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Lydia N. Yu Jose

This article examines in broad strokes three major areas of Philippines-Japan relations: (1) exchange of goods, (2) movement of peoples, and (3) transmission of ideas. The second of these is the most intense, viewed in the context of Japan's Asian interest. Because peoples are not only subjects of state policies but are non-state actors as well, it is argued that their impact on bilateral relations must be equal to, if not more significant than, the impact of state actors. The current movement of Filipinos to Japan is heavier than the movement of Japanese to the Philippines. Filipinos in Japan have not only influenced some Japanese, but have also brought Japanese ideas and culture to the Philippines. These Filipinos may define the future shape of social and cultural relations between the two countries.

KEYWORDS: foreign policy; non-state actors; immigration; trade; tourism; Pan-Asianism

This article aims first to find out which area of the relationship between Japan and the Philippines has been most intense: Is it in the area of trade, transmission of ideas, or movement of people? The second aim is to find out the directional flow of this relationship: whether it is one-way or two-way, and whether the flow is predominantly from Japan to the Philippines, or the other way around.

It has long been recognized that actors in international relations are not only states, but also non-states, such as multinational companies, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and individuals (reputable personalities, businessmen, tourists, refugees, immigrants, and other individuals, high and low) (Papp 1997, 114-19). This

concept is most relevant in the present age of globalization, migration of peoples across national borders, and international marriages, to name only a few movements and developments. Import and export of goods by overseas residents through unconventional means such as huge *balikbayan* boxes (often checked-in by traveling Filipinos) take place side by side with the more conventional trade. Foreign currency transfer through "padala" (asking a traveling person to bring money to someone back home) happens along with the official bank transfers and remittances. Intellectual exchanges through foreign professionals and students and cultural exchanges through expatriates, overseas workers, foreign spouses, and the like take place side by side with the more institutionalized state-to-state cultural programs. Even individuals who do not go abroad get exposed to foreign cultures through the mass media. This occurs side by side with official cultural policies of states.

Nonetheless, states have retained monopoly of foreign policy formulation. Moreover, when problems arise from interactions among non-state actors, the state inevitably gets involved. For example, it is the responsibility of a foreign embassy to represent an overseas worker whose rights have been violated, regardless of whether the alleged violator is a state or a non-state actor, such as an employer or a customer of an entertainer. Hence, in spite of the recognition that non-state actors play a role in international relations, scholars and academics still tend to focus on the state.

Because of this preoccupation with the state—defined as a group of people occupying a definite territory, with a system of government and enjoying sovereignty—international relations of colonies tend to be neglected. Colonies are not sovereign and do not have the power to make policies, much less foreign policies. Such tendency leads to a further bias against studies on foreign relations of colonies. However, during the colonial period, while colonial powers formulated foreign policies concerning and in behalf of their colonies, individuals under them did have "international relations."

A case in point is the relationship between the Philippines and Japan. Before World War II, Japan, as a sovereign state, had the power to formulate and carry out policies, including foreign policies. The Philippines was not sovereign and did not have the power to make and carry out any policy. As a result, the pre-World War II relationship

between Japan and the Philippines was, in theory but not in fact, a relationship between Japan and Spain during the Spanish period, and between Japan and the United States (U.S.) during the American period. But, indeed, close and exciting interactions between Filipinos and Japanese flourished in the pre-World War II period. Between the end of World War II and the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 8 September 1951, Japan was ruled by the Allies through Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). MacArthur conducted foreign policy in behalf of occupied Japan. However, even during this short period, interactions between Filipino and Japanese non-state actors were not lacking.

Even in the postcolonial period, focus on the state has always been a delimiting concept because the focus is not on any state but on big powers. International relations of small states do not get as much attention as the policies of big states. When small states have significant relations with big states, studies about this relationship often revolve around the policies of the big states, eclipsing the policy, if any, of the small states. This kind of bias is problematic, because a state may be small, but the actions of its citizens—the non-state actors—may have an impact on numerous aspects of national and international affairs.

For example, since the 1960s even if Japan and the Philippines have been both sovereign states, there has been more focus on Japan than on the Philippines because the former is an economic power while the Philippines is not. The focus continues to be imbalanced and has intensified since the 1980s, when Japan embarked on a more active policy of exporting its culture abroad. Even the Japan-Philippines cultural festival held every February and March is not a celebration of the cultures of both countries.¹ It puts stress on Japanese movies, artists, arts and crafts, seminars on Japanese education, how to study in Japan, and other things about the country.

Exchange of Goods and Peoples, Transmission of Ideas

While it is true that international studies focus more on Japan than on the Philippines because Japan is more powerful than the latter, an

unequal relationship need not and has not entirely resulted in an unequal scholarship on it. The existing body of literature on Philippines-Japan relations, especially those about pre-World War II relations, contains accounts of both Japanese and Filipino activities, of state and non-state actors. Due to the economic power that Japan has attained in the post World War II and post Cold War periods, there have been many studies on Japan's policy regarding aid and investments to, and trade with the Philippines, but there is no lack of studies on Filipino overseas workers, Filipino wives of Japanese, Filipino students, and other non-state actors.²

The existing body of literature, however, does not present a general picture of the relationship between the two countries. Each academic piece is a detailed study of specific aspects of Philippines-Japan relations. Grant K. Goodman, for example, wrote numerous articles and monographs about the Japanese immigration to the Philippines in the 1930s, professorial exchanges, Filipino students in Japan during World War II, Artemio Ricarte in Japan, and many more.³ Equally, if not more, numerous are books and articles on the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines. For the post World War II period, various articles have been written about Philippines-Japan trade, Japanese investments and aid in the Philippines, cultural relations, overseas Filipino workers, Filipino brides in Japan, and many other topics. These works show the trees in the forest, but not the forest itself.

This article presents the forest, not the trees. It constructs a paradigm consisting of three major areas of most bilateral relationships, namely, goods, ideas, and people, on one hand, and the two categories of actors, namely, states and non-state actors, on the other.

"Goods" include export and import items. "People" are individuals or natural persons who are not in official positions to represent the state. They have roles—such as being an immigrant, a foreign student, a trader, or a consumer—and, as such, may or may act in accordance with state policies, but do not make or implement them. People, aside from being a major area of relations among nations, are also actors. They are non-state actors. "Ideas" include anything that are not included in "goods" and "people." They include those intangible precepts, images, concepts, beliefs, thoughts, notions, tenets, doctrines, culture, and

ideologies that may accompany transmission of goods and movement of peoples. In this article, "ideas" is used interchangeably with these intangible concepts.

In this paradigm, states make and carry out trade, cultural, and migration policies, and formulate and propagate ideologies. On the other hand, non-state actors such as manufacturers, traders, consumers, financiers, or middlemen play a role in the transmission of goods. They may also directly or indirectly, deliberately or unconsciously, play roles as transmitters of ideas, cultural traits, and values. Moreover, as illustrated in the matrix, non-state actors are not only actors in international relations. They are also people being acted upon. To illustrate, immigration policy (state action) affects people, and people as non-state actors affect the increase or decrease of immigration. Successful immigrants attract prospective immigrants. Those who are known to be failures have an opposite effect.

Matrix: Roles of state and non-state actors in areas of bilateral relations

Areas	Actors	
	State	Non-State (People)
Goods	trade policy	traders' efforts, consumers' tastes, etc.
Ideas	ideologies, cultural policy, etc.	observers' admiration, etc.
Peoples	migration policy	informal, direct, and indirect enticement

It must be stressed that this paradigm, as illustrated in the matrix, is a model, a simplified representation of the actual. Hence, while there are still other areas, goods, ideas, and people are the major areas in bilateral relations. The model does not and cannot account for everything that makes up the relationship between Japan and the Philippines. Investments and aid from Japan, for instance, may be grouped under "goods," but they are not included in the paradigm, largely because they are not a two-way relationship. Investments and aid come mainly, if not only, from Japan; the Philippines hardly invests or gives aid to Japan. Security concerns are also an important part of foreign relations, but in the case of both Japan and the Philippines this is more significant in their relationships with the U.S. than with each other.

Likewise, not all non-state actors are included in the model. While non-state actors include people, multinational companies, NGOs, the church and other institutions, and all actors that are not or do not represent the state, the paradigm is limited to people. This is because in the history of Philippines-Japan relations, people have been the most visible and concrete non-state actors. Multinational companies appeared only in the 1980s, and non-governmental organizations only in recent years.

Goods

Items of trade between the Philippines and Japan have undergone changes throughout the centuries. Tracing these changes would reveal an interesting account of the persistent gap in the economic development of the two countries.

From the sixteenth century—which has the earliest records of Philippines-Japan trade—to the mid-nineteenth century, that roughly corresponds to the beginning of modern Japan and the end of the Spanish period in the Philippines, various goods were traded.⁴ From Japan came flour, paper screen, sword, knives, lacquer ware, pottery, fans, paper, iron, and other light manufactured products. Japan hardly exported any raw material, for it was poor in natural resources. Indeed, with few exceptions, its light manufactured products were made from imported raw materials. *Abaca* (Manila hemp) from the Philippines became the raw material for *papel de japon* and Manila paper, which were exported back to the Philippines. From the Philippines, too, came jars called *ruson tsubo* or “jars from Luzon,” which were originally from China. They were used as burial items in the Philippines, but were highly appreciated by tea ceremony aficionados in Japan. Silk was traded in Manila, but this also came from China. European products reached Japan through the port of Manila. With the exception of a few agricultural products like sugar, deerskin, and carabao horn, which were from the Philippines, much of the manufactured products bought in Manila were not really from the Philippines. Manila was only a transit port for these goods.

Statistical figures for 1888, 1918, and 1938 show changes in the top Philippine exports to Japan. The three top exports in 1888 were indigo

(42.9 percent), cordage (19.5 percent), and unmanufactured tobacco (17.1 percent). In 1918, abaca topped the list (63 percent), followed by sugar (20.8 percent) and maguey fiber (12.2 percent). In 1938, abaca was again the top export (30.9 percent), copper and its products (27.7 percent) were second, and lumber and timber (13.2 percent) were third. Other exports were vegetable fibers, coffee, copra, molasses, syrup, hides, copper, manganese, and others. They were all agricultural or mineral products (Nagano 2003, 102).

On the other hand, Japanese exports to the Philippines during the same sample years consisted mainly of manufactured products. While in 1888 rice accounted for more than half of Japan's export to the Philippines, in 1918 it was negligible. In this latter year cotton and cotton products constituted more than forty percent of Japan's export. In 1938, cotton and cotton products were still the top Japanese exports, while artificial silk constituted more than ten percent of the total (Nagano 2003, 102).

Items of present Philippines-Japan trade are largely different from those in the pre-World War II period, but they still reveal a great difference between natural resource endowments and a gap in the industrialization and technological advancement of Japan and the Philippines.

Table 1 shows that, among the ASEAN countries, the Philippines is the top exporter of eight items to Japan. Most of these are light manufactured products connected with computers and electronics. Foodstuff, such as bananas, pineapples, coconut and coconut products, comprise only a small portion. Table 2, which lists major Japanese imports from the Philippines in 2000, shows the same picture. Almost seventy percent of Japanese imports from the Philippines consisted of machinery and equipment, such as power generating machines, office equipment, audio and visual apparatuses, telecom equipment, and semiconductor devices. Foodstuff, on the other hand, was a mere ten percent.

On the other side of the exchange are Japanese exports to the Philippines in 2000, which are shown in table 3. More than eighty percent of Japanese goods that entered the Philippines in that year were heavy machinery such as power generating machines and heating or cooling equipment; transport equipment, such as buses, trucks, and cars; electrical machinery, such as television sets, video tape recorders, radio receiv-

ers, and the like. In contrast to the ten percent foodstuff export of the Philippines, export of foodstuff from Japan was only 0.1 percent.

The items of trade between Japan and the Philippines have not substantially changed in the last four centuries. Although the Philippines has been exporting to Japan light manufactured and assembled products—

Table 1. Major Philippine exports to Japan, by rank, share, and amount of exports, June 2002

Exports	Rank of Philippines among ASEAN countries	Share of Philippines	Amount (million Yen)
Magnetic disc units	1	31.3	90,485
Banana	1	70.6	41,884
Motor vehicle radio receivers	1	28.6	11,172
Cased microperipherals	1	56.1	10,777
Wood for carpentry works	1	55.2	7,879
Pineapple	1	96.9	5,167
Fixed electric resistors	1	24.4	3,004
Coconut (copra, etc)	1	91.8	1,960
Microprocessor units	2	29.3	96,985
Motor vehicle ignition wiring sets, etc.	2	27.4	24,750
Input/output electrical parts	2	17.7	23,861
Other inductors	2	14.9	5,038
Camera roll films (35mm), etc.	2	10.3	2,453
Printed circuits	3	12.3	7,637
Static converters (other than rectifiers)	3	18.8	6,375
Nickel ores and concentrates	3	20.4	4,527
Flexible discs	3	11.4	2,343
Plugs and sockets for voltage not exceeding 1,000	3	11.8	2,051
Parlour games articles	3	9.5	1,162
Iron ores and concentrates (other than roasted)	4	5.0	17,311
Read-only memory	4	10.9	16,139
Cased micro-computers	4	6.7	15,568
Portable digital automatic data processing machines	4	2.6	6,362
Silicon transistors	4	8.0	2,718
Asparagus, fresh or chilled	4	16.4	1,856

especially electronics and computer parts—since the late 1990s, this change has not made the Philippines catch up with Japan, from which it has been importing capital goods, large machinery, and sophisticated manufactured products.

This unequal state of trade between Japan and the Philippines is largely a result of economic givens. The economic given is that the Philippines is rich in natural resources, while Japan is poor. Therefore, it is just natural for the Philippines to export raw materials, and import

Table 2. Japanese imports from the Philippines, by percentage distribution, 2000

Commodity	Percentage
Machinery and equipment	69.5
Foodstuff	10.0
Furniture, wood manufactures, handbags, etc.	9.5
Raw materials (wood, pulp, iron ore, non-ferrous metal scrap)	5.5
Textiles (clothing and clothing accessories)	2.0
Mineral fuels (petroleum products, LPG)	1.3
Metals (iron & steel products, copper and alloys, aluminum and alloys)	1.1
Chemicals (medical products, organic chemicals, plastic)	0.7
Non-metallic mineral product	0.4

Source: http://www.asean.or.jp/general/statistics/td_bw03.html, 17 June 2002

Table 3. Japanese exports to the Philippines, by percentage distribution, 2000

Commodity	Percentage
Electrical machinery	41.4
Machinery other than electrical	23.3
Paper manufactures, rubber tires and tubes, records, tapes	10.2
Transport equipment	6.8
Metal products (iron & steel, non-ferrous metals, etc.)	6.2
Chemicals (organic chemicals, plastic)	5.7
Precision instrument	2.7
Non-metallic mineral manufactures, Chinaware	2.1
Textiles (synthetic fabrics)	1.5
Foodstuff	0.1

Source: http://www.asean.or.jp/general/sttistics/td_bw03.html, 17 June 2002

from Japan manufactured and labor-intensive goods. On the other hand, a national economic given can be improved upon by state action. That the Philippines has not been able to meaningfully industrialize is largely a failure of state economic policy. In contrast, the Japanese state, even as early as the 1860s, has come out with policies to overcome its poor natural resources and carry out a program of industrialization.

While items of trade have not substantially changed, the balance of trade between Japan and the Philippines has fluctuated. These fluctuations have been partly due to changing needs of the Japanese and Philippine economies and the volume and kind of commodities traded, and partly due to state policies. Thus, in the 1880s, Japan exported to the Philippines cheap manufactured products, while the Philippines exported its valuable raw materials. Hence, during these years, the balance was generally in favor of the Philippines (Medina 1974, 274–75). In the years between the 1920s and the outbreak of World War II, the balance of trade was in favor of Japan, except from 1939 to 1941 (Guerrero 1966, 20). In the 1920s and 1930s, the top export of Japan to the Philippines was cotton and its products, while the Philippines remained an exporter of raw materials. Toward the 1940s, however, Japan had to import iron and many materials needed for its war in China. From the immediate postwar period up to the 1950s, the balance was in favor of the Philippines; it alternated between Japan and the Philippines between 1967 and 1974. During these years, shifts in the balance of trade were due to the fact that raw materials from the Philippines fed the machines of Japan, which, in turn, helped it to recover from the ashes of World War II and export finished products to the Philippines. From the mid-1970s, the balance has been consistently in favor of Japan. This is largely due to the failure of the Philippine state to industrialize and produce exportable high-value added products (Tan 2003, 485–89).

Meanwhile, Japanese share of Philippine trade has been historically minimal. From the 1850s to 1902 Philippine exports largely went to Europe, with Great Britain getting the largest share. It was only between 1898 and 1902 that Japan's share of Philippine exports became 4.3 percent, still minimal compared with Europe's 47.4 percent (Great Britain's share was 33.4 percent). In the same years, Japan's share of

Philippine imports was only 2.2 percent, compared with Europe's 44 percent (Great Britain's was 18.8 percent) (Nagano 2003, 86).

During the American period, because of the U.S. policy of free trade between the U.S. and the Philippines, the U.S. naturally dominated Philippine trade. Even if Japan's trade record after World War I (1916–1920)—which improved because of the postwar boom—is taken into consideration, the figures are still low. During these years, Japan's share of Philippine exports was only 6.1 percent, compared with the U.S.'s 61.9 percent. Its share of Philippine imports was only 11.2 percent, already the highest throughout the American period, compared with the U.S. share of 60.1 percent (Nagano 2003, 86). Nevertheless, Japan was the second most important trading partner of the Philippines, although a poor second to the United States.

The Philippines, however, was insignificant in Japan's total trade. This was because Japan did not find in the Philippines the products it needed most. Raw cotton, comprising 34 percent of Japan's import in 1910, came from other countries: China, India, U.S., and Egypt (Beasley 1995, 113; Sugiyama 1994, 42). As a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, demand for metals and chemicals to support the demands of heavy industry amounted to 800 million yen in 1919 (Beasley, 113). Obviously, these did not come from the Philippines. Foodstuffs became a significant part of Japan's imports especially after 1900, when agricultural production had failed to catch up with the growth of population. However, this did not affect Japan's imports from the Philippines, because a large part could be obtained from its colonies—from Korea, rice; and from Taiwan, rice and sugar.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Philippines was only sixteenth among countries exporting to Japan, with the exports making up about three-fifths of one percent of the total (Goodman, 1970, 3–4, 246).

In the three sample years of 1975, 1985, and 1988, the average export of the Philippines to Japan was 35 percent of its total exports, but this was only 1.3 percent of Japan's total imports. The average Philippine import from Japan was 21.5 percent of its total imports, but this was only 1 percent of Japan's total exports.⁵

Data on Japan's trade with Asia between 1970 and 1996 show that the share of the Philippines was not only small, but it was also gradually

getting smaller. Occupying 2.8 percent of Japan's total imports, the Philippines was second to Indonesia among Japan's Asian trade partners. In 1985, its rank slid to seventh, to eighth in 1990, and back to seventh in 1996. In terms of Japan's exports, the Philippines ranked 4.5, with its share of 2.3 percent of the total Japanese exports to Asia. In 1975, its rank was fifth and in 1985 it ranked seventh. It hit bottom at rank nine in 1980, 1990, and 1996.⁶

The discussion above shows that historically, in spite of geographical proximity, trade is not one of the intense areas of Philippines-Japan relations.

People

There is hardly any record of individuals from the the Philippines going to Japan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Neither is there any record of such a colony. To date, the only known "Filipino" who stepped on Japanese soil was Lorenzo Ruiz, a Chinese mestizo, who discreetly entered Nagasaki in 1636 together with a number of Dominican missionaries. He and the Dominican missionaries were found out and executed (Villaroel 1970).⁷

The other noteworthy encounter between Japan and a Filipino is separated from Ruiz's tragic sojourn by more than two and a half centuries. This was Jose Rizal's sojourn in the spring of 1888 (Lanuza and Zaide 1961). About a decade later during the Philippine Revolution, Jose Ramos and Mariano Ponce stayed in Japan for quite some time as part of their efforts to purchase arms from Japan. Other revolutionaries made short trips to Japan for the same purpose.

Between 1924 and 1938 during the American period, the highest number of registered Filipinos in Japan was recorded at 113 in 1934 and the lowest was twenty-three in 1925. Artemio Ricarte, the general of the Philippine Revolution who refused to swear allegiance to the U.S., chose self-exile in Japan. He lived mostly in Yokohama from 1915 to April 1942, teaching Spanish to prospective Japanese emigrants to Latin American countries. Benigno Ramos lived in Japan for four years (1934-38). A rebel against the Philippine Commonwealth, he advocated immediate independence for the Philippines and claimed that he had the support of Japan in this cause. Aside from Ricarte and

Ramos there was a handful of former revolutionaries against the Spanish and American colonial governments. In addition were students who, with financial resources from their parents, pursued higher education in Japan. Numbering not more than twenty-five in any given year between 1923 and 1935, most of them were in medical school. There were also Filipino musicians, less than thirty-five in any given year between 1924 and 1935. Last but not least were a trickle of Filipinos, such as boxers and businessmen (Jose 2002).

Besides these few Filipinos who went to Japan for specific purposes were those who went for leisure or tourism. Some of them were general tourists, but others were students and professionals who joined group tours organized with the cooperation of semi-governmental organizations and Japanese newspaper and business companies. A group would consist of fifty to ninety participants and would tour Japan for around fifty days. The participants paid their own expenses. These general and educational tours became popular in the mid-1930s.⁸

During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, twenty-seven Filipino students arrived in Tokyo in July 1943, and twenty-four in May 1944. These students were different from the handful of students who studied in Japan before World War II, because they did not have as much freedom—freedom to decide where to study, what to study, when to quit—as the prewar students. Moreover, they were scholars or *pensionados* of the Japanese government.⁹

After World War II, Filipino exodus to Japan began in Okinawa, with encouragement by the U.S., then occupying the island. In 1958, there were 365 Filipinos in mainland Japan and 997 in Okinawa. In 1972—the year Okinawa reverted back to Japan—there were 2,250 Filipinos in the whole of Japan, of whom 1,132 were in Okinawa. Majority of the Filipinos in Okinawa were professionals—engineers, doctors, managers, computer specialists—hired by the Americans because of their expertise and ability to communicate in English (Jose 2002, 109–22). From 1972 to 2000, Filipinos had consistently been the third largest foreign nationals in Okinawa (1,656 in 2000). The largest were Americans (1,862 in 2000), followed by Chinese (1,831 in 2000).¹⁰

The number of Filipinos in the whole of Japan gradually increased. There were 61,837 in 1991, or 5.1 percent of the total foreign popu-

lation. They increased to 105,308 in 1998 (7 percent). In 2001 the number rose to 155,667, comprising 8.6 percent of the total foreign population. In that year, Filipinos became the fourth largest foreign population in Japan. Koreans were the largest group at 632,405 (35.6 percent), followed by Chinese at 381,225 (21.4 percent), and Brazilians (mostly of Japanese descent) with 265,962 (15 percent) (see table 4).¹¹

Table 4. Registered foreigners in Japan and the percentage of each group to total foreign population, 1991–2000

Year	Korean	Chinese	Brazilian	Filipino	Peruvian	American	Others	Total
1991	693,050 56.90%	171,071 14.0%	119,333 9.80%	61,837 5.10%	26,281 2.10%	42,498 3.50%	104,821 8.60%	1,218,891
1992	688,144 53.70%	195,334 15.20%	147,803 11.50%	62,218 4.90%	31,051 2.40%	42,482 3.30%	114,612 9.0%	1,281,644
1993	682,276 51.70%	210,138 15.90%	154,650 11.70%	73,057 5.50%	33,169 2.50%	42,639 3.20%	124,819 9.50%	1,320,748
1994	676,793 50.0%	218,585 16.10%	159,619 11.80%	85,968 6.40%	35,382 2.60%	43,320 3.20%	134,344 9.90%	1,354,011
1995	666,376 48.9%	222,991 16.40%	176,440 13.0%	74,297 5.50%	36,269 2.70%	43,198 3.20%	142,800 10.50%	1,362,371
1996	657,159 46.40%	234,264 16.60%	201,795 14.30%	84,509 6.0%	37,099 2.60%	44,168 3.10%	156,142 11.0%	1,415,136
1997	645,373 43.50%	252,164 17.00%	233,254 15.70%	93,265 6.30%	40,394 2.70%	43,690 3.0%	174,567 11.80%	1,482,707
1998	638,828 42.20%	272,230 18.0%	222,217 14.7%	105,308 7.0%	41,317 2.70%	42,774 2.80%	189,442 12.60%	1,512,116
1999	636,548 40.90%	294,201 18.90%	224,299 14.40%	115,685 7.40%	42,773 2.70%	42,802 2.80%	199,805 12.90%	1,556,113
2000	635,269 37.70%	335,575 19.90%	254,394 15.10%	144,871 8.60%	46,171 2.70%	44,856 2.60%	225,308 13.40%	1,686,444

Source: Ministry of Justice Homepage (moj.go.jp/PRESS/010613-1/010613-1-3.html), viewed 1 October 2001.

It must be noted that before World War II, there were hardly any other Southeast Asians in Japan other than Filipinos. Right after the end of the war until 1960, a number of Southeast Asians were registered, but the most numerous were Filipinos. Between 1960 and 1971, they were topped only by Indonesians, but since 1971 Filipinos have been the largest Southeast Asian group in Japan (see table 5.)

Table 5. Registered Southeast Asians in Japan, 1947-1988

Year	Philippines	Indonesia	Myanmar	Cambodia	Laos	Malaysia	Vietnam	Thailand	Singapore
1947	240	191	1	21	15	3	48		
1948	307	155	2	17		7	12	59	
1949	298	176	2	7		5	18	63	
1950	367	257	2			7	25	73	
1951	450	304	6			8	24	84	
1952	341	205	5			4	24	84	
1953	431	231	9			4	22	109	
1954	476	245	12	2		4	34	133	
1955	435	284	19	14		3	48	150	
1956	376	247	27	17		3	41	154	
1957	395	249	39	14	1	4	36	166	
1958	365	260	42	20	6	10	47	172	
1959	431	297	40	13	7	33	52	188	
1960	390	420	39	13	17	71	57	266	
1961	444	760	48	21	11	132	67	317	
1962	495	912	71	36	19	159	89	433	
1963	494	897	66	24	5	212	100	512	
1964	497	976	71	26	5	292	129	600	
1965	539	1,026	85	31	10	320	169	704	18
1966	520	920	96	25	13	337	192	707	95
1967	539	1,017	80	24	16	330	243	709	114
1968	32	834	84	29	24	391	330	674	138
1969	758	953	96	41	39	406	381	723	337
1970	932	1,036	86	45	49	451	557	721	469
1971	863	1,121	92	53	40	466	773	769	266
1972	2,250	1,076	101	68	39	567	1,015	798	435
1973	2,424	1,239	107	80	50	649	1,073	930	396
1974	2,758	1,211	125	82	128	752	1,073	967	438
1975	3,035	1,119	146	98	132	718	1,041	1,046	415
1976	3,083	1,139	123	84	75	589	1,039	1,022	401
1977	3,600	1,173	135	85	66	617	1,425	1,087	456
1978	4,281	1,245	134	82	67	641	1,516	1,136	601
1979	4,757	1,325	166	83	72	669	2,126	1,195	596
1980	5,547	1,448	186	164	264	744	2,742	1,276	681
1981	6,729	1,462	189	235	433	767	2,842	1,671	785
1982	6,563	1,494	213	358	500	970	3,132	1,974	706
1983	7,516	1,577	232	531	561	1,337	3,472	2,233	785
1984	11,183	1,803	313	667	573	1,905	3,993	2,758	834
1985	12,261	1,704	312	784	581	1,761	4,126	2,642	768
1986	18,897	1,839	368	751	699	2,182	4,388	2,981	830
1987	25,017	2,038	434	960	725	2,649	4,381	3,817	988
1988	32,185	2,379	657	1,021	806	3,542	4,763	5,277	1,084

Source: Homu Daijin Kanbo 1992, 548-50.

Foreign currency remittance from Japan between 1990 and 1997 amounted to between US\$39,461,000 in 1990 and US\$137,426,000 in 1997. In terms of percentage to total labor income remitted to the Philippines from all over the world, the share of Japan was from 2.4 percent to 3.3 percent (POEA 1998).

Up to the outbreak of World War II, Filipinos went to Japan without any encouragement or push from the state. Any such role of the state was indirect and minimal. In the case of Ricarte, for example, his self-exile in Japan was partly because he was "pushed out" by the hostile American colonial government. In the case of the students and professionals who joined tour groups to Japan in the 1930s, the hand of the Japanese state may be seen in the support it gave to the semi-governmental organizers of the tours. Since the participants paid their own expenses, however, it may be concluded that the role of the Japanese state was still minimal. During World War II, the Japanese government had a direct hand in the sending of Filipino students to Japan. Financial support came from the coffers of the Japanese government. Choosing the students and educational institutions was within the powers of the Japanese government.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the large number of Filipinos in Okinawa was not due to the policy of the Philippine state, but was rather partly a result of the American policy in Okinawa to employ Filipinos until Okinawans and Japanese were trained and could take over their jobs. Nevertheless, such policy received a positive response largely because of the openness of Filipinos to working abroad. It was only in 1974 that the Philippines under President Ferdinand Marcos began to adopt the policy of encouraging Filipino workers to go abroad to improve the country's foreign currency reserves. Just like the 1950s and 1960s American policy in Okinawa, this policy of the Philippine government received a positive response. Recruitment agencies proliferated, and Filipinos began the flight out of the Philippines, on to the greener pastures abroad. What brought about such readiness to pack up and seek employment abroad among Filipinos can be explained by several interrelated factors. First, the attitude among Filipinos—which was formed during the American colonial rule—is that, in a democratic system, individuals have the freedom of movement and the right to pursue

happiness wherever it may be found. Second, successful pioneer immigrants to Hawaii and the mainland U.S. have become role models for prospective Filipino immigrants. Third, the Filipinos' ability to speak English makes them believe that they can live anywhere (Ballescas 2003, 563).¹²

Turning to the Japanese presence in the Philippines, we see that until the 1920s the number of Japanese who came was also small, but not as small as the number of Filipinos who went to Japan. While there is no record of Filipinos going to Japan in the early centuries, records show that there were a few Japanese who came to the Philippines between the sixteenth century and the 1920s.

Some of them came because of *force majeure*. In 1614 some three hundred Japanese Christians were banished to Manila. Among them was Takayama Ukon (Lord Takayama), a Christian *daimyo* (feudal lord) from Takatsuki, whose statue now stands in Plaza Dilao across the old Paco Railroad Station in Manila. In 1632, a group of Christian lepers were exiled to Manila (de Pedro 1990, 451–545; Saniel 1958, 189–94).

But the majority of the Japanese who came to the Philippines were driven by economic motivation. In the sixteenth century Japanese traders who sometimes acted as pirates (*wako*) often visited the Philippines to trade, at times to plunder (Iwao Sei Ichi 1943). There are accounts of Japanese settlements or communities in Cagayan, Pangasinan, and Manila, consisting of these traders. In 1873, a large acrobatic group from Osaka stayed in the Philippines for ten years. In November 1893, the Yokohama Trading Company sent thirty electricians to the Philippines to install the first electric power generator in Manila. By 31 December 1899, there were ninety registered Japanese in Luzon, twenty-eight of whom were merchants, three employees of the Japanese consulate, and one student (Yoshikawa 1995, 167). Not registered were the Japanese women who worked in bars and engaged in prostitution. They were the *karayukisan*, who wanted to escape from poverty in Japan. Attracted by the presence of American soldiers in the Philippines, they were estimated to number around 280 in 1903. In any given year from 1907 to 1919, their number was at least 123 and not more than 432. From the 1920s, due to the efforts of the Japanese consul and the legitimate businessmen in Manila, the number of these

women gradually dwindled to five, twenty, or thirty, but did not entirely disappear (Hashiya 1985, 9; Terami-Wada 1986, 287–316). Definitely in search of work were more than 4,000 Japanese who came to complete the construction of the Kennon Road in Benguet between 1903 and 1904 (Jose 1997, 108–23).

From the 1920s to the outbreak of World War II, annual Japanese immigration to the Philippines was consistently large and usually on the upward trend. In 1927, there were more than 11,000 Japanese in the Philippines, 7,000 of whom were in Davao. In 1930, of the 19,600 Japanese in the Philippines, 12,500 were in Davao, engaged in hemp cultivation. By 1939, there were 17,888 of them (Jose 1999, 65–72).

Among the Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines was the most popular destination of Japanese workers. Between 1907 and 1917, 30 percent of all Japanese in the region were in the Philippines. It rose to 45 percent in 1918, became 50.3 percent in 1929, hovered around 60 percent throughout the 1930s, and reached 63.7 percent in 1940 (Hashiya 1985, 33).

Japanese remittances from the Philippines was the highest among Southeast Asian countries, as can be seen in the statistical figures for 1918 to 1935, and 1941 and 1943 (see tables 6 and 7).

The influx of Japanese immigrants to the Philippines from the late 1920s to the 1940s was due to several factors. First, it was a policy of the Japanese government to encourage laborers to go abroad in order to solve what it perceived to be a problem of overpopulation and the

Table 6. Japanese remittances to Japan, in yen, 1918–35

	Philippines	British Malaya	Dutch East Indies	Others
1918–22	2,814,938	934,472	542,578	1,155,971
1923–27	3,847,624	1,411,946	687,683	1,230,856
1928–32	4,170,144	1,940,998	915,863	786,042
1933	875,965	494,706	166,595	14,881
1934	1,001,119	247,601	266,650	77,193
1935	857,240	198,104	250,313	106,924

Source: Constructed from Diplomatic Records of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JFMA), J.1.2.0-J8-2, Imin ni kansuru tokei oyobi chosa zakken, zaigai Honpojin jin'in oyobi sokin gaku chosa (dai 4-6 kan) (Emigration Statistics: Number of Japanese Overseas and Total Amount of Remittances) (vols. 4–5).

real problem of poor natural resources. Second, the rich natural resources of the Philippines were an attraction not only to investors but also to laborers determined to become investors. Third, the stability gained by the immigrants was an incentive for them to stay, in spite of the low price of abaca in the world market. And, fourth, successful immigrants who beckoned others to follow them created a chain reaction (Hashiya 1985, 33-51). The influx was both a result of state and non-state actions.

Table 7. Japanese remittances to Japan, in yen, 1941 and 1943

	1941	1943
Philippines	1,166,086	156,772
Thailand	35,656	10,980
French Indo-China	55,138	78,396
Burma	3,000	55,028
Malaya	148,952	135,221
Java	4,037	12,657
Sumatra	1,458	7,500
Borneo	35,060	23,401
East Indies	254,309	3,831

Source: Constructed from JMFA.J.1.2.0-58, *Imin ni kansuru tokei oyobi chosa kankei zakken dai 2-kan* (Miscellaneous Matters on Statistics and Investigations Regarding Japanese Emigrants, vol. 2)

After World War II, the Japanese government resumed the policy of encouraging Japanese to emigrate to Brazil and Peru, but not to the Philippines. The insignificant number of Japanese who came in the 1950s did so for varied reasons: official or business missions, sports diplomacy, and education. In the 1960s, aside from these purposes, a trickle came for tourism. The number of Japanese who came to the Philippines reached only ten thousand in 1966. Table 8 shows the

Table 8. Japanese in the Philippines, by status of stay, 1970-89

	Long-term	Permanent	Tourists
1970	1,220	39	7,204
1980	3,958	310	187,445
1989	3,041	573	170,661

Source: Constructed from Yanao Toru 1991, 265.

number of Japanese tourists, long-term visitors (who stay at least three months), and permanent residents for 1970, 1980 and 1989.

In 2000 only 390,517 Japanese visited the Philippines, and less than this in 2001 (see table 9). The Philippines was not in the top thirteen destinations of Japanese tourists (see table 10). On the other hand, in a 2000 survey, the Philippines was the top eleventh country in ASEAN that had overseas Japanese who stayed for long periods (table 11). It lagged behind Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. These were Japanese businessmen, diplomats, students, NGO volunteers, etc. Moreover, the Philippines was the top country in ASEAN that had Japanese permanent residents. Most probably, they are descendants or relatives of Japanese residents in the Philippines before World War II. Or, some of them may be Japanese married to Filipinos, or children of Japanese married to Filipino women, which in turn, is a result of the influx of Filipinos to Japan in the last three decades. Entertainers and long-term residents are the most likely Filipinos to get married to Japanese citizens.

Table 9: Visitors to the Philippines by country/region of residence, 2000–01

2000			2001		
Country of Residence			Country of Residence		
U.S.A.	445,043	24.2	U.S.A.	392,099	23.1
Japan	390,517	21.2	Japan	343,840	20.2
S. Korea	174,966	9.5	S. Korea	207,957	12.2
Hong Kong	146,858	8.0	Hong Kong	134,408	8.0
ASEAN	132,742	7.2	ASEAN	115,566	6.9
Taiwan	75,722	4.1	Taiwan	85,231	5.0
Australia	75,706	4.1	Australia	68,541	4.0
U.K.	74,507	4.0	U.K.	60,147	3.5
Canada	61,004	3.3	Canada	54,942	3.2
Germany	51,131	2.8	Germany	40,605	2.4
Others	213,587	11.6	Others	194,726	11.5
Total	1,841,783	100.0	Total	1,698,062	100.0
Overseas Filipinos*	150,386	–	Overseas Filipinos*	98,831	–
Total	1,992,16	–	Total	1,796,893	–

Source: <http://www.asean.or.jp>, viewed on 8 November 2003

*Philippine passport holders permanently residing abroad; excludes overseas Filipino workers.

Table 10. Principal destinations of Japanese tourists, 1998–2000

Destination 1998			Destination 1999			Destination 2000		
U.S.A.	4,885,369	21.3	U.S.A	4,826,077	20.6	U.S.A	5,061,377	20.5
Italy	2,017,742	8.8	S. Korea	2,184,121	9.3	S. Korea	2,472,054	10.0
S. Korea	1,954,416	8.5	Italy	1,875,139	8.0	China	2,201,528	8.9
China	1,572,054	6.9	China	1,855,197	7.9	Italy	1,617,442	6.6
Hong Kong	1,100,579	4.8	Hong Kong	1,174,071	5.0	Hong Kong	1,382,417	5.6
Thailand	986,264	4.3	Thailand	1,064,539	4.5	Thailand	1,197,931	4.9
Guam	975,402	4.3	Guam	957,738	4.1	Guam	1,048,813	4.3
Singapore	843,713	3.7	Singapore	860,662	3.7	Singapore	929,895	3.8
Taiwan	826,632	3.6	Germany	818,482	3.5	Germany	914,635	3.7
Germany	814,889	3.6	Taiwan	809,947	3.5	Taiwan	880,551	3.6
Australia	751,110	3.3	Australia	707,500	3.0	Australia	720,300	2.9
France	603,500	2.6	France	637,300	2.7	France	685,098	2.8
U.K.	545,000	2.4	Indonesia	606,102	2.6	Indonesia	643,794	2.6
Others	5,015,098	21.9	Others	5,170,736	21.6	Others	4,879,171	19.8
Total	22,891,768	100.0	Total	23,547,611	100.0	Total	24,635,006	100.0

Source: <http://www.asean.or.jp>, viewed on 8 November 2003

Table 11. Number of Japanese residents overseas, by country or region, 2000

Country	Total	Long-term Stay	Permanent Residents
Asia	163,108	156,539	6,569
ASEAN	81,530	77,178	4,352
Brunei Darussalam	91	91	0
Cambodia	453	452	1
Indonesia	12,254	11,586	668
Laos	366	364	2
Malaysia	11,625	11,024	601
Myanmar	615	598	17
Philippines	9,227	7,980	1,247
Singapore	23,063	22,074	989
Thailand	21,154	20,405	749
Vietnam	2,682	2,604	78
Europe + NIS Countries	146,774	117,958	28,816
Africa	5,992	5,546	446
North America	332,042	201,940	130,102
Central America	7,025	4,683	2,342
South America	99,496	6,432	93,064
Oceania	51,909	29,107	22,802
Middle East	5,326	4,440	886
South Pole	40	40	0
World	811,712	526,685	285,027

Source: Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, viewed in <http://asean.or.jp> on 8 November 2003.

It is interesting to note that, during the Spanish period, the Japanese government had refused to allow Japanese workers to go to the Philippines due to unstable political conditions, especially during the Revolution. Safety of the workers was a concern (Yoshikawa 1995, 167). It allowed the first large number of workers to go and work at the Kennon Road only upon the prodding of the Japanese Consul in Manila.¹³ Finally, during the American period, after the political situation had become stable, the Japanese government did not only allow its workers to go, but it even encouraged them in the 1920s to stay for longer periods to give themselves time to prosper.

Things have not changed. Today, one of the main reasons very few Japanese come to the Philippines is fear for their safety in this country

that is known in Japan—mainly due to unbalanced media reports—as the land of pickpockets and kidnappers.

The role of the travel advisory given by the Japanese government to travel agents should not be discounted. Such advisories affect particularly the tourists, most of whom are highly dependent on suggestions of the tourist agents who, in turn, are obedient to official government travel advisories. A cursory visit to several travel agencies in Tokyo will show that while Asian destinations such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Bali are widely advertised through attractive posters on display, there is hardly any poster that features the Philippines.

Not particularly affected by travel advisories are the Japanese who stay in the Philippines for a long term or who are permanent residents. They do not come to the Philippines for leisure or holiday, but to perform official, business or family obligations. Hence, in terms of the number of Japanese who stay permanently or for the long-term, the Philippine record is not as bad as that in tourism.

To sum up this section on movement of peoples between Japan and the Philippines, it may be concluded that this area of bilateral relations is one of the most intense and colorful. It is definitely more intense than the exchange of goods.

Ideas

Throughout the history of modern Japan up to World War II, the idea of Pan-Asianism (*han-Ajia shugi*) had affected Japan's policy towards its Asian neighbors. By late 1930s, Pan-Asianism had been eclipsed by the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine and, from 1942 until the end of World War II, by the slogan Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The roots of the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, however, are found in Pan-Asianism.

Pan-Asianism was a movement that began in the 1880s as a part of the debate on how to modernize Japan and make it equal to the Western powers. One way of modernizing was to keep a harmonious relationship with the Western powers, as the Japanese government exerted efforts in domestic development. The other method was to help Asian countries liberate themselves from Western imperialism and,

under Japan's leadership, the whole of Asia would achieve modernization. Since China was the largest and the most important Asian country, it was the first to be helped (Eto Shinkichi and M. Jansen 1982). This approach was called Pan-Asianism. It stressed the alleged uniqueness of Asia and Japan's special role in molding their collective future. The Japanese government adopted the first approach, and officially discouraged Pan-Asianism because of its potential to disrupt friendly relations with the Western powers. On an unofficial level, however, the Japanese government kept its option of replacing Western colonial rule over Asia with its own (Ikehata 1989, 17-29).

During the Philippine Revolution, a number of its leaders met Pan-Asianists in the Philippines, in Hong Kong, as well as in Japan. Their image of the military might of Japan after its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 could have been reinforced by their conversations with these Pan-Asianists.¹⁴ As a result, they came to believe that Japan could help them in their fight for independence. However, the turn of events did not lead to what they had believed.

After 1924, when the U.S. Congress passed the National Origins Act, more popularly known as the Immigration Law of 1924, Pan-Asianist movements became more overt. To many of the Japanese, this law, which prohibited nationals ineligible for American citizenship from entering the United States as laborers or immigrants, was a proof that Japan was not being treated by the Western powers as an equal. The demand for Japan to turn its back on the West and establish solidarity with Asia became stronger. The concept of Pan-Asianism was already being used interchangeably with the concept of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine.

Pan-Asianism or Asiatic Monroeism became the subject of an exchange of newspaper commentaries between two Filipino intellectuals, Claro M. Recto, then minority leader of the Philippine Assembly, and Maximo Kalaw, then professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines. In this debate that lasted from August to October of 1927, Recto (1930, *passim*) was skeptical about Asiatic Monroeism, and saw it as a dangerous ploy for the eventual takeover by Japan of the Philippines. Kalaw, on the other hand, did not believe that Philippine independence would be jeopardized; on the contrary, he maintained that if the U.S. Monroe Doctrine were able to protect Central and

South America, so would a Monroe Doctrine for Asia protect the independence of the region.

The Japanese government openly adopted Pan-Asianism as a foreign policy only in the 1930s. In the January 1933 speech of Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya in the Imperial Diet, he announced that, if the United States had the Monroe Doctrine over Central and South America, then Japan's interests in East Asia should also be recognized (Nish 1977, 198–99). Japan's Asiatic Monroe Doctrine was reiterated by the next Foreign Minister, Hirota Koki. He said, referring to the worsening situation in Asia caused by its invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, "Japan, serving as the only cornerstone for the edifice of the peace of East Asia, bears the entire burden of responsibilities" (Akagi 1937, 512–13).

In the Philippines, Hirota's speech became the topic of the editorial of *The Tribune* (26 January 1934, 8) entitled "Hirota and Monroeism," three days after it was delivered. The editorial cartoon depicts Japan standing twice taller between Russia and the United States. The peoples of Manchuria, China, Korea and Formosa (Taiwan) look up to them as if in awe, as the Philippines (represented by a farmer prodding a carabao to plow the field) nonchalantly goes on with its own business. England watches. The editorial essay contrasts Japan's questionable Asiatic Monroeism with the original and what it considers to be more credible policy of the United States President James Monroe in the Central and South Americas. The essay argues that if the purpose of the Asiatic Monroeism was to give "protection," as the original Monroe Doctrine extended "protection" to the Central and South Americas against invaders, "there is but one country which Japan can logically claim to protect on the basis of Monroeism, and that country is her own creation—Manchukuo." On the other hand, the essay points out, Asiatic Monroeism "would impute anything but altruistic motives to any country promulgating the doctrine. It would imply occupation in the guise of protection." The editorial, sarcastic in its tone, ends with an advice that the Philippines, "on the threshold of an independent existence," should be wary of such policy.

After the invasion of the Philippines, the Japanese government announced its intention to establish the Greater East Asia-Co-Prosperity

Sphere, a euphemism for Japanese imperialism. "However, increasingly after its proclamation in 1942, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere came to be viewed within the region as a cynical exercise on Japan's part to disguise its intention to supplant Western colonial rule in East Asia with its own" (Hook 2001, 156).

Pan-Asianism, or its various other appellations, including the Monroe Doctrine for Asia as well as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, was the foremost ideology associated with Japan. Its impact on the Philippines before World War II was to divide Filipino intellectuals into a small pro-Japanese group and a bigger anti-Japanese one. The pro-Japanese in turn could be divided into those who sincerely believed Japan's promise of liberation from Western imperialism and those who did not, but were willing to accept Japanese domination for the reason that it was Asian, not Western. During World War II the anti-Japanese group was proven correct; those who believed in the promise of liberation were disillusioned; and those who welcomed Japanese domination did not exactly find Asian imperialism less oppressive than the Western type.

In the end, the only ideology that the Japanese state had tried to export to Asia did not endear it to the region. The memory of the destruction wrought by the harsh implementation of Pan-Asianism still lingers today, and the term is still a taboo in diplomatic relations.

To sum up, the flow of ideas, specifically, Pan-Asianism (which developed into the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere) between Japan and the Philippines was mainly one-way: from Japan to the Philippines. It was intense, but in a negative way. Hardly any Filipino escaped unscathed by the war and the Japanese Occupation.

The Impact of People on Bilateral Relations

Pan-Asianism has remained a historical memory that, so far, has succeeded in stopping Japan from becoming a military power. It did not stop Japan, however, from quickly and speedily reestablishing its economic ties with Asia, while the resumption of cultural ties came much

later in the late 1960s, which picked up fast. In spite of the lack of military presence, there are no indications that Japan is about to disengage from Asia. On the contrary, its active participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN, as well as its dynamic cultural activities in the region, indicate that it is determined to further strengthen its ties with Asia, as it enhances its relationship with Europe, U.S., and the rest of the world.

Indeed, Japan has decided to maintain its economic and cultural presence in Asia. In this context the historical exchange of goods and movement of peoples between Japan and the Philippines gains significance. For if the whole gamut of Japan's foreign relations is taken into account, the volume of trade and movement of peoples between the two countries would be a mere drop in the bucket. However, when taken in the context of Asia only, these areas of relationship are relatively significant.

With regards to Japan and the Philippines, the movement of peoples between them is more intense and mutual than the exchange of goods and the transmission of ideas. Before World War II, majority of the Japanese in Southeast Asia were in the Philippines, while there were hardly any Southeast Asians in Japan other than Filipinos. Since the end of World War II, Filipinos in Japan have been the most numerous among Southeast Asians.

As shown in the matrix, movement of people is an area of bilateral relationship, and people are also non-state actors. Since the movement of people between Japan and the Philippines is historically the most intense of the three areas of the relationship (exchange of goods, movement of people, and transmission of ideas), the role of people as non-state actors may be expected to be equal to, if not more, important than the role of the state.

While items of trade and fluctuations in the balance of trade may be largely a function of economic givens in Japan and the Philippines as well as the economic policies of the two countries, manufacturers, traders, and consumers as non-state actors have impact on it. There are no empirical data to measure the extent of this impact, but there are several indications of it. For instance, prewar Japanese trade with the Philippines had been helped by the presence of Japanese immi-

grants in the Philippines. In the first place, they were the first ones to patronize Japanese products, especially foodstuff. Secondly, the presence of Japanese distributors in the Philippines shielded Japanese exports from total damage when Chinese retailers boycotted Japanese goods to protest the Manchurian invasion (1931) and the 1937 Sino-Japanese War. During the boycott the Japanese decided to distribute Japanese goods themselves (Tan 1981, 2–9; Nakajima 1939, 173–93; Jose 1999, 68–69). Third, Japan was able to import high quality low-cost Manila hemp from the Philippines due to the fact that abaca in Davao was produced mainly by the Japanese for the Japanese market (Hayase 1984, 204–9, 302–3). Fourth, without buyers who go for imported products, trade would not flourish. Before World War II, Filipino consumers bought imported products because there were no local ones. Today, they still do even though there are local counterparts because of the habit formed by history and tradition.

The presence of Japanese immigrants in the Philippines affected the outcome of the judicial trial of a Filipino medical student in Japan in the 1930s, accused of performing an abortion surgery on his female Japanese acquaintance.¹⁵ Being yet a student, he did not have license to practice medicine, much less perform surgery. While his case was in a Japanese court, the Japanese Consul General in Manila wrote to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo. He expressed apprehension that, if the Japanese court would impose heavy penalty on the accused, Japanese residents in the Philippines might feel undue repercussions. He recalled that the Philippine courts had been fair and just to Japanese accused of crimes. Moreover, he was worried that any untoward treatment of the Filipino student, or any Filipino in Japan for that matter, might jeopardize the future of Japanese immigrants in the Philippines. The Filipino student was found guilty and was deported to the Philippines. A couple of years later, he was readmitted to Japan and allowed to continue his studies. Considering the gravity of his crime, and the outrage the reading public in Japan expressed, the punishment meted on him was light. In the Philippines, *The Tribune* religiously reported the development of the case.¹⁶ If there were no Japanese immigrants in the Philippines at the time this student was arrested and brought to court, the Japanese Consul General in Manila would not have any reason to mention a

word about the repercussion of a strict trial and punishment. In a way, immigrants in a foreign land serve as reminders to their home country that the government should maintain cordial and harmonious relations with the host government, for otherwise, they could be taken as hostages.

Japanese immigrants in the Philippines, with the exception of the rare educated ones who could speak English, had very limited contact with Filipinos.¹⁷ Unlike Chinese who conglomerated in urban areas and intermarried with Filipinos, majority of Japanese lived on plantations in the rural areas. And, as the findings of Hayase (1984, 218) show, "it is clear that the affluent Japanese living in well-appointed suburban houses in Davao Poblacion had no contact whatsoever with tribal people. They only knew the Christian Filipinos whom they employed." With these Filipinos, they communicated in "abaca Spanish," a mixture of Spanish and Visayan or Tagalog. As for the few who were in the urban commercial areas, their interaction with their Filipino clients was limited to the brief communication in "abaca Spanish" just to be able to give the goods being purchased and get the money in return.

The Japanese immigrants' tendency to isolate themselves from the rest of Philippine society was reinforced by the subsidies given by the Japanese government to build schools exclusively for Japanese. The Japanese government also subsidized Japanese associations, which took care of the common concerns of Japanese immigrants. Without such governmental support, the Japanese's tendency to be self-sufficient would have weakened a bit, and they might have had reasons to interact more regularly with Filipinos. For example, since the Japanese schools in the Philippines were only at the elementary level, a few Japanese children who were not sent to Japan went to Philippine high schools, played with Filipino children, and learned English.¹⁸

Because of the limited interaction between Japanese and Filipinos even at the height of Japanese immigration to the Philippines, their cultural influence on Filipinos was not much.

However, observant Filipinos did take note of Japanese characteristics, both the admirable and the undesirable at least from their own point of view: their diligence, thriftiness, honesty and patriotism; the low position of the woman, their not being Christian, their tendency

towards totalitarianism, etc. Aside from these Filipinos who observed Japanese immigrants amidst them, the Filipinos who went on leisure as well as educational tours to Japan in the 1930s took note of the things they admired in Japan. Some spoke of the things that the Philippine Commonwealth might learn from Japan. Says one of the members of the first educational tour in 1935: "To me one of the most striking social phenomena in the life of the Japanese people is their willingness to sacrifice individual liberty of action and freedom of thought for the sake of national discipline and collective efficiency. . . . Perhaps a combination of both . . . would better serve the interests and well being of our commonwealth" (Calica 1935, 106). Says another one: "When I saw Japan . . . I was surprised. I did not expect these things: concrete buildings, modern means of communication and transportation, factories, department stores, shrines and temples, beautiful parks and gardens, universities, subways, and all sort of modern conveniences. Why my Philippines is afar behind!" (Calica 1935, 131). Others admired Japan's ability to preserve its traditional culture even as it embraced modernization. A Filipino journalist who visited Japan in the 1930s wrote: "There seems to be no question that there is today a silent struggle between the ancient and the modern, between the native and the foreign, between tradition and the increasing demand for new things. The ability of Japanese so far to maintain their own culture in the face of advancing modernity reveals the native strength and characteristic individuality of the race" (Farolan 1934, 35).

At this point, it may be hypothesized that much of the image Filipinos had of Japan before World War II was brought only indirectly by the Japanese themselves, and more directly by the Filipinos who had been to Japan, or had been observed among the Japanese immigrants in the Philippines.

People who have crossed national borders and learned a foreign language and culture are not only potential agents of cultural exchanges. They are also potential cushions of negative impacts of adverse state-to-state relations, as well as repositories of goodwill. In no other period in the history of Philippines-Japan relations was this seen than during the Japanese Occupation.

During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the Japanese military secured the services of Japanese residents in the Philippines who knew the local language and, to a certain degree, the Filipino culture. The able-bodied males were conscripted in the army, while those who were not qualified for military service were hired to do civil duties, such as interpretation and translation. Japanese businessmen who had resided in the Philippines for years, and who had links with the Filipino political elite were hired as consultants (Dabao-kai 1993, 317; Furukawa 1956, 334–40; Osawa 1994, 651; Takahashi 217–37; Zensaku 1990, 48–49). If there were no Japanese immigrants in the Philippines who had acquainted themselves with the Filipino way of life, the Japanese occupiers would have been completely lost and frustrated, and might have been more fierce and severe towards the Filipinos.

The Japanese military also made use of a number of Filipinos who knew Japanese because they had studied in Japan before the war. Examples were Julio Luz and Leopoldo R. Aguinaldo (proprietor of Aguinaldo Department Store), who studied in Japan at different times, but whose lives crossed in the Philippines under the Japanese. Aguinaldo finished textile engineering in the Higher Technical School of Nagoya in 1909, while Julio Luz finished medicine also in a school in Nagoya. It cannot be established in what year Luz graduated, but he was in Japan in 1918. Both Aguinaldo and Luz had gone back to the Philippines when World War II broke out. During the Japanese Occupation, the Japanese tried to use Aguinaldo's prestige as a successful businessman and friend of many Japanese by making him deliver a speech to the Filipino prisoners of war at Camp O'Donnell in Capas, Tarlac. His speech, written in English, was revised by a Japanese censor, who inserted the following message: "It is indeed regrettable that your courage and bravery had been mistakenly exerted not for the Philippines but for the selfish interest of the United States."¹⁹ Moreover, the revised speech said that the prisoners of war were victims of American propaganda, and extolled them to cooperate with the Japanese. Aguinaldo decided to deliver his speech in Tagalog. The only Filipino on stage, together with the Japanese, was Julio Luz. He had been hired by the Japanese as interpreter and guide. Luz did not report to the

Japanese that Aguinaldo did not deliver the revised speech. There was also Jose P. Laurel, who did not study in Japan, but as a lawyer he had had many Japanese clients, friends, and acquaintances. The Japanese made him President of the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic.

The Japanese Occupation was a dark period in the history of Philippines-Japan relations. It would have been grimmer, were it not for the Filipinos who had had a chance to interact with Japanese, or had known Japan, before the outbreak of hostilities. If there were no students who had learned the Japanese language and culture, or the likes of Jose P. Laurel who had befriended many influential Japanese, the Japanese occupiers would not have had individuals whom they believed they could trust, but who, in the end, were really on the side of their fellow Filipinos. Contrast them with the *Makapilis*, many of whom had never seen Japan, nor learned Japanese. They brought suffering and death to their fellow Filipinos.

Since today the movement of people is more heavily from the Philippines to Japan than the other way around, it is pertinent to inquire into the impact of Filipinos on Japanese.

Generally speaking, Japanese are convinced that their culture is higher than that of Filipinos, and that they have nothing to learn from the latter. This was true before and is still true now, but there are signs of change.

Many Japanese who have met Filipinos notice the Filipinos' deep faith in God, even if this may only mean that they go to church every Sunday, and nothing else. The author does not have hard statistics, but, as a result of frequent and long periods of residence in Japan, has personal knowledge of a Japanese man who converted to Catholicism after the death of his beloved Filipina wife. She knows of a Japanese professional who expressed a desire to learn the Rosary, after being convinced that her Filipina friend is successful in her career and personal life because she always prays. The author has encountered a Japanese woman who has decided to study the Bible, and later be baptized to the Catholic faith (she chose Catholicism over Protestantism), after a careful observation of the seemingly happy lives of her Filipino neighbors in Japan. Sunday English Masses in Catholic churches in Japan are almost always dominated by Filipinos. Quite a number of churches

even hold Mass in Filipino. It is not hard to imagine that this anecdotal knowledge of Japanese who embraced the Catholic faith due to the influence of Filipinos can be multiplied a hundred times.

Side by side with this influence, resulting not from a deliberate attempt to have an impact but by simply living their own lives, is a more conscious effort by organized Filipino wives of Japanese. The sheer number of Filipinos in Japan, majority of whom are women, and the determination of many of them to organize and be liberated from the negative image of "Japayuki," gold-digger "*ajia no hanayome*" (brides from Asia), and/or Filipino wives abandoned by their Japanese husbands, contribute to a more deliberate attempt to make the Japanese appreciate Philippine cuisine, dances, songs, costumes, and family values. Suzuki (2002, 197–98) observes a Christmas party organized by one of the more than 200 Filipino groups in Japan:

A standard feature of the Christmas party is the introduction onstage of the organizers and all their family members at the end of the event. Wearing dresses inspired by the *Barong Tagalog* (the Filipino men's national attire), colorful dance costumes, or formal clothing, the women stand in the front row with their children. Their Japanese husbands, in formal *Barong Tagalog* shirts and black trousers or business suits, line up behind them. The audience will probably notice that some of the twenty or so couples have large age gaps and that some of the children's physical features are different from those of most Japanese children. Despite this, the families intend to send the message that they are "happy families, just like those in the audience." They can see this message countering the image of abandoned Filipina mothers and their "Japanese Filipino Children."

Moreover, it may be hypothesized that similar to pre-World War II, more Filipinos today have been to Japan than the number of Japanese who have visited the Philippines. These Filipinos may be given credit for the spread of aspects of Japanese popular culture, such as karaoke and Japanese food. Today, Japanese food is more popular in the Philippines than thirty years ago. In the 1970s, there were only a number of Japanese restaurants, and they could be found only in the business area of Makati and the tourist belt in Malate, catering to Japanese businessmen

and tourists who, just like the prewar immigrants, generally kept to themselves. Since the mid-1990s, Japanese food has been available in inexpensive food stalls and stands in malls that cater to Filipinos. Since the proliferation of Japanese food coincided with the increase of Filipino workers in Japan and the phenomenon of *balikbayans*, while the number of Japanese tourists to the Philippines decreased, it may be surmised that it was primarily the Filipinos, and not the Japanese, who made Japanese cuisine more popular now than before.

Karaoke, too, can be heard even in the remotest rural Philippines. This is no doubt due to the Filipinos who sometimes come home from their stint abroad with nothing more valuable than a karaoke set. In contrast, the more elitist aspects of Japanese culture such as *ikebana* and tea ceremony have not been as popular. These traditional arts of Japan have been introduced in the Philippines with the help and encouragement of the Japanese government since the prewar period,²⁰ but these have remained in the consciousness only of elite Philippine society.

The Search for a Sharper Analytical Tool

This article has argued that, in terms of number, the movement of people between Japan and the Philippines has been more intense than trade. It has also given historical examples of the impact of these people, in other words, non-state actors, on the relationship between Japan and the Philippines before and during World War II. In terms of transmission of ideas, it has been pointed out that the state-sponsored Pan-Asianism resulted in the disaster of World War II, but Asia remains one of the main interests of Japan. In terms of other ideas, such as a certain image of Japan, including the more recent Japanese food and karaoke, the article hypothesizes that the conveyor of these ideas and cultural aspects are primarily Filipinos who have been to Japan, and not the Japanese.

The movement of Filipinos is towards Japan rather than the other way around. But there are indications that these Filipinos not only have the potential to affect Japanese culture and society, but also seem to be effective transmitters of Japanese culture to the Philippines. Japan may

be a strong state vis-à-vis the Philippines, but social and cultural ties between them might be more defined by non-state actors, namely, the Filipinos.

In the light of the present trend of Filipino exodus to Japan, which does not indicate any abatement, the challenge at hand is to arrive at an analytical tool that would accurately and conclusively confirm the hypotheses and anecdotal evidence offered here.

A comparative analysis may support or destroy the hypothesis. After all, Japanese cuisine, karaoke, *manga* (Japanese cartoons) and *anime* (animation, usually referring only to Japanese animation) are now found all over the world, even in countries that do not share the Philippine experience of outward migration to Japan. On the other hand, they are also found in countries without a large number of Japanese residents. Japanese culture may have been globalized. But who are the agents of this globalization? The hypothesis presented earlier—that in the case of the spread of Japanese culture in the Philippines, it seems that the agents are Filipinos—is reiterated here. Who are the agents in other countries? More importantly, who are the agents in countries where, just like the Philippines, there are few Japanese residents and, unlike the Philippines, do not have many of their nationals in Japan? Answers to these questions may support or negate the hypothesis presented here.

Notes

1. A mere perusal of the programs of activities of the Japan Foundation throughout the years will attest to this. The programs are announced in newspapers, aside from the flyers, brochures, pamphlets, and letters of invitation distributed by the Japan Foundation to universities, colleges, and other institutions and offices.

2. For a partial list of works only in English, see Jose and Jose 1998. There are more works in Japanese.

3. The works of Goodman are described in Jose and Jose 1998.

4. Basic works on this are those of Guerrero 1966 and Medina 1974.

5. Computed from table 2.4 of Krugman 1995.

6. From the *Statistical Handbook of Japan*.

7. Lorenzo Ruiz was declared blessed on 11 October 1980.

8. Several works on this are summarized in Terami-Wada 2003.

9. See the two monographs on these pensionados by Goodman 1962, 1985.

10. Homusho, Nyukoku Kanri-Kyoku (Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau), *Shutsu nyu koku kanri toketi nenpo* (Yearbook of Emigration and Immigration Statistics).

11. Ministry of Justice Homepage (moj.go.jp/PRESS010613-1/010613-1-3.html), viewed on 1 October 2001.

12. The role of the American occupation in educating Filipinos in English and inculcating democracy is discussed in Jose 2002, 9–2, 110–12, 123–24.

13. Diplomatic Records of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Gaikomonjo*, vol. 36, part 2.

14. See, for example, the recollection of Miyazaki Toten in Eto and Jansen 1982, 141–42.

15. For details of this case, see Jose 2002, 75–78.

16. See issues of *The Tribune* for 28 July, 3 August, 7 September, and 30 September 1933.

17. Interview with old-time Filipino residents and Japanese descendants in Davao City, conducted on 21–24 August and 22–26 October 2003. The author is grateful to Engineer Michael Dakudao, scion of a family with long historical ties with the Furukawa Plantation in Davao, for his assistance in contacting the interviewees.

18. Interview with Mr. Mizuguchi Hiroyuki at his residence in Davao City, 25 October 2003. Mr. Mizuguchi had completed his elementary education in Japan when his parents brought him to Davao, where he continued his high school education.

19. File of Leopoldo Aguinaldo in the People's Court Papers, University of the Philippines Library, 5.

20. Negishi Yoshitro, visiting professor from Rikkyo University in 1939 was only one of those who lectured on *ikebana*. See Goodman 1968.

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