of the provincial government to the Vicar-Forane, Padre Jorge Barlin. The dismantling of the Spanish colonial structure in the province was completed without much bloodshed.<sup>9</sup>

The expeditionary force under General Diokno reorganized provincial government in Sorsogon upon its arrival in October 1898. Elections were held for provincial and municipal positions, and the officials who had held office prior to the collapse of the Spanish regime easily occupied positions vacated by the Spaniards. As Guerrero observed, "the municipal elite was essentially unaltered . . . local government offices simply rotated within its ranks."<sup>10</sup>

In November 1898, a new politico-military governor for Sorsogon, Lieutenant Colonel Amando Airan, was appointed by President Aguinaldo. A month later, Domingo Samson of Albay arrived as a special commissioner of the Malolos Republic and conducted new elections, but there were only a few changes on the municipal level. By the end of 1898, therefore, Sorsogon had been integrated into the new Philippine Republic, even if it did not send delegates to the Malolos Congress held three months earlier.<sup>11</sup>

The immediate concern of this revolutionary government was to restore socioeconomic activities and raise wartime contributions for the fledgling Republic. But a more pressing problem was the acquisition of sufficient arms and ammunitions for the defense of the province, especially when hostilities broke out between the Americans

9. For the successful revolt in Nueva Caceres, see Ataviado, *Revolution*, pp. 80-82; 113-16; Manuel Sastron, *La insurreccion en Filipinas: Guerra Hispano Americano en el archipelago, 1896-1899* (Madrid, 1901), pp. 537-38; Apolinar Pastrana Riol, ed., *A Friar's Account of the Philippine Revolution in Bicol* (Q.C.: Franciscan Friary of St. Gregory the Great, 1980); and, "Relación de los sucesos de Nueva Cáceres en la actual insurreccion," (n.a., n.d.) microfilm copy, Ateneo de Manila Rizal Library. The abandonment of Sorsogon is described by Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 358-61 and Ataviado, *Revolution*, pp. 130-31.

10. Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 361-63; for a table of elected officials see between pages 362-63. Election results can be found in *Philippine Insurgent Records* (hereafter, *PIR*), Box No. I-21: Election Returns, Sorsogon, 1898-1900, in Philippine National Library, Rare Manuscript Section; Guerrero, "Provincial Elite," p. 170.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 363-64, citing *PIR-Sorsogon*, Box I-21 and PR-182.

and the Filipinos in February 1899 and Aguinaldo's army broke up into smaller groups by the year's end as the Americans began their drive towards the other parts of Luzon.<sup>12</sup>

#### THE AMERICAN LANDING AND PASSIVE ACCOMODATION

The American occupation of Sorsogon and the Bicol region was motivated primarily by economic needs rather than by an intense desire to pursue the "insurgents" operating there. In August 1899, General Elwell Otis ordered a blockade of the Bicol region's ports to prevent them from exporting their abaca and financing the cause of Aguinaldo's army. This same blockade, however, prevented abaca from reaching the United States and created a mild "hemp panic" among American cordage manufacturers. The American War Department was besieged by "urgent inquiries and anxiety about hemp."<sup>13</sup>

By 1900, American officials had decided to reopen the hemp ports to allow the free flow of this vital raw material to the United States. In January 1900, an expeditionary force led by Brigadier General William A. Kobbe was sent to occupy the hemp ports of Tabaco and Legazpi in Albay, and Sorsogon, Donsol, and Bulan in Sorsogon, to establish civil government and customs services there so as to be able "to render a sufficient quality of hemp available for the American market as soon as possible."<sup>14</sup>

On 20 January 1900, two days after departing from Manila, General Kobbe's expeditionary force, made up of the Forty-third and Forty-seventh U.S. Volunteers, anchored in Sorsogon Bay without encountering any resistance. A soldier on the expedition described the landing:

Not a shot greeted us. Only silence and signs of a hasty departure of inhabitants as well as troops, . . . Our flotilla . . . must have seemed like all the navies of the world advancing faithfully upon them. The deserted town was Sorsogon . . . (it) was secured by default.<sup>15</sup>

12. Ibid., pp. 364-68.

13. Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 575-76, citing *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain* . . . 2 vols., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), vol. 2, p. 1130.

14. See Brian Linn, "The War in Luzon: U.S. Army Regional Counter Insurgency in the Philippine War, 1900-1902," (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1985), pp. 198-99, citing the report of Brig. General William Kobbe.

15. Clarence Lininger, *The Best War at the Time*, (New York: Robert Speller, 1964), p. 114.

The account of Captain J.M. Field, a quartermaster who wrote a regimental history of the forty-seventh U.S.V. Infantry, describes this amusing incident which they witnessed upon landing:

... the appearance of a small party on the pier, composed mostly of Spaniards, who wished to give expression to their friendship for Americans and pleasure at their appearance. The only member of the party who could speak English and who had been selected to act as spokesman was an Assyrian merchant of the town whose chief characteristics were a very small and peculiarly shaped head and a generous expansiveness in the region of the waistband. It was soon demonstrated that this gentleman's English vocabulary was in inverse proportion to his rotundity of person but he did the best he could with the gifts at his command and as the first boat approached the pier ... he delivered with all the force of his lungs, in a monotonous shrill and ridiculously childish treble the cheerful invocation from the prominent citizens of Sorsogon there assembled, "Come to Yee-sus, come to Yee-sus, come to Yee-sus!"<sup>16</sup>

The troops disembarked and headquarters were set up in Sorsogon town. On 21st January, Company 'A' and 'D' under Major Hugh Wise occupied Donsol after meeting with slight resistance. On the same day, Captain Charles MacLain with Company 'B' occupied Bulan with no resistance. Three companies under Colonel Walter Howe attempted to reach Legazpi via the land route, but no road could be found and the rough terrain compelled them to return to Sorsogon.<sup>17</sup>

General Vito Belarmino, overall commander for the revolutionary forces for Albay and Sorsogon, explained the reason for the lack of resistance in Sorsogon in a letter to General Mariano Trias, commanding officer of the Republic's Department of Southern Luzon:

Not a shot has been fired in the province of Sorsogon, which is occupied by the enemy at the present time. The troops have withdrawn to Albay, where they are serving under my immediate orders with the exception of the politico-military governor, Señor Amando Airan, who is in one of the towns of Nueva Caceres sick, so I am informed.<sup>18</sup>

We do not know the exact reason for Airan's decision to abandon the province and offer no resistance. The lack of firepower and the

16. United States National Archives and Records Service, Record Group 94, (hereafter to be cited as USNA, RG #) Entry 187-396223, Adjutant-General's Office, Col. Walter Howe, "Historical Sketch of the 47th Infantry, United States Volunteer Army," pp. 10-11, (hereafter to be cited as "History, 47th").

17. Ibid., pp. 11-14, 18.

18. General Belarmino to Lt. Gen., commander of Southern Luzon, 28 February 1900 in John R.M. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States*, 5 vols. (Pasay City: Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971), vol. 5, p. 180.

size of the American fleet may have made him decide that any form of resistance was futile and that he would save men by retreating inland and joining Belarmino's troops in Albay. In Legazpi, the response to the American landing was different. On 23 January 1900, native troops under Generals Belarmino and Paua, engaged the newly-arrived Americans in fierce combat and hand-to-hand fighting. Only with naval artillery support were the Americans able to occupy Legazpi.<sup>19</sup>

By January's end, Kobbe could happily report that the ports of Sorsogon, Bulan and Donsol, whose storehouses contained an aggregate amount of around 70,000 bales of hemp, were once again open to trade, this time for the benefit of the Americans.<sup>20</sup>

The American troops in Sorsogon province were first met with passive accommodation by the inhabitants, since the revolutionary army had fled the province. Sorsogon town, the capital and commercial center of the province, was spared from any revolutionary encounters since it was to the advantage of both sides, with their vested interests in favor of peace and the resumption of trade, that no confrontations take place in the capital. Secondly, the efforts of Padre Jorge Barlin, who has been described as "instrumental in rallying the people in the maintenance of peace and order went along finely with the combatants, be they Spaniards, Filipinos or Americans, for the benefit of his province," in maintaining order and asking the townspeople to cooperate with the Americans proved to be effective. The Americans set up their provincial headquarters and barracks in Sorsogon town and rented some of the private properties of local principales. They did go on routine reconnaissance missions, many of which turned out to be, in the words of an American soldier, "uneventful sightseeing promenades."<sup>21</sup>

Likewise in Bulan, around 60 kilometers south of the capital, the American captain reported that they had been received in "perfect friendship." The town's *presidente*, Zacarias Asuncion, offered to cooperate with the Americans in maintaining order. The townspeople were only too glad to reopen the port and revive the abaca trade since they had been suffering from a shortage of provisions since the blockade

19. "History, 47th," pp. 12-14; Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 561-62.

20. U. S. War Department, *Annual Report*, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900), vol. 3, pp. 396, 399. (Hereafter to be cited as WDAR, with corresponding year and volume).

21. Domingo Abella, *Bikol Annals*, vol. 1: *The See of Nueva Caceres*, (Manila, 1954), p. 204. See also John Schumacher, S.J., *Revolutionary Clergy: The Filipino Clergy and the Nationalist Movement, 1850-1903* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1981), p. 171; Lininger, *Best War*, p. 116.



of last year. From this post at Bulan, the Americans sent a detachment to Irosin, about 30 kilometers inland where they were also received in friendship.<sup>22</sup>

Only in Donsol was the situation different. The arrival of the Americans precipitated the mass evacuation of the town by its inhabitants led by the *vice-presidente*, Indalecio Hernandez, and the *cura parrocco*, Padre Felipe Orense. The town's presidente, Rodrigo Abitria, some Spaniards and a few Chinese were left behind to deal with the Americans. This force, led by Orense, was composed of around one thousand men but armed with only thirteen rifles. It offered the longest resistance against the Americans in Sorsogon province from January 1900 until the surrender of Orense sometime in July 1901. But their operations fell under the command of Belarmino in Albay, particularly his chief of operations, Colonel Ramon F. Santos of Ligao, Albay.<sup>23</sup>

The first two months of the American occupation in Sorsogon were thus met with passive accommodation, as the inhabitants of the province could do little but accept the American presence and return to the peaceful life they had enjoyed before the outbreak of hostilities.

#### ORGANIZED RESISTANCE AND PRINCIPALIA REACTION

The efforts at organizing resistance in the face of Col. Airan's abandoning the province were led by Lieutenant Colonel Emeterio Funes, a native of Bulusan, and would bear fruit only in March 1900. Little is known of Funes's background, but prior to the American occupation of Sorsogon, he served under General Malvar's command in Batangas. In August 1898, records show him requesting a loan from Apolinario Mabini to help finance an expedition to Camarines to be led by General Vicente Lukban.<sup>24</sup>

By around February 1900, Funes presented himself before Belarmino in Malobago, Albay and received a commission as the overall military commander of Sorsogon, with the power to name the provincial officials under his command. He returned to his hometown, Bulusan, forty kilometers southeast of Sorsogon, organized the revolutionary forces

22. WDAR, 1900, vol. 5, pp. 27-30. The full text of the report translated into Spanish can be found in Elias Ataviado, *Lucha y Libertad*, vol. 2 (Manila: Commonwealth Press, 1941) pp. 147-49.

23. The resistance in Donsol is described in Schumacher, *Revolutionary Clergy*, pp. 168-70 and Ataviado, *Lucha*, vol.2, pp. 46-47, 208-14.

24. Emeterio Funes to Apolinario Mabini, Lucena, 2 Agosto de 1898, *PIR-Revolutionary Leaders*, Box #11.

in the neighboring towns and appointed certain principales as commanders of the different zones of operations. Among them were presidente Eustaquio Diaz for Bulusan, *juez de paz* Esteban Fulay for Barcelona, Victorio Gratela for Matnog, and Dr. Bernardino Monreal, who was chosen *in absentia* as *comandante de sanidad militar*. The town of Juban sent a delegation, composed of Mario Guariña, Leoncio Grajo, Arcadio Gisala, Eugenio Guardian, Padre Domiciano Camu and Monreal to confer with Funes. They agreed to avoid conducting military operations in Juban so as not to arouse American suspicions, but this town and nearby Casiguran would both help supply the needs of the revolutionary forces. Funes set up his headquarters in Judi, a barrio of Gubat. The towns of Barcelona and Bulusan would form the backbone of the resistance while Irosin, Bulan, Sta. Magdalena and Gubat would offer aid when necessary.<sup>25</sup>

The formation of this revolutionary army came to the attention of the Americans in early March when a committee of principales from Bulan, headed by Claro Muyot and escorted by American soldiers, visited Bulusan to reorganize local government under American sponsorship. Since the presidente, Eustaquio Diaz, was now organizing the resistance in the barrios, the vice-presidente Anastacio Camara met with Muyot and was eventually appointed to head the local government. This collaborative effort angered the revolutionaries. A few days later, Diaz and around forty *sandatahanes* appeared in town and accosted the two men. Camara tried to resist and was hacked to death. Muyot was taken prisoner and having been found guilty of treason by the revolutionaries, was executed.<sup>26</sup>

The murder of two of their collaborators was the first time that the Americans had been challenged in these parts of Sorsogon, which hitherto had offered no resistance. It was a case of principales who opted to resist confronting those who had opted to collaborate. The American troops had not yet even been engaged. After that incident at Bulusan, the American forces would continually pursue the members of this revolutionary army for the next few months. The American chronicler summed up the situation thus:

The adjoining country . . . especially that portion lying along the coast of San Bernardino was in a turmoil under the leadership of Funes, (who) maintained for some months a very active opposition to the Americans, necessitating on the part of the Gubat garrison a practically continuous scouting for more than ten months.<sup>27</sup>

25. Ataviado, *Lucha*, vol. 2, pp. 149-51.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

27. "History, 47th," pp. 36-37.

The inability of the Americans to post a garrison at Bulusan made it the nerve-center of Funes's resistance. Late in March 1900, a detachment was sent to garrison the town of Bacon. The Americans now had posts in five towns—Sorsogon, Bulan, Gubat Bacon and Donsol. Funes's revolutionary army would harass the garrisons at Gubat and Bulan, while seeking refuge in the mountainous areas near Bulusan. Meanwhile, the local groups in the revolutionary army would wage their own war with the detachments in Bacon and Donsol. The guerilla campaign had begun.

The revolutionary army had to contend with a better-equipped enemy. But perhaps, a more formidable foe were the principales who refused to support their revolutionary cause and who opted to collaborate with the Americans.

In Bacon, where an American detachment had been set up late in March 1900, the presidente, Cirilo Jimenez, who had been given the rank of lieutenant colonel in Airan's army, did not offer any resistance, but instead, denounced the men who had helped the revolutionaries. Early in April 1900, the relatives of the men who had been imprisoned because of Jimenez's accusations, burned the rice granaries and houses of Jimenez and other local leaders, forcing them to evacuate to Sorsogon under American escort. The reduced number of American soldiers in Bacon led the revolutionaries to plan an attack on the town, to be headed by Captain Valentin San Miguel from Legazpi, whose uncle worked with Funes's headquarters in Jupi, Gubat.

On the morning of 16 April, 400 sandatahanes converged on Bacon. But the Americans had anticipated the attack with the help of their spies, and the small detachment was able to stave off the charge of the rebels. At the end of the brief battle, sixteen rebels had been killed, including Captain San Miguel. Reinforcements of cavalry coming from Sorsogon engaged revolutionary forces under Captain Mariano Dreu in barrio San Roque, on the way to Bacon, and routed them. This was a major setback for the revolutionaries in Bacon.<sup>28</sup>

In the following months, the battle would be a war of words between Captain Mariano Dreu, who was appointed chief of operations in Bacon by Belarmino and Don Ramon Garcia, a Spanish mestizo and ex-gobernadorcillo who was appointed by the Americans as the presidente of Bacon. With a series of circulars, written orders and letters, the two principales competed for the loyalty and support of the citizens of Bacon for their respective causes. The word war ended only on 14 October 1900, when Dreu, Captain Balbino Belmonte and other revo-

28. Ataviado, *Lucha*, pp. 203–7, citing *El Comercio*, 24 Abril 1900; "History, 47th," p. 45.

lutionary officers of Bacon were captured. All revolutionary activity on this front ground to a halt, thanks to the active cooperation of presidente Garcia, who narrowly escaped an assassination attempt one month later.<sup>29</sup>

In Donsol, the recognized leader of the guerilla movement was Padre Felipe Orense, although Indalecio Hernandez held the rank of lieutenant colonel in the revolutionary army. After evacuating the town upon the arrival of the Americans in January 1900, the revolutionaries succeeded in attacking the American detachment several times and burning the town and barrios before retreating into the mountains. In the ensuing months, the Americans tried to lure the population to return to the town. In his proclamation to the citizens of Donsol dated 24 January 1900, Major Hugh Wise, post commander, stressed that the Americans had come to protect them so that they could resume the peaceful pursuit of their occupations. He emphasized that Aguinaldo's government had ceased to exist and that it would be foolhardy to engage the Americans in combat. He then requested the townspeople to return to their homes.<sup>30</sup>

For this purpose, he solicited the help of the town's presidente, Rodrigo Abitria. The revolutionaries, in an anonymous letter, denounced Abitria's collaborative efforts and labeled him "Al espia Americanista," a traitor to the Republic.<sup>31</sup> By late August, Wise reported that efforts to resume trade were yielding results. A large quantity of abaca, copra and vegetables had been brought into town and sold and former residents were gradually returning to their homes.<sup>32</sup>

The Americans intensified their operations against the revolutionaries after November 1900 and they captured Jovellar, the lone upland town that the revolutionaries held and which had served as Belarmino's headquarters. In January 1901, they blockaded Burias and Ticao passes, and within a month, captured Burias island, depriving the rebels of a source of food.<sup>33</sup>

A last-ditch offensive by Belarmino's troops was launched in May 1901 when they attacked Donsol, but the rebels were repulsed. Finally

29. Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 380-86, citing documents from PIR, SD, Box 20, document no. 594.1; Box PR 182: Sorsogon; Box AN-108; see pp. 514-15, footnotes nos. 74-81 for individual titles; "Report of Operations: Sorsogon," USNA, RG 395, Entry 5318.

30. Maj. Hugh Wise, "Proclamación: A los habitantes de Donsol," 24 January 1900, in USNA, RG 395, entry 3671: Letters Received, Donsol.

31. (n.a.) "Al espía americanista Rodrigo Abitria," in USNA, RG 395, Entry 3671: Letters Received, Donsol, Box #1.

32. "Report of Operations: Donsol," USNA, RG 395 Entry 5318.

33. Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 402-3, citing PIR-RL Box 17: Papers of Ramon Santos.

on 4 July 1901, Belarmino, almost blind, surrendered to the Americans. On the 14th, Santos and his troops, presumably including Padre Orense, also surrendered. With that, organized resistance in Albay ended. The Donsol army gained the distinction of having been the last revolutionary group in Sorsogon to capitulate to the Americans.<sup>34</sup>

The guerilla campaign in Bulusan and the neighboring towns on the southwestern coasts of Sorsogon took on a different character. Not all the inhabitants left the *poblacion* or retreated to the mountains. Some prominent principales preferred the American presence and sought their protection from the revolutionary forces. This can be seen in a letter of June 1900 from Rafael Hernandez, former *juez delegado de justicia* of Gubat and twenty-two others, addressed to the military governor of the Philippines:

We . . . are all owners of lots of land within the jurisdiction of this town, the products of which are rice, coconut and hemp . . . These properties had to be abandoned on 3 March 1900, the date of rupture of hostilities in this neighborhood, the owners having found themselves forced to recur to the American detachment stationed in the town for protection. The result was . . . the insurgents reaped harvests of rice, coconut, hemp and ate our cattle . . .

It is our wish to attend personally to the cultivation of our land, but we are unable to do so, fearing to be captured by the insurgents . . .

If this situation lasts much longer, we will be obliged to ask for help even for the simplest necessities of life. All of the hemp in stock was sold as well as what is being produced now in the towns of Casiguran and Sorsogon . . .

Matters will probably continue so while these insurgents thrive and are able to obtain money and rice from this source unless it is prevented by the American forces. We therefore beg that your excellency will consider our situation and that measures may be adopted to put a stop to this robbery.<sup>35</sup>

Sensing the willingness of these principales to cooperate with the pacification effort, the Americans solicited their support in exacting contributions for the formation of a native police force to patrol the town and monitor the presence of these "insurgents." The most generous contributor and collector of funds was Rafael Hernandez, who in October 1900 furnished a list of the amounts donated by

34. Schumacher, *Revolutionary Clergy*, p. 170. The campaign in Donsol is recounted by Agustin Aguilar in "Reminiscencias de un revolucionario," in *An Parabeta*, 25 January, 1 February, 8 February 1939, copies available in the University of Nueva Cáceres Museum, Naga City.

35. Rafael Hernandez, et. al., to Military Governor, 24 June 1900, USNA, RG 395, Entry 3804: Letters Received, Gubat.

businessmen and merchants in Gubat, mostly Chinese and some his relatives, for the maintenance of a police force.<sup>36</sup>

In Sorsogon, although most principales did not join the revolutionary ranks, some of them supported the cause with financial contributions. But some of them did the same for the Americans. In October 1900, Colonel Howe appointed Tomas Martinez, "who has shown himself devoted to our interest by his acts" as presidente of Sorsogon, to replace Hugo Nicolas who tendered his resignation on account of ill health, and according to Howe, "whose loyalty to the United States has been strongly suspected by me."<sup>37</sup> The significance of this change became apparent in early 1901, when members of an alleged "insurgent committee" tasked with collecting contributions for the revolutionary cause were arrested and imprisoned by the Americans. Among them were Bernardino Monreal, Justino Bautista, Pedro Duran and Nicolas.<sup>38</sup>

Meanwhile, sometime in March 1901, Martinez appealed for an increase in the rent of the property owned by him and occupied by the Forty-seventh Infantry as barracks. The Americans were paying \$100 a month, which according to Martinez, was barely half of the rental value compared to the prices of other buildings. Colonel Howe endorsed Martinez's request, noting that the latter "has devoted a great deal of time and energy in our interests." Howe cited the fact that Martinez lost a house worth \$5000 in March 1900 when it was burned by some natives allegedly under the orders of the revolutionaries. Sadly for Martinez, higher command disapproved the increase because the garrison in Sorsogon had already been greatly reduced. Martinez lost an apparently good opportunity to do good business with the Americans.<sup>39</sup>

Owen's observation about the native response to the American campaign in Albay also holds true for Sorsogon, that the most active collaborators were mostly "ordinary principales and peasants who had more to gain from association with the Americans."<sup>40</sup>

36. Rafael Hernandez, "Relación de los comerciantes que han dado contribucion para el sostenimiento del cuerpo de Policia de este pueblo correspondiente al presente mes," 31 de Octubre de 1900 in *USNA*, RG 395 Entry 3809: Letters Received, Gubat.

37. Col. Walter Howe to Hugo Nicolas, 3 October 1900 in *USNA*, RG 395, Entry 5311: Letters Sent, Sorsogon, vol. 1. Howe to Adjutant-General, 26 March 1901, entry 5134: Sorsogon, Document File.

38. *USNA*, RG 395, Entry 5322.

39. Tomas Martinez to Assistant Adjutant General, 23 March 1901, *USNA* RG 395, Entry 5314: Sorsogon, Document File. See attached letter of disapproval dated 17 April 1901.

40. Owen, "War in Albay," p. 565.

The most stubborn resistance on this front occurred in November 1900 at Capangihan, a cave along the slope of Mount Bulusan known as "el batteria." From this strongly fortified positions on the the brow of a precipitous cliff, the revolutionaries fired upon American patrols in the rice fields below. It took the Americans and reinforcements from Bulan and Gubat nearly two days to neutralize this position. On 21 November, the Americans were finally able to make their way up the cliff and chase the revolutionaries away from this stronghold. No further attempts would be made by the revolutionaries to use the natural advantages of this position.<sup>41</sup>

By the end of 1900, operations temporarily ceased because of the rains. In December, General Jasper Bell, who had been appointed in March as commander for southeastern Luzon, landed 100 fresh troops in Matnog to relieve the Forty-seventh Infantry there. He immediately hired native police to assist them as guides, offering them attractive salaries. By January 1901, he issued an order saying that when "insurgents" voluntarily surrender their arms, they should immediately be released and paid \$30 Mexican for the gun.<sup>42</sup> The difficult conditions in resisting and the attractive incentives for surrendering would make many a revolutionary in Sorsogon rethink his decision to resist the Americans.

Two other factors were crucial in breaking the backbone of organized resistance. One was the capture of Dr. Bernardino Monreal on 20 January 1901, for allegedly financing the revolutionary cause. Colonel Howe insisted that Monreal was the "leading spirit in conducting the finances of the insurgency" and that he was said to be in correspondence with both the "junta in Hongkong and Madrid." The papers found in his room led to the arrests of other prominent principales and the filing of charges before a military commission.<sup>43</sup>

The other factor was the organization of the *Partido Federal* in Sorsogon.

#### THE FEDERAL PARTY

The initiative to create conditions for a workable peace between the Americans and the revolutionaries once again came from the principales of Sorsogon and even from the native clergy. Fr. John

41. Ibid., pp. 363-68; "History, 47th," pp. 53-56; "Report of Operations: Sorsogon," USNA, RG 395, Entry 5318: Document File.

42. WDAR, 1901, p. 326; Assistant Adjutant General to Commanding General, 3rd District, Nueva Cáceres, 3 January 1901, USNA, RG 395, Entry 5314: Box 1, Document File.

43. "Report of Operations: Sorsogon," USNA RG 395, Entry 5318.

Schumacher, S.J. has pointed out that although resistance in Albay and Sorsogon was largely influenced by the native clergy, as in the case of Padre Orense, the decision to cooperate with the Americans was also an idea which the clergy would later advocate.<sup>44</sup> The eventual surrender of the revolutionaries began with this incident described by an American captain in Bulan:

On January 27 (1901), Casiano Vera, the priest of this town, preached a strong sermon to a large congregation. His sermon dealt with the existing condition of affairs in the province. He urged the people to use all the influence in their power to bring about a speedy peace; to assist the American authorities to apprehend all persons who are acting as agitators and disturbers of the peace. On Monday, thirty-five of the leading citizens of Bulan and its barrios held a meeting in the tribunal and organized a branch of the Federal Party. The meeting then adjourned and in a body visited these headquarters, and one and all signed the oath of allegiance. The alcalde, the justice of the peace, the priest, and the schoolmaster were in this party and subscribed to the oath of allegiance.<sup>45</sup>

On 18 February 1901, Rufino Geron, presidente of Bulan and other members of the newly-formed Federal party traveled to Irosin and spoke before a large crowd, citing the benefits of opting for peace and that further resistance was useless. When the American lieutenant announced that they would offer protection to those who took the oath of allegiance, over 800 males over eighteen years of age, promised their allegiance by evening of that day. In the next two days, 200 more took the oath, among them some revolutionaries who had grown tired of resisting. The Federalistas sent communications to Col. Funes, inviting him to discuss the possibility of surrender. Within a day, Funes replied that he wanted Geron to speak to his men before they turn themselves in.<sup>46</sup>

On 21 February 1901, at around 4:00 p.m., Col. Funes came marching into the convent at Irosin with thirty-four officers. Among them were local presidentes Victorio Gratela of Matnog, Zacarias Conspecto of Irosin and Eustaquio Diaz of Bulusan, 23 riflemen and 113 bolomen. Funes certified that he was in supreme command of the revolutionary forces in Sorsogon and his surrender included all the officers under his command. Funes expressed a desire to participate in the celebration of George Washington's birthday the following day. So on the 22nd, Funes's command, escorted by the Irosin detachment, marched

44. For an analysis of the role of the native clergy in Sorsogon during the revolution, see Schumacher, *Revolutionary Clergy*, pp. 171-72; see also Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 404-14.

45. WDAR, 1901, I, pt. 5, p. 421 quoted in Schumacher, *Revolutionary Clergy*, p. 172.

46. Ibid., pp. 435-36.



into Bulan where they were met by Captain Charles MacLain, post commander, and members of the Federal Party who were on horseback and in carriages. The entire procession entered the church and a *Te Deum* was chanted by Fr. Casiano de Vera, after which, Funes surrendered the firearms in his command's possession. MacLain remarked, "The Federal Party of Bulan deserves credit for this work . . . this surrender will bring all armed insurrection to an end."<sup>47</sup> Subsequent events would however prove him wrong.

Actually, a larger group of revolutionaries headed by Major Esteban Pulay of Barcelona surrendered in Gubat on 3 March 1901. In this group were 64 officers and 265 soldiers, but they were armed only with 2 rifles and 7 revolvers. Most of them were bolomen and residents of Barcelona and the barrios of Gubat. Among them was a second lieutenant who would lead the continued resistance in Sorsogon a few months later—Antonio Colache.<sup>48</sup>

For some of the revolutionaries, taking the oath of allegiance was an expedient way to avoid being pursued by the Americans. But living up to it was another matter. Later in the year, Funes was arrested for breaking the oath of allegiance, and charges of robbery and murder, committed during the revolutionary campaign in 1900, were filed against him. The outcome of the trial is unknown. Funes lived only until 1909. But the behavior he displayed as a former revolutionary would be followed by the likes of Antonio Colache. Meanwhile, other principales were busy reorganizing the government to assure themselves of a place in the new colonial set-up.<sup>49</sup>

On 7 April 1901, Col. Howe directed all post commanders of the detachments at Donsol, Bacon, Gubat, Matnog, and Bulan to notify the local presidentes of each municipality of the intended visit of the Philippine Commission to the province on April 28, and that all officials and leading citizens of the different towns should assemble in Sorsogon on the said date to participate in the session.<sup>50</sup>

47. Ibid.; see also the report of Capt. Charles MacLain, 47th Inf., U.S.V., 25 February 1901 in *PIR-Box AN-114* and *USNA RG 395*, Entry 5314: Box 1, Document File, Letter of MacLain to Adjutant, 47th Inf., 22 February 1901.

48. "Report of Operations: Gubat," March, 1901, *USNA RG 395*, Entry 3808; and "List of Insurgent Officers and Men who took the Oath of Allegiance," *USNA*, RG 395, Entry 3810.

49. See the following letters in *USNA*, RG 395, Entry 5311: Letters Sent, Sorsogon—1902, letters # 21, 40, 99, 110, 112; also Entry 5313: Letters Received, Sorsogon-1902, letters # 23, 73, 74, 114, 218. The case of an insurgent officer, Mariano Flores being arrested and executed for the crime of murder can be found in *USNA*, RG 395, Entry 5311.

50. Col. Howe to Commander, Donsol, 7 April 1901, *USNA RG 395*, Entry 5311, Letters Sent: Sorsogon, vol. 1, p. 13.

The Commission arrived on 30 April, two days late, after having been to Tacloban, Albay, and Nueva Caceres, for the purpose of organizing provincial governments. It was headed by William H. Taft and accompanied by Dr. Trinidad Pardo de Tavera of the Federal Party. D.R. Williams, who accompanied the Commission on its trip, described their arrival in Sorsogon:

We are two days behind schedule and the elaborate preparations prepared (sic) by the townspeople had suffered from rain and storm. They felt quite badly about it, as also that many who had come to meet us were unable to remain. We found the temper of the people very different from that encountered in Nueva Caceres. Here there is a splendid set of officers, who have the respect and confidence of the entire community. The province is completely pacified and it is said that an American can pass unmolested through any part of it. Our reception was enthusiastic, the only drawback being the place of meeting, which was close (sic) and hot.<sup>51</sup>

The Commission was present to implement the Provincial Government Code, Act No. 83, enacted in February 1901, which provided for the establishment of civil government in provinces where peace had been restored. It called for the creation of a provincial board, composed of a governor, a treasurer and a supervisor. The Commission later held sessions in different provinces, assisted by the Federalistas, who expounded on the benefits of cooperating with the Americans.<sup>52</sup>

Interestingly, the first matter discussed in the meeting was the salaries of the incoming provincial officials. Leon Paras, presidente of Sorsogon, asked that similar salaries be paid to the officials of Sorsogon and Albay. But upon being presented with data that Albay's population was twice that of Sorsogon and the latter's revenues were much lower, Paras settled for the same salary levels as the province of Tayabas. The actual salaries granted were slightly higher, and Paras ended up being chosen as the provincial secretary, with an annual salary of \$1200.<sup>53</sup>

51. Daniel Williams, *The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission* (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and Co., 1913), pp. 242-43.

52. Michael Cullinane, "Implementing the New Order: The Structure and Supervision of Local Government During the Taft Era," in Norman Owen, ed., *Compadre Colonialism: Philippine-American Relations, 1898-1946*, (University of Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, 1971), p. 19; see also Peter Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States 1899-1921*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 75.

53. *Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*, (Government Printing Office, 1901), 1901, part II, pp. 185-86 (hereafter to be cited as *RPC*, with corresponding year and page number).

A controversial proposal was the suggestion to transfer the capital from Sorsogon to Casiguran. Both had good ports, but no provincial buildings. Sorsogon had a larger population, around 12,000, compared to Casiguran's 9000. When the proposal was put to a vote among the *presidentes*, a tie resulted. The Commission decided, on consultation with Col. Howe, not to interfere with the status quo and to keep Sorsogon as the capital. With regard to the officers, the Commission claimed that though they often appointed a native for governor, they had received numerous petitions to select an American instead until the next elections in February 1902. The following were appointed: Captain J.G. Livingston, Forty-seventh Infantry, governor; Leon Paras, secretary; Captain E.W. Terry, treasurer; Patricio Bailon, fiscal; and Lieutenant George Purington, supervisor. The bill organizing Sorsogon into a province under Act No. 124 was unanimously approved and the officials then took their oath. Dr. Pardo de Tavera capped the session with an address, citing the mutual benefits to be gained by supporting the Americans.<sup>54</sup>

A new civil government under American control, but composed of the same cast of *principales*, had been established. Consequently, a Constabulary force of 150 natives under First Class Inspector Wilfred Turnbull was organized on 30 August 1901. The Forty-seventh Infantry pulled out by May 1901 and was relieved by the Fifteenth Infantry. But the armed insurrection which the Americans hoped had ended was not yet over.<sup>55</sup>

#### ACTIVE COLLABORATION IN THE COLACHE CAMPAIGN

The new provincial government had hardly buckled down to work when it had to contend with a phenomenon that had arisen in many provinces in the Philippines,—prolonged armed resistance by bands of former "insurgents" even after the surrender of organized revolutionary armies. These bands were often led by ex-officers, but of minor rank, and composed of non-*principales* and residents of rural areas. The Americans downplayed this form of resistance, citing the absence of an enlightened leadership, and dismissed it merely as the fanaticism of "ignorant" elements in society labelling members of these groups as bandits, thieves, or *ladrones*.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 186–87. The text of Act # 124: An Act extending the provisions of the provincial government act to the province of Sorsogon, is found in *Public-Laws and Resolutions: United States Philippine Commission*, vol. 1, pp. 266–67. Act # 83: Provincial Government is found on pp. 168–77.

55. *RPC*, 1902, part III, p. 205; History, 47th, p. 66.

In Sorsogon, these bands of "ladrones" began appearing in the southern portions of the province in September 1901, six months after Funes's surrender. They are described by an American lieutenant thus:

... workmen in Irosin are taking refuge in the towns because of the activities of "ladrones" ... a fanatical craze among certain classes of people about Irosin called "anting-anting," the belief prevailing among victims of this excitement is that the wearing on the forehead and in the mouth of small pieces of paper bearing signs and crosses renders them immune to American bullets ... when (we) encountered parties of the fanatics, each held a dagger in the left hand, a bolo in the right and around the head was a hanky with "anting-anting" inside and a charmed piece of writing in their mouth ... a native styling himself Jesus Christ, accompanied by a woman impersonating the Virgin Mary were originators of this fanaticism ... they sold the papers at ₱2.00 each.<sup>56</sup>

These members of the "anting-anting" apparently belonged to a secret society formed by a Tagalog, Francisco de la Cruz, who had, as early as April 1901, gathered nearly four hundred adherents in and around the slopes of Mount Bulusan. They raided the barrios of Irosin and Bulan occasionally, the same sites of Funes's guerilla campaign, from September to October, until De la Cruz was captured on 6 November 1901.<sup>57</sup> But his capture did not bring an end to the movement. In his report, the Constabulary Inspector stated that De la Cruz was "a man of very low intellect, little above that of an animal and cannot write his name." De la Cruz pointed to an Isaac Gimao as the real commander, who affixed the former's name on the orders and used him as a scapegoat. De la Cruz's capture was just the tip of an iceberg. The constabulary chief expressed these forebodings:

It may seem strange that a hostile body of this proportion could organize and virtually take control of a section of the province without the knowledge of the authorities ... once the mysterious contagion gains a few converts in a barrio, it will sweep through it like an epidemic and the whole barrio will go over to the standard of the fanatics, and it seems that nothing short of gunpower will disillusion them after once becoming a convert to the mysteries of "anting-anting."<sup>58</sup>

Isaac Gimao and Antonio Colache, the ex-second lieutenant in Funes's army, reorganized the followers of De la Cruz in the vicinity of Bulusan and continued to sap the energies of the authorities the following year.

56. WDAR, 1902, pp. 373-74.

57. Ibid., pp. 378-79; see also Luis Dery, "Bicol Bulwark," *Filipino Heritage*, 10 vols. (Manila: Lahing Filipino Publishing Inc., 1978). vol. 8, pp. 2202-2207.

58. RPC, 1902, part I, p. 206.

On 3 March 1902, Dr. Bernardino Monreal was elected governor of Sorsogon, the first native to hold the position under American rule. A native of Daraga, Albay, he was municipal physician of Malabon, Rizal at the outbreak of the revolution. Believed to have been involved in financing the revolution, he was imprisoned during the early months of 1901 and was conspicuously absent during the meeting with the Philippine Commission.<sup>59</sup>

Colonel Howe, commanding officer of the American troops in Sorsogon, believed that Monreal was "one of the worst men in this province during the insurrection." But his fellow officers believed otherwise. Major Cornish, who replaced Howe in mid-1901, endorsed the request for Monreal's release, citing the fact that the latter was "an influential man in this community and if friendly, capable of using it to our advantage."<sup>60</sup>

Likewise, Captain Livingston, the provincial governor of Sorsogon, commented that Monreal, although at one time an "insurgent sympathizer," did not commit any specific acts against the American government, and therefore, should be released. Thus, on 26 June 1901, the man suspected of being the "financial backer" of the revolutionaries was released. He would become one of the most active collaborators of the Americans in the pacification campaign against Antonio Colache.<sup>61</sup>

In March 1902, Colache's men attacked the police force of Bulusan, killing a sergeant. The Constabulary chief dispatched a group of native soldiers to pursue them but this group was also ambushed on the road between Barcelona and Bulusan by around one hundred "bolo-wielding fanatics," who killed the three policemen in this manner:

... beginning from the toes to the top of their head, there was not an inch of body which had not been cut or hacked by a bolo. All joints of the legs and arms had been unjointed and the stomach laid open, leaving the frame hanging together by mere strips of flesh.<sup>62</sup>

The American authorities were alarmed. There were around two hundred of these "anting-anting" in the hills disturbing the towns of

59. Ataviado, *Lucha*, vol. 2, pp. 150-51; Jose, *Facts*, p. 33.

60. Col. Walter Howe to Adjutant-General, Department of Southern Luzon, 20 April 1901, USNA RG 395, Entry 5311: Letters Sent, Sorsogon, vol. 1, p. 26, LS # 63; Major Geo A. Cornish to Adjutant-General, 22 May 1901, USNA RG 395, Entry 5311: Letters Sent, Sorsogon, vol. 1, p. 36, LS # 97.

61. Captain J.G. Livingston to Adjutant-General, 18 June 1901, USNA RG 395, Entry 5314: Document File, Sorsogon, 1901, Box 1, LR # 192.

62. RPC, 1902, part I, p. 207.

Bulusan, Barcelona, Gubat, Casiguran and Sta. Magdalena. Realizing the widespread support for Colache among the population, Inspector Harvey Nevill sought the help of Monreal in planning a systematic campaign against the "anting-anting." Monreal organized a committee on public order, headed by Rufino Gerona, former presidente of Bulan and the current president of the Federal Party in Sorsogon. The committee decided to deploy a cordon of native volunteers around the affected areas, suspend work within the cordon and reconcentrate the people in the nearby towns. The Constabulary could then pursue the "ladrones" within the cordon while depriving them of their support from the native populace. A contingent of 450 men from the towns of Sorsogon, Gubat and Bacon was raised to man the cordon.<sup>63</sup>

By 15 April 1902, a cordon was formed across Sorsogon town from barrio Abuyog in the west to Buenavista in the east. Another extended from Bulusan to Irosin and from Irosin to Casiguran. Meanwhile, Colache consolidated his position in the deserted barrios of Sta. Barbara, San Isidro and Sta. Cruz, near Bulusan. In four days, the cordon was completed and the drive against Colache began. For the next month, Constabulary men pursued Colache's forces. It was a short, but nonetheless taxing, campaign. Some principales, like Rufino Gerona and Esteban Fulay, former major in Funes's army and *juez de paz* in Barcelona, had taken to the field. By mid-May, the native troops swooped down on a Colache camp in the mountains west of Sta. Barbara and captured some of his men, his correspondence and the rolls of his organization. After this date, the "ladrones" lost all resemblance of an organized force. Only Colache and five others remained at large.<sup>64</sup>

By this time, Nevill had dismissed the volunteers and employed spies to locate Colache's whereabouts. In four days, he was spotted at Taloanga, near Sta. Magdalena. At 3:00 a.m. of 25 May, an expeditionary column headed by Gerona struck the camp and captured Colache, his wife and daughter, Isaac Gimao and three followers. The campaign which lasted for fifty-six days and netted around 250 prisoners proved to be successful with the active cooperation of Sorsogon's principales and native volunteers.<sup>65</sup>

The Constabulary chief was all praises for Gov. Monreal, whom he hailed as "efficient, unbiased and conscientious . . . who took the field himself in the cause of law and order, and left nothing undone which

63. *Ibid.*, p. 208, 1903, part I, p. 917.

64. The Colache campaign is described in *RPC*, 1902, part I, pp. 208-10; see also Dery, "Sorsogon," pp. 415-22.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 209-10.

would aid the senior inspector in putting down the petty insurrection."<sup>66</sup> Monreal was also active in capturing the remnants of Colache's band who continued their activities throughout 1902: Mariano Guiriba in Pilar, Francisco Espocia in Sta. Magdalena and Esteban Diño in Bulusan.<sup>67</sup>

Governor Monreal's pivotal role in the successful campaign against Colache was but a prelude to and a fine example of the kind of cooperation that the principales of Sorsogon would extend to the Americans with the establishment of a new order.

#### THE PRINCIPALIA AND THE POLICY OF PACIFICATION

In retrospect, one can describe the principalia response to the pacification campaign in Sorsogon during the years 1900-1903 as a process of passive accommodation, organized resistance, then active collaboration. Norman Owen characterized the Bicol campaign in this manner:

The 1900-1901 campaign, therefore, was marked not only by an unhurried American offensive, a defensive strategy by the revolutionaries and a mutual respect for the rules of war, but also by an unofficial economic symbiosis offering certain advantages to each side. As a result, the Americans had time to demonstrate to wavering Bicolanos that their rule was tolerable and potentially beneficent. . . . the Americans did not attempt to exterminate all Filipinos who surrendered or enslave them or force them to convert to Protestantism. . . .

By mid-1900, those who hoped for the restoration of some kind of civil order had nowhere to look but to the Americans.<sup>68</sup>

This article has shown that the pacification policy or the promise to restore civil order became an attractive option for the principales of Sorsogon, especially those whose properties had been damaged or confiscated because of the guerilla campaign of Funes. Realizing the potential of benefiting from an American-controlled set-up, many principales shifted their loyalties to the American cause by late 1900. By 1901 they had formed the Federal Party in Sorsogon to negotiate Funes's surrender.

Faced with this setback, the revolutionaries, who probably felt that the goals of the revolution had not yet been fulfilled, had to reorganize their armies and seek new leaders, as their former leaders had

66. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

67. *RPC*, 1903, part I, pp. 916-18.

68. Owen, "War in Albay," pp. 577-78.

already capitulated to the Americans. Owen says that they now had to "recruit leadership from further and further down the socio-economic scale."<sup>69</sup> Hence, the emergence of Antonio Colache, Isaac Gimao and Francisco de la Cruz, whose backgrounds are obscure. The available evidence shows that Colache served as a second lieutenant in Funes's army and surrendered in Gubat in March 1901, with Major Fulay's forces. He took the oath of allegiance, retired to barrio San Isidro in Bulusan, conducted a small hemp business, but soon ran into debt, so he "resorted to banditry."<sup>70</sup>

When Colache began his campaign, this time, the principales of Sorsogon led by Monreal, Gerona and even Major Fulay, Colache's superior in the army, actively supported the pacification drive against them. This reaction was common in many provinces in the Philippines, especially after Aguinaldo's capture in 1901. Reynaldo Iletto explains:

... members of the Filipino elite ... found it to their advantage to collaborate in the American campaign of "pacification," ... These individuals could pursue their tasks with hardly any feelings of guilt or pangs of conscience because of the myth, created by the Declaration of the "Bandolerismo Act" in 1902, that all remaining "troublemakers" in the new colonial order were plain bandits or "ladrones". ... It was easy for educated or propertied Filipinos to accept the bandit myth because the Katipunans that rose after 1901 were composed of "ordinary" people and led by ... "men lacking in social status and intelligence."<sup>71</sup>

The principales of Sorsogon reacted in this manner because as Michael Cullinane put it, "by preserving the peace and order, they were also preserving the traditional system which gave them support."<sup>72</sup> They knew that when the smoke of the revolution and rebellion cleared, the reorganization that would follow would result in their occupying positions of leadership in the new colonial government, positions they once held during the Spanish regime.

In effect, what determined the Sorsogon *principalia's* response to the American occupation in their province was not so much their adherence to the revolutionary cause, but their assessment of the pragmatic gains to be achieved by either accommodation, resistance or collaboration. The moment they realized that the first two options would not succeed, they enthusiastically embraced the third response.

69. Ibid., p. 568.

70. RPC, 1902, part I, p. 206; see also footnote 48 above.

71. Reynaldo Iletto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979), pp. 210-12.

72. Cullinane, "Implementing the New Order," p. 24.