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Simmons: The Scientific Art of Logic

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LOGIC, PROFUSE BUT GOOD

THE SCIENTIFIC ART OF LOGIC. By Professor Edward Simmons.
Milwaukee, Wisc.: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1961. 331 pp.

In starting my review of this book I would like to have known whether the students who are to use this text would also take up *Philosophical Psychology*, for if they were, it would seem better to have omitted several explanations which appear to be more appropriate to that section of Philosophy.

For instance, the explanation of the difference between sense and intellectual knowledge (page 2) could have been left out—even though the author certainly makes excellent use of this distinction when he comes to explain formal signs.

Of course, if the students were not to take up *Philosophical Psychology* later, then by all means the author should bring in psychological explanations wherever they fit and I must say that such explanations certainly make the course much more scientific and thus more intellectually satisfying.

Supposing then that Psychology will not be taken, I still fail to see how this textbook could be covered in one semester. True, the professor could do it if he merely lectured without working out many of the excellent exercises in class. But unless many of these exercises are discussed, it would seem that the principles of formal and material logic would not be firmly grasped.

Moreover, as a textbook of elementary logic, it seems to be too formidable for most students, a fact which the author himself appears to admit when he suggests that some teachers might choose to omit the more difficult parts. Now if some parts could be omitted without frustrating the author's purpose, I believe they should have been omitted from a textbook which purports to be an elementary text.

Having looked at the book from a student's point of view, let me consider it from the teacher's viewpoint. Undoubtedly a teacher will agree with the author that unless the rules of logical procedure are scientifically grounded on immediate analytic principles, they cannot adequately serve as principles either of a critique of, or defense for, scientific discourse.

The author has chosen a very logical and clear division of the matter into three parts, namely the Logic of the first operation, of the second, and of the third. In the first part, dealing with Simple Apprehension, there are several sections which display clear explanations of diverse aspects which the teacher only too often passes over in a cursory manner.

Thus, when the author deals with formal signs, he carefully shows how the logician is directly interested in ordering the objects of intellectual knowledge and only indirectly concerned with the formal signs through which these objects are known. The explanation of the extension of the concept is also well clarified by showing there is an indefinite number of subjects within the extension of any concept due to the abstract nature of the concept.

When the author comes to "Definition" and "Division" he brings out the value of division in regard to definition by indicating how division is one of the chief instruments of the intellect in its search for definitions. This the author expertly explains by deriving the definition of Mathematics (page 90).

When the author comes to the second part of the book, which deals with the second operation of the mind, he starts with a very clear explanation of the judgment by pointing out the difference between the first and second operation of the mind and by indicating the two basic types of judgment, namely the existential and the attributive. Moreover, he is careful to avoid the erroneous impression which students are apt to have regarding the attributive propositions by showing that such judgments also bear on existence and not merely on essence, and he does this by indicating the two types of existence that things can possess.

The author also prevents the misapprehension some students have about the importance of the third operation of the mind, reasoning, which they derive from defining logic as the art and science of correct reasoning. He does this very simply by showing the pre-eminence of the judgment, which is the intellectual operation *par excellence* for man.

But when the author discusses the motive for assent, he merely calls it evidence without explaining the meaning of objective evidence, and although he explains the two kinds of evidence, intrinsic and extrinsic, he fails to make an important distinction. When we get the evidence from the testimony of some authority, which he merely lists as extrinsic evidence, I think it would be better to say that we have extrinsic evidence of the event but intrinsic evidence of the credibility of the witness. However, since I think the book is too profuse, to be logical I should advocate the omission of this section entirely.

One of the many fine points that deserve special commendation is the author's treatment of the supposition of terms. This, in my opinion, is very essential in evaluating the correctness of the syllogism yet a point which many students fail to grasp. One of the difficulties is due to the student's difficulty in understanding the difference between "signification" and "supposition" of terms (or perhaps I should say that it is due to the teacher's failure to emphasize this difference).

In any case, the author certainly brings out the difference in a clear and forceful manner, which should go a long way towards removing this stubborn block.

In this connection, however, I do not see the need for the use of the term "logico-real" supposition, because I think the term "absolute supposition" would be sufficient to cover such cases, since absolute supposition is regarded without explicit reference to individuals.

When the author takes up the compound proposition, he would be clearer if he treated the categorical proposition first, then the hypothetical, which would be better divided into the conditional, disjunctive and conjunctive. The author prefers to call the disjunctive the alternative and the conjunctive the disjunctive, which of course can be defended but is not so traditional.

Moreover, I fail to see any necessity for treating of the reduction of alternative (disjunctive) and disjunctive (conjunctive) to the conditional, nor do I see how it benefits the student to treat of the symbolic representation of compound propositions.

When the author reaches the third operation of the mind he presents a very clear exposition of the nature of reasoning which students will be able to grasp without any difficulty. However, when treating of the basic principles for the categorical syllogism, he does not explicitly show the connections between the principles of triple identity, of the separating third and the principles of the dictum *de omni* and *de nullo*.

Moreover, when he states the general rule that nothing follows from two particular premises, I would like to see mention made of such exceptions as:

Most boys are honest.

Most boys are brave.

Some brave ones are honest.

Thus, although the middle term "Most boys" is twice particular, still in such cases we may disregard the rule about the middle term since we are sure we are comparing the minor and major terms with the same middle term and so we are, in such cases, accomplishing the purpose of the rule.

In discussing the disjunctive and conjunctive syllogism, I would prefer to determine first how the different parts are opposed, i.e., whether they are opposed like contradictories or like contraries or like sub-contraries, and then indicate the proper rules to be followed in each case.

A section of the book which most teachers will particularly appreciate is that on the self-evident proposition, because many students fail to grasp the distinction between the self-evident and the factually evident immediate proposition. However, I should not be too hasty in blaming the students since the fault may well lie with the teacher who fails to bring out the difference. In any case, this section will certainly prevent such fundamental errors regarding the basic truths of the scientific syllogism. The author, moreover, is very careful to bring out and clearly explain the further distinction of self-evident propositions which are self-evident in themselves and those which are self-evident to all of us and to the learned.

Another point the author carefully brings out in connection with self-evident propositions is the role that experience plays in their formulation.

Although the author treats of mediate induction very well, still I would like to have seen clearly expressed the connections between the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of efficient causality, the principle of uniformity of nature and the nature of the object under investigation.

In treating of fallacious argumentation, the author handles the matter in a very satisfactory manner, namely, with clearness and not too diffusely.

Doctor Donald A. Gallagher, the general editor of the Christian Culture and Philosophy series, is to be congratulated for starting the new series with this book on Logic by Edward D. Simmons. Undoubtedly those who peruse this first contribution will look forward to future works in the series with great interest.

HENRY B. McCULLOUGH

THE GUY AND JUAN

MAGSAYSAY AND THE PHILIPPINE PEASANTRY. The Agrarian Impact on Philippine Politics, 1953-1956. By Frances Lucille Starner. University of California Publications in Political Science. Volume 10. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961. 294 pp.

The late President Ramon Magsaysay was the first presidential candidate in Philippine political history who perceived and used to