

# philippine studies

Ateneo de Manila University • Loyola Heights, Quezon City • 1108 Philippines

---

## **Expulsion of the Chinese and Readmission to the Philippines: 1764-1779**

Salvador P. Escoto

*Philippine Studies* vol. 47, no. 1 (1999): 48–76

Copyright © Ateneo de Manila University

---

Philippine Studies is published by the Ateneo de Manila University. Contents may not be copied or sent via email or other means to multiple sites and posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's written permission. Users may download and print articles for individual, noncommercial use only. However, unless prior permission has been obtained, you may not download an entire issue of a journal, or download multiple copies of articles.

Please contact the publisher for any further use of this work at [philstudies@admu.edu.ph](mailto:philstudies@admu.edu.ph).

<http://www.philippinestudies.net>

## Expulsion of the Chinese and Readmission to the Philippines: 1764–1779

*Salvador P. Escoto*



"Murderers!" "Traitors!" "Apostates!" "Ingrates!" These are some of the nasty epithets directed against the Chinese in the aftermath of the British Occupation of Manila, 1762–64. To the Spaniards, it was an intensely emotional issue filled with hatred, revenge and disbelief. How could the *sangleyes* (as they were then called in the Philippines), the Christian-Chinese in particular, do such a terrible thing! After enriching themselves in the Philippines, they became enthusiastic allies of the English invaders, joined in their military campaigns, set fire to many towns, desecrated the churches, killed several Spaniards, and even tortured a few priests. The Chinese, on the other hand, believed they had legitimate reasons for their disloyalty. They regarded the Spanish government as unbearably oppressive. After suffering discrimination, overtaxation, periodic massacres and expulsions for almost two centuries, they probably considered the arrival of the British as the best thing that ever happened in the Islands. The British treated them better, were tolerant of other religions and more enlightened in trade policy. Unfortunately for the *sangleyes*, the Peace Treaty of Paris, which ended the Seven Years War of 1756–63, returned Manila to Spain. Consequently, they were terror-stricken at the thought of being left behind at the mercy of the Spaniards.

At the beginning of the transfer-of-power conference with the English officials, Simón de Anda, the *de facto* governor and leader of the resistance movement, instructed his delegates to deny general pardon to the Chinese. This attitude was maintained by the interim governor, Francisco de la Torre, who arrived on 18 March 1764. Colonel Thomas Backhouse, the chief British negotiator, cajoled, remonstrated and finally threatened to delay the departure of some of his troops and charge the Spanish government 20 pesos for every Chinese transported out of Manila. De la Torre eventually yielded and

published a general amnesty, which was supplemented by a British edict declaring that the Chinese were under the protection of the King of England (Leebrick 1915, 196–206).

Many Chinese, however, did not trust the Spaniards. Since there was a shortage of ships to transport even the British troops to India, a large number of Chinese assembled a flotilla of small boats off Cavite on April 4–6, and embarked for Mariveles, where Alexander Dalrymple, the provisional governor of Manila, promised them transportation. Dalrymple was able to accommodate them aboard sampans sequestered from Chinese traders. Some unlucky refugees, however, were shipwrecked and were forced to land on Spanish-controlled territories. In desperation, they killed themselves by plunging back into the sea and drowned, rather than be taken back to Manila (Leebrick 1915, 208–9).

In his long letter of 30 June 1764, Anda recommended the total expulsion of the Chinese and informed the king that more than 3,000 of them had already fled the Islands.<sup>1</sup> Of these “1,100 to 1,200” sangleyes in “nine or ten sampans”, excluding of course those who died in the tragic shipwreck, followed Dalrymple to Sulu. Another group of “near 300 Chinese,” were sent in February to the “West Coast” under the charge of the “Governor of Fort Marlborough.” Apparently, the fort referred to here was not in Bombay (India), but in Bencoleen, Sumatra.<sup>2</sup> There are many references indicating that the bulk of the refugees returned to China, especially to Canton. Sometimes, small groups departed on ships with no known destinations, but no Chinese was ever mentioned as having been taken to India.<sup>3</sup>

Meantime, Governor de la Torre proclaimed an ordinance banning the Chinese from carrying any kind of weapons under penalty of death. A muster of troops was dispatched to Parian, the Chinatown in Manila, and to the suburbs of Arroceros, Binondo and Santa Cruz, where many of them lived, to confiscate and inventory surrendered arms. At this early stage, De la Torre ordered some Chinese from neighboring towns to come to the city in preparation for their expulsion.<sup>4</sup>

### Spanish Public Opinion

Spanish public opinion was totally against the Chinese. While in the past, segments of Spanish society, like the Commerce of Manila (known after 1769 as the *Consulado* and roughly equivalent to today's Chamber of Commerce) and many friars came to their defense, this

time it was different. They had no protectors. Not a single government official or religious figure came forward to defend them. The prevailing sentiment was unanimous: they had to go. Even the Cabildo, the municipal government of Manila, which traditionally supported the Chinese for economic reasons, was critical. Moreover, at its own initiative and with the Audiencia's blessing, it called upon the leading civil and religious establishments to voice their views and to disclose any further crimes committed by the Chinese during the war. The testimonies began June 15 and ended July 17.<sup>5</sup>

The first to testify was Fray Remigio Hernández, the provincial superior of the Augustinian Order. According to him, the chief Chinese conspirator was Don Nicolas Subang, who was the collector of taxes on liquor in Bulacan where his extended family lived. He informed the British of Anda's arrival in that province and his attempts to rally the support and loyalty of the natives. Because of his spying services, he was appointed leader of the sangleyes. Through his influence and his many relatives, Subang persuaded the Chinese throughout the province of Pampanga not to recognize Anda and to subject themselves instead to the British. He masterminded the plot to kill the Spanish officials and people as they left the Church after the Christmas midnight mass. Fortunately, Anda was forewarned and, with the help of the natives, he defeated the rebels and hanged those captured.

Afterward, Subang and his many followers guided the English forces to the towns of Bulacan and Malolos in Pampanga and to the towns of Taal and Balayan in the neighboring province of Batangas, where they tortured and killed some friars. When Subang realized that Anda's forces were getting stronger, he and his henchmen escaped to China taking with them a huge amount of silver.<sup>6</sup>

The testimony of Fr. Bernardo Pazuengos, the Jesuit superior, was hard-hitting and thorough. He accused the Chinese of being more barbarous to the Church than the Moros, Malabars, and Sepoys combined. They even compelled some Chinese mestizos to join the insurrection. In Santa Cruz, all but three Chinese joined the rebellion. They served as guides to all the British military campaigns, pointing hidden paths and indefensible sites to them. They were the suppliers of foodstuffs to the enemy, and were responsible for the burning, looting and robberies in the suburbs. He personally saw them bring 1,300 [sic] cattle to maintain the needs of the English army. Without them, the enemy would not have been able to provision the

squadron that left 2 March 1763, nor the eight ships that sailed later to China, nor even sustain the defence of Manila.

According to Pazuengos, those that came to these Islands were the worst scoundrels in the kingdom of China. They debased and falsified the coins; made cheap imitations of whatever the natives manufactured and thus ruined their weaving industry; shipped their enormous profits to their relatives in their home country; and many times escaped to China with a huge amount of money entrusted to them by Spaniards or pretended that their ships were lost. Whenever the government increased their taxes, they merely raised the price of their merchandise and passed it on to their customers.

They had revolted in the past and in those uprisings many Spaniards, Indios, and two governor-generals lost their lives. From King Philip IV to the present time, many royal orders were decreed ordering their expulsion, but these were never carried out. The Chinese could be compared best to the Moriscos. The Moriscos, the so called "Moors" in Spain, were the Muslims who accepted Christian baptism. Like the Chinese, they were considered indispensable to the Spanish economy, but remained an unassimilable minority and posed a major problem to the Spanish crown. They were overtaxed, discriminated against suppressed after various rebellions and became Christians to avoid expulsion. They were also rounded up and herded aboard waiting vessels to transport them to Africa. Their mass expulsion began in 1609 and was completed in 1614. Of the 300,000 Moriscos, only about 10, 000 managed to remain in Spain (Regla 1953, 215-68, 402-79). Many arguments were once raised against their deportation, because it was bad for the economy of Spain. In this capital [Manila], a successor to Governor Obando was purposely appointed due to his noncompliance with the expulsion decree. In turn Governor Arandia was "able to hide the truth from the royal court" in his failure to execute the order.<sup>7</sup> The response of the Cathedral Chapter on 3 July, was very brief. The Metropolitan See of Manila was then vacant due to the death of Archbishop Antonio Rojo. Because of the archdiocese's delicate situation, the canons of the cathedral requested to be excused from making any statement.

The testimony of Fray Pedro Yre, the provincial superior of the Dominican Order, was probably the most devastating to the Chinese. After all, the Dominicans were supposed to be their friends and protectors. These friars had looked after their well-being since the late 16th century, established a parish, and constructed Hospital San

Gabriel exclusively for them. This time the Dominican provincial was asking for their total expulsion. "I plead once, twice, thrice with the most urgent request," he told the Audiencia, "that in the coming monsoon all Christian Chinese be sent back to China. Their religion should not be used as a pretext for further delay, because they could still practise their faith in the various Catholic parishes established in China by His Royal Majesty. If an exception should be made for the married because of the untold sufferings which their families would undergo, then they must be confined to live outside the city walls under rigid supervision so that they would not cause any harm to the state nor corrupt the customs of the natives."

In a lengthy narrative, Fray Yre traced the history of the various Chinese uprisings since 1594 and the subsequent unenforced royal decrees ordering their expulsion. Finally, Governor-General Arandia carried out the order and reported to the king that not a single infidel Chinese was left in the Philippines. However, the sangleyes astutely used baptism to remain in the Islands. Of the 2,500 Chinese [catechumens], less than 120 regularly complied with their religious obligations. Over two-third of 33 percent [sic] continued practicing idolatry in private as well as in public. They wore their hair in pig-tails to show that they were infidels; they tore their baptismal certificates; they burned their dead and buried them in cemeteries designated for infidels; and displayed the idols of their ancestors for public veneration. When the English came, they carried flags bearing the names of their idols and carried them in solemn processions around Parian as an act of public worship.<sup>8</sup>

The testimonies of the provincial superiors of the Franciscan and Recollect Orders as well as the letter of the Cabildo to the king did not disclose new information, but were equally forceful and fully endorsed the expulsion of the Chinese.<sup>9</sup> Gov. de la Torre also wrote to the king, urging total expulsion of the Chinese and advising against their baptism and intermarriage with native women since these were used merely as loop-holes for staying in the Philippines. He further suggested that Chinese merchants be allowed to trade, but only in Manila and not in the provinces, and that after the fair they return to China (Diaz-Trechuelo 1969, II, 18).

### **The Decree of Expulsion**

The testimonies and reports that were sent to Spain were turned over to the Supreme Council of the Indies on 8 November 1765 for

study and consultation. The following year, 17 April 1766, King Charles III issued a decree which is [abridged] as follows:

Because of the petitions made by the interim governor [De la Torre] the royal audiencia, the municipal government of Manila and other ecclesiastical dignitaries, I was fully informed of the numerous crimes perpetrated by the Christian sangleyes, [which were enumerated], either by armed collaboration with the British, or by their public disdain of the Spanish crown, or of the Catholic religion, as manifested in the pillages of towns and churches as well as in the torture and killing of captured Spaniards and ecclesiastics. They showed in many instances their insincerity of faith, such as praising the enemy because they had no friars, no masses, confessions, nor sermons, and the failure of the 200 catechumens to return to Parian for their scheduled baptism declaring that they were just pretending conversion.

Consequently, on the recommendation of the Supreme Council of the Indies, I order the total and absolute expulsion of all married or unmarried Chinese, who during the war had either apostasized or had committed seditious acts, either by helping the enemy or by fomenting the rebellion of the natives in the provinces. Children under twelve years old may remain in the Islands with their mothers and those older who repent could also stay. Those who left voluntarily with the British and those about to be banished should not be allowed to return under penalty of death, and any officials or ecclesiastics who violate this order under any pretext will be deprived of their respective offices. Chinese who sail regularly to Manila for trade could continue as usual as provided by the laws. They have to stay at the Alcayceria of San Fernando (silk market) and return to China after the fair. No one will be allowed to remain, and trading in other ports is absolutely forbidden.

Those Chinese allowed to remain as disposed by law 8, title 18, and book 6 of the Code of the Indies, are to be registered and assigned to towns or places suitable for agriculture or mechanical arts, and should be accessible to local churches for their religious obligation. They may not carry arms nor leave without the expressed permission of the magistrates or *alcaldes mayores* under penalty of expulsion. At the appropriate time, you have to send me through my secretary an account of what you have done and the outcome of your compliance in carrying out my royal decree. The King, Aranjuez, April 17, 1766.<sup>10</sup>

The royal decree arrived in Manila on 17 July 1767, and the new Governor-General, Jose Raon convoked a meeting with the Audiencia on July 21. Since only two *oidors* (magistrates of the Audiencia) of the usual four remained in Manila, the *alcalde* or *cabecilla principal*

(mayor) of the Chinese in the Parian was temporarily placed in charge of the Chinese concentrated in Parian. Because of the heavy workload in the *audiencia*, Raon did not not commission an *oidor* to take charge of expelling the Chinese for two years.<sup>11</sup>

The Chinese rounded up earlier by ex-governor De la Torre were sequestered outside the city walls. After the receipt of the royal decree, Raon ordered the first batch of these Chinese to be expelled. It is not known how they were selected. They had hardly boarded the ships that would take them to China when Raon also ordered the *alcaldes mayores* and *corregidores* (provincial governors) in neighboring towns to empty their jails and galleys, and to send the prisoners to Manila. They formed part of the second group for deportation. The first and second groups as well as the Chinese who were subsequently banished had one thing in common: they were mostly Christian Chinese. Detailed rolls (*padrones*) were taken with separate lists of the names of each individual aboard each ship, indicating their ages, places of origin in China, identifying physical marks such as moles, where baptized, marital status, and the towns where the marriage occurred. Since the towns in which they were married were assumed to be their residences, bachelors had no designated residence. Each list was certified with the signatures of the ship captain, the *alcalde* of Parian, the interpreter, and a Spanish official. The non-Christian Chinese were seldom mentioned and only in numerical terms, if at all. Rarely was a roll taken of them, partly because very few non-Christian Chinese were left in the Islands after the exodus that began from late 1763 onward. Those who arrived in Manila for commercial purposes were required to return to China as soon as possible.

On record, the first group of 218 Christian Chinese were deported in 1767 in four sampans, but a count reveals only 213 names (29 married and 184 single) in the list. What happened to the missing five—not uncommon in these circumstances—is open to speculation. The French astronomer, Le Gentil, who was in Manila at that time, commented: "In the month of September 9–12, several sampans left carrying with them 200 Chinese from the Parian, as well as 400 others who had arrived that same year to establish themselves in Manila."<sup>12</sup> Usually, the trading sampans that arrived annually in Manila brought many more people than the required number of crew needed to operate the ship. Some of them were bonafide merchants who returned to China after the fair, but the majority, mostly non-Chris-



tians, came to stay illegally in the Islands. The "400 others" mentioned by Le Gentil probably belonged to this category.

On 7 October 1767, Raon ordered the Chinese cabecilla to notify his countrymen that in preparation for their expulsion, all stores would be closed within a month or face confiscation of their merchandise. Accordingly, Ignacio Mayoral Gauquiquia notified the heads of the various gremios (guilds) in the Alcayceria which managed ninety stores. On 3 November, he reported that the decree was carried out. Actually, the stores reopened but were managed by the wives, relatives or friends of the owners. Noticing this deception, some Spanish ladies, mestizo Chinese and natives, who made a livelihood selling household wares, complained to the government. Therefore, the acting fiscal of the audiencia, Domingo Aranas, advised Raon to close the stores.<sup>13</sup>

The leaders of the gremios, however, petitioned Governor Raon on 7 November, to postpone the closure until June 1768. They protested because the merchandise was acquired on consignments and could not be sold within a month unless at very low prices. In such circumstances, they would be unable to pay their creditors or maintain their families. Furthermore, the Spaniards and mestizos did not have the goods to keep those stores open and meet the needs of the community. Since the 1768 galleon would be leaving soon for Acapulco and the Spaniards as well as the mestizos needed the goods to obtain a permiso (trade license), the stores had to be kept open and stocked with merchandise for the common good.

Raon relented, but on 16 March 1768, Fiscal Aranas once more urged the governor to observe the strict compliance with the royal decree. The sampans will arrive from China on June 1, he reminded the governor, and four months were needed to process their deportation. By missing the coming monsoon, the Chinese—notorious for their delaying tactics—were practically assured of staying for another year. The fiscal contended that the Chinese were given ample time to dispose of their goods and told Raon to close the stores immediately. However, the City and Commerce of Manila intervened on their behalf, and the owners were allowed to remain and kept their stores open.<sup>14</sup>

Instead, the 257 Chinese expelled in 1768, from 4 July to 17 September, were 164 convicts and vagrants or *vagamundos* (12 married and 152 single) together with 91 "infidels," the crew of a sampan that foundered off the coast of the province of Ilocos. There is a miscount of two and the total should have been 255 expelled, not 257.<sup>15</sup>

A fascinating aspect of the rosters or padrones is the detailed personal information they contain about the deported Christian Chinese. They recorded their ages, marital status, origin, locations where baptisms and marriages took place as well as the names and ages of their wives and children. It is almost impossible to make a complete tabulation of these data, because there are missing entries of individuals and even of entire groups aboard a specific ship. Nevertheless, some knowledge of this raw information is important for an insight into their personal histories and the socioeconomic milieu in which they lived. About 90 percent of both married and single were baptized in Parian, Santa Cruz, Binondo (occasionally at the Hospital San Gabriel), and the remaining 10 percent took place in various haciendas, missions and elsewhere. After their conversion to Christianity, most of them moved to other places.

### **Raon and the Roundup of the Chinese**

Even though Governor Raon failed to commission an *oidor* to take charge of the expulsion, he nevertheless began earnest implementation of the royal decree. In late 1767, he began sending letters to all *corregidores* and *alcaldes mayores* ordering them to send all the Chinese and their families to Parian. He further told them to make a detailed roster of their ages and marital status, as well as the names and ages of their wives and children. Some of his letters were undelivered and replies from the local authorities in the entire Bikol region (from Camarines Norte southward to the island of Masbate) and from many parts of the Visayas and Mindanao are missing. Some reports, mostly from northern Luzon, dated November 1767 to mid-1768, provide some insight into the socioeconomic conditions of the territory within their respective jurisdictions, while some responses portray vividly the pathos and sufferings inflicted on the Chinese by the expulsion decree.

The first to reply was Jose Farando, the castellan and *alcalde mayor* of Cavite. In his report of 20 November 1767, he stated that there were forty bachelors and forty married *sangleyes* in Cavite. He could send the bachelors more quickly after giving them enough time to attend to their personal affairs. It would take more time for the married since some of the wives and children were sick. He also asked what he should do with the skilled ironworkers and contractors who provided the port town with supplies of meat and wine. After

receiving Gov. Raon's order, Farando waited until the sick members of the families recovered before sending them to Manila. As to the ironworkers and the suppliers of meat and wine, they were also sent to the capital after replacements were found through public bidding.<sup>16</sup>

The *alcaldes mayores* of Pagsanjan and Lingayen had similar problems and asked for guidance. The former asked what he should do with the blind, the gravely ill, and the wives who could not accompany their husbands, because they had to attend to their children and their means of livelihood. The latter inquired about the adult sons and daughters married to natives and mestizo Chinese, about the very old, the widows, or wives whose husbands had fled probably to China. Raon told the provincial governors to let them stay, but those who could journey to Manila had to maintain themselves.<sup>17</sup>

The *alcalde mayor* of Ilocos reported that in Vigan alone, the capital of the province, there were more than 200 Chinese tributes. The Chinese community was so big that it had its own *gremio*. However, he was unsure what to do with families whose fathers were either deceased or had slipped out of the country, or whose adult children were already married.

In the provinces of Ilocos and Pangasinan, the operation was temporarily suspended due to the intervention of the new bishop of Nueva Segovia. Monsignor Miguel Garcia Luna asked Raon to give the Chinese a grace period. In Pangasinan, the bishop pointed out, at least seventeen families were so sick that it was practically impossible for them to negotiate the strenuous trip to Manila. Furthermore, an epidemic rampant in Ilocos had confined many to bed. The long, exhausting journey to Manila would expose them to the inclemencies of nature and they could lose (meaning "be robbed") their belongings along the way.<sup>18</sup>

The *corregidor* of the province of Iligan, Captain Gaspar Ylagorri, informed Raon on 17 May 1768 that he detained three married Chinese merchants from Cebu. Their big *parao* (masted vessel used for interisland commerce in the Philippines) was new, heavily armed and loaded with a rich cargo, which he confiscated. After entrusting the goods for safe-keeping to the tax-collector, Ylagorri communicated with Cebu to verify the authenticity of the Chinese's trading permit. Jose Andres Velarde, the *alcalde mayor* of Cebu, confirmed that he had given the owner of the *parao* the license to trade with the island of Camiguin, which was under the *corregimiento* of Yligan. The ten crew members were bona-fide residents of Cebu, Velarde assured

Ylagorri. They had paid their tributes, and had the permit to carry those weapons to defend themselves against the moros.

The vessel was then sent back to Cebu with the understanding that the crew and their families were to be sent to Manila with their valuables and unsold disposable goods. Ylagorri had only one Chinese living in Dapitan, and a Jesuit there certified that he was too old and sickly to travel.<sup>19</sup> The inventory of the parao's rich cargo is a fascinating variety of merchandise with their respective prices, providing an economic historian interesting data and insight into the exchange of trade between Cebu and Cagayan.

The alcalde mayor of Iloilo excused himself for sending only thirty non-Christian Chinese to Manila. Citing shortages of ships, weapons and available soldiers who had to accompany the deportees during the voyage, he explained to Raon that it was only through immense work and scrimping that he was able to construct a vessel to transport them to Manila.

In Samar, it was unusual that a friar, not a government official, dispatched six married Chinese to Manila. Their wives were unable to go with them, the priest explained, because they had to care for so many children. It was impossible to contact the other Chinese in the island since they were dispersed in several remote places.<sup>20</sup>

This moving letter to Raon came from the fort commander of Paragua in Mindanao: "There is only one Chinese here in this town of Taytay. He's Francisco Onco, married, and was exiled to this presidio thirty-four years ago by Governor Fernando Valdes Tamon. I showed him your order, and he replied he was ready to obey. A few days later, he died."

Here's another letter from an alcalde mayor, who asked for guidance on what to do with the four old Chinese within his jurisdiction:

One of them named Bartolome is 96 years old and can hardly walk. His nieces looked after him because all his sons are dead. Another called Santiago Pasco, almost the same age, who beside being senile is of similar condition as Bartolome... The third, Ventura Guanzon, has been affected with leprosy for fifteen years, and his whole face and part of his two hands and feet were already eaten away by the disease. He's bedridden and supported by his wife, who's just awaiting the hour of his death. The fourth, Jose Guanco, has been blind for seven years.<sup>21</sup>

Even in circumstances less extreme than these, Raon was oftentimes sympathetic and accommodating when asked by the pro-

vincial governors what they should do, but some officials simply carried out the order with no question asked.

Although the governor-general's correspondence might indicate that the expulsion process was going smoothly, actually it was disorganized and slow-moving. At least one critic contended that Raon's order to round up the Chinese from the late 1767 to mid-1769 was followed by little action. While a few hundred vagrants and convicts were banished aboard nine sampans in 1767 and 1768, the rank and file of the Chinese population remained in the Islands. The new fiscal, Antonio Andrade, described the situation in his letter to the king on 24 July 1769: "When I arrived in the Islands, I noticed ... the infidel Chinese, apostates and traitors, were just placed under the charge of their cabecilla in Parian; the Chinese in the provinces remained there with frivolous pretext; and those arriving for the commerce were wandering freely about and outside the city. Instead of speedily carrying out the expulsion decree received two years earlier, the operation was being conducted in a manner consonant to the wishes and character of the Governor."<sup>22</sup>

However, Raon had a good excuse. There were only two oidores left in Manila, Francisco Villacorta and Manuel Galban. In fact, the former was shortly promoted to the Audiencia in Mexico and Raon understandably blocked his departure, because in no way could Galban accomplish the work in the audiencia alone. When two new oidores, Antonio Uruñuela and Domingo Blas de Basaraz, together with the new fiscal, Andrade, finally arrived in Manila in November 1768, another royal decree ordering the expulsion of the Jesuits arrived. The governor-general gave it priority and appointed Galbán in charge of expelling the Jesuits. Uruñuela was not commissioned to take over the task of banishing the Chinese until the sixth of June of the following year. The new oidor needed time to adjust in Manila and become acquainted with his responsibilities. Ironically, Andrade, who complained to the king about the governor's sloppy work and claimed the credit for recommending Uruñuela to his new position, was himself responsible for stalling the operation by keeping official papers in his possession for six months. In his second letter to the king, he defended himself by saying that it was only for less than four months, and part of the reason was that his views were at first totally ignored and he received some of the records late. However, he made up for the lost time by quickly completing all the required paper work.<sup>23</sup>

### **Uruñuela and the Official Expulsion of the Chinese**

Immediately after Uruñuela took over his commission, there was general disagreement on how to interpret the royal decree. The commissioner believed it meant total and absolute expulsion; the governor-general wanted many exceptions; but the opinion of the fiscal prevailed in calling for a judicial inquiry to be conducted in order "to distinguish with clarity and justice the infidels from the faithful, the Christians from the apostates, and the loyal to the traitors."

The investigation (*pesquisa*) lasted seventeen days from 21 June through 7 July 1769. It was held night and day in order to expedite the deportation of the guilty before the coming monsoon. Of the seventy-six selected witnesses, two were Armenians, one Malabar, two natives (*Filipinos*), two Spanish widows, four Spaniards born in the Philippines, and nine Chinese *mestizos* reflecting their rising social importance. The rest were Spaniards, most of whom were either officials in the central or municipal governments, military and naval officers, or members of the Commerce of Manila. Nine of the witnesses did not state how long they had lived in the Philippines. For those who did, two had lived in the Islands for around forty years, one for thirty-six years, three for thirty years, and the shortest period of residence was seven years. In general, the witnesses described the Chinese in collective terms,—frenzied, faceless, murderous mobs caught up in a spontaneous, heady uprising where even the leaders were hardly identifiable.<sup>24</sup>

Most of the testimonies were long, boring and repetitious—a partial rehash of some information made earlier by the religious superiors in 1764. Uruñuela in his report to the king on 27 July 1769 aptly summarized their accounts in the following manner: When the British entered Manila, the Chinese exacted exorbitant fares from fleeing Spaniards to ferry them to safety across the Pasig river. Once aboard, the latter were stripped naked, robbed and beaten up. Afterwards, the rebels tried to kill Anda in Guagua, Pampanga. During the expedition to Bulacan, 1,500 Chinese joined the English forces serving as vanguards and asked that the prisoners be delivered to them. With the permission granted, they took them out of the churches and convents, killed them and set the buildings on fire. In Pasig, they put to death several natives of both sexes. In the provinces of Laguna, Tayabas and Batangas, they pillaged and burned the towns, tortured an Augustinian friar, made him drink urine, brought him to Manila tied to a horse where he died from beatings

at San Juan de Dios Hospital. In Quiapo, they slew men, women and children inside the church including a native parish priest, Fr. Bartolomé Saguinsin, profaned holy statues, stole the sacred vessels and scattered the sacred hosts across the floor. They even offered the British a large amount of money to permit them to kill as many Spaniards they could find. They yanked the rosaries off their necks saying there was no "Santa Maria" and prevented their wives from fulfilling their religious duties. Based on this investigation, Uruñuela concluded that practically every body was guilty of sedition and apostasy.

Consequently, he ordered that the sangleyes in neighboring towns be promptly brought to the city, with the understanding that those who would be judged innocent would be confined in Parian for eventual resettlement elsewhere. On 18 July, at four o'clock in the morning, eight pickets of soldiers were dispatched to seal off the streets in the suburbs of Arroceros, Binondo and Santa Cruz, where most of the Chinese were quartered. They were aroused from their sleep and marched off to the Alcayceria of San Fernando, which served as a detention center. By noon, some 1,500 were apprehended. A padrón was later made indicating their names, ages, place of birth, marital status, where baptized or married, and places of residence. These exclude the Chinese from the provinces who were on their way to Manila, bringing with them a separate roster provided by their respective alcaldes mayores.

Since those arrested in the capital could not bring their possessions with them, the unmarried were ordered to close their stores and the married to leave them in the care of their wives or relatives. This was done to make them understand the fairness of the king's policy and to forestall any complaints of being robbed of their property; but if that were to happen, it was done by their own people. For this reason, some Chinese were posted in strategic places to guard the stores. At first, the cabecilla and three of their captains were made trustees with powers to sell their stores, settle their accounts and take charge of their assets. However, when the four Chinese officials declined the appointments as caretakers to avoid their countrymen's suspicion of dishonesty, each individual Chinese was permitted to return to his home. Those living in the neighboring provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Laguna and Balayan were given fifteen days to dispose of their merchandise wholesale, settle their accounts, and entrust their assets to the persons of their choice. The captains of the sampans assigned to take them back to China

were to collect the corresponding amount for their fares and other expenses.<sup>25</sup>

Dissatisfied with the way the roundup was handled, Fiscal Andrade reported to the king that the sangleyes were yanked from their beds with no thought given to the property left behind. This resulted in two days of extortions and looting even within the sight of the commissioner. Finally, the Chinese were permitted to return to their homes and to dispose of their belongings in an attempt to cover up the injustice committed. In the past two years, only 348 Chinese had been expelled and there were still many left in the provinces. The *alcaldes mayores* were to be held responsible for the robbery and fraud suffered by many families on their way to Manila. No Chinese so far had been sent away from Pangasinan, Ilocos and Iloilo. Since the royal order must be obeyed, the *alcaldes mayores* there should be compelled to comply despite the intercession of the bishop of Nueva Segovia. Apparently, the *alcalde mayor* of Albay had not received the decree and should be notified again. Two investigators should be dispatched to Cebu to verify the *alcalde mayor's* claim that all of the Chinese there met the requirements to remain in the island. Incoming sampans were to be inspected immediately for possible returnees. Those who come for commerce were to be restricted strictly to the *alcaycería* with no wandering around permitted beyond the designated area. After the fair, they were to leave in the same number aboard the same vessel that brought them to Manila.<sup>26</sup>

Two years after the arrival of the expulsion decree, the central government was finally ready to begin deporting the bulk of the Chinese population. There were still small bands trickling into the capital from northern Luzon, and many more from distant islands had not arrived, but they would be processed and shipped out the following years.

On record, 573 Christians and eight infidels were officially expelled in five sampans and two pataches in the month of August 1769.<sup>27</sup> However, these figures should be taken with caution. For instance, in one sampan there were only thirty-eight Chinese Christians in the list and not 65 as officially reported. It is hard to ascertain the number of Chinese expelled as demonstrated in Uruñuela's letter (abridged) to the king two weeks earlier:

At the advice of two distinguished Spanish pilots who examined the four departing sampans to determine how many expellees could be accomodated, I found out I could squeeze in 412 Christian-Chinese,



plus 117 more Christians who came with the vessels with the intention of remaining. The first sampan, Sin Tong Cuat, brought [to Manila] 171 Chinese, of which 153 were infidels and 18 Christians. The latter could be increased to 129 [which means, he could squeeze in 111 more Christian Chinese for deportation]. The second sampan, Guan Tin, brought 217, of which 174 were infidels and 43 Christians. The latter could be increased to 125. The third sampan, Tay Cuan Chao, brought 124—107 infidels and 17 Christians—and the latter could be increased to 66. The fourth sampan, Ong Sin Tin, brought 208—178 infidels and 30 Christians—which could be increased to 92. I also learned that the four sampans had brought in many more men than the number of the crew required, so by deporting them [the non-Christians] too, the total number of expelled will be about 700. I am presently trying to procure some more vessels to hasten the expulsion of the many sangleyes that still remained in this capital. When this is done, I will be able to attend to the resettlement of those found innocent in compliance with your royal decree.<sup>28</sup>

As Uruñuela put it, he could squeeze in a total of "412" Christian-Chinese, but when computed it amounted only to 304. When the expulsion was finally carried out several weeks later—with Sampan Tec Sen and two Spanish pataches added to the four original sampans—the actual number of expelled was 565 (officially 580). Only eight "infidels" are mentioned, and it is not indicated whether the "117" stowaway Christian-Chinese were included in the "580" officially expelled in 1769. Regardless, more non-Christian Chinese were expelled on this occasion, "720" according to the Audiencia as reported to the king in their letter two days later.<sup>29</sup>

From the 7th of February through 26 October 1770, some 753 Christian Chinese were expelled in five sampans, two goletas, one patache and one paquebot. Two vessels were headed to Macao, one to Canton, another to Amoy and the destinations of the rest were not mentioned. Allegedly, some of the 50 Chinese aboard the patache Nuestra Sra. del Rosario were captured by the moros, although the circumstances of their capture were not reported.

The Chinese had hardly left for China when a Spanish frigate carrying Simon de Anda, the new governor-general, arrived in Cavite on 15 July 1770. He promptly incarcerated Gov. Raon, three oidores—Villacorta, Galban, and Basaraz—and the government secretary, Antonio Cosio, for malfeasance of office and dereliction of duty in regard to the expulsion of the Jesuits. For a while, the governor was considering adding Uruñuela to his victims for his alleged clandes-

tine investments in the Acapulco galleon trade and for accepting "gifts and bribes" from the Chinese. Unfortunately, Anda did not elaborate on the bribes allegedly given to Uruñuela. In his letter to the king, Anda explained: "I did not take action [against him] because the Audiencia would have only two oidores left [one of them accompanied him to the Philippines], and also to avoid the inconvenience that would ensue if the dishonesty of the person concerned were made public." He ended his letter by leaving the matter to the king. "If His Majesty decided that Uruñuela should be prosecuted, then another oidor should be sent to Manila."<sup>30</sup> Apparently, the king decided otherwise.

Still in charge of his commission, the following year, from June 12 through 25 November 1771, Uruñuela expelled 712 Christian Chinese in eight sampans, one goleta and one patache. Six of the ten vessels were bound for Amoy, one for Macao and no destination was mentioned for the rest.

Finally, the number of expelled in 1772 dwindled considerably, as can be expected, to a total of only thirty-seven Christians. They were deported from 2 January through 16 August in seven sampans, three of which were bound for Amoy, one for Chiang Chiu, another for Cuajay and the rest were not mentioned.<sup>31</sup>

The grand total of Chinese deported from 1767 through 1772 is 2,460 as indicated in the following chart:

Years	Number of vessels	Number of Christian-Chinese	Number of non-Christian Chinese
1767	4	218	?
1768	5	166	91
1769	7	573	1
1770	9	753	35
1771	10	712	0
1772	7	38	12
Grand total	42	2,460	139

In fact, the exact number of Chinese expelled may never be known. As stated earlier, the ship rosters of 1767 listed only 215 names not 218, that of 1768 had only 164 not 166, and that of 1769 had only 565 and not 580. In 1770, some of the 50 expelled aboard the patache, *Ntra. Sra. del Rosario*, were allegedly captured by the moros. Doubtless, some Christian Chinese were not really banished, but were

merely sent back as stowaways. It is also certain that many more non-Christians who tried to remain illegally in the Islands were also deported, but complete figures concerning these last two groups seldom appear in the record.

The Spanish records are inconsistent in other ways as well. In December 1772, Uruñuela sent the following table of information to the king:

Provinces	No. of Chinese	Expelled	Incapacitated	Dead
Tondo	1,706	1,656	45	5
Cavite	154	147	5	2
Bulacan	43	39	4	0
Pampanga	41	38	3	0
Pangasinan	23	19	4	0
Ilocos	34	30	4	0
Laguna de Bay	41	36	4	1
Tayabas	1	1	0	0
Camarines	13	11	2	0
Albay	2	0	2	0
Cebu	56	55	0	1
Catbalogan	24	17	5	2
Iloilo	89	70	5	4
Capiz	9	8	1	0
Isla de Negros	3	2	1	0
Zambales	4	4	0	0
Batangas	25	23	2	0
Bataan	26	24	2	0
Total	2,294	2,180	89	15

The provinces of Playahonda, Cagayan, Mindoro, Zamboanga, Calamianes, Iligan and Caraga had no Chinese residents.<sup>32</sup>

In a letter which accompanied this table, Uruñuela wrote: "The only sangleyes left in these dominions [were] 94 old, sickly men (reservas). To show them your humane rule, I let them return to their respective provinces so that they could die in peace. Five able-bodied men remained in this capital. One serves as assistant clerk who runs errands for the court regarding infidel Chinese who arrived here annually for commerce. The second is a physician who attends to the sick at the Hospital San Gabriel. The third, an ironsmith who shows the natives how to smelt iron to make plows. The fourth, a translator, who helps communicate his orders to his countrymen.

(Uruñuela forgot to mention the fifth). The moment their services are no longer needed, they will be banished just like the rest. A good number of fugitives had fled to the mountains to escape deportation, but they will be dealt with eventually." After asking pardon for whatever excesses he might have committed in the performance of his commission, Uruñuela requested a reward for his services in carrying out to completion his royal orders.<sup>33</sup>

### **Governor Basco and the New Chinese Policy**

Meanwhile, the mood in Manila had changed as the economy in the city deteriorated. As early as 1767 after the first shipload of Chinese was deported, the French traveling scientist Le Gentil commented that, "all the Spaniards I met in Manila expressed sincere regret at the expulsion of the Chinese, and admitted that they would be missed in the Philippines, because the natives were incapable of taking their place" (Le Gentil 1964, 79).

This change of public opinion began to be felt in Spain and found an influential spokesman in the person of the highly respected Pedro de Calderon. Because of his outstanding achievements while serving as *oidor* of the *audiencia* of Manila in the mid-eighteenth century, he was promoted as *fiscal* to the powerful Council of the Indies, the highest ruling body in charge of Spain's colonial affairs. His main achievements were the tax reform of 1741 and the tactful suppression of the agrarian revolt of 1745 (Roth 1977, 71-75, 100-116).

In 1772, Calderon argued before the Council that only about 1,000 Chinese gave aid to the English and that all of them were new Christians and members of the low class who were given fifteen pesos each for their assistance. As *oidor* in Manila, he had found out that towns inhabited by Chinese were more prosperous because their business transactions with the natives stimulated the cultivation of Philippine products. The natives told him that the Christian Chinese were very helpful in supplying them with all their needs in exchange of rice, chickens and lumber. They were able to live without money, because the Chinese accepted payment in kind. Calderon emphasized the necessity of revoking the expulsion decree and allowing the Chinese, whether Christian or infidels, to return to the Philippines, because their economic role could never be filled by either the Spaniards or the natives. His views were strongly supported later by Fray Manuel de la Concepcion in Manila.

Governor Anda died 30 October 1776. His death marks the end of the hard-line brand of sinophobia and the beginning of the government new policy of readmitting the Chinese in the Philippines. His successor, Jose Basco y Vargas, who arrived in Manila on 27 July 1778, was expressly instructed by the king to allow the return of a small number of Chinese, preferably farmers and artisans. Accordingly, Basco communicated the new decree to all the sampan captains so that they could disseminate the information upon their return to China. Basco also commissioned Bartolome Pitco, the cabecilla of the tiny Chinese community in Manila to go to Canton, Lanquin and Amoy and recruit as many as 4,000 settlers, especially porcelain manufacturers, dyers, foundrymen, blacksmiths, miners, master artisans in lacquer production and those skilled in mulberry silk culture. Unfortunately, many of the expelled Christian Chinese were getting old, or were no longer interested, and some had moved to the interior of China and were hard to contact. On his return, therefore, Pitco was only able to bring mostly merchants, a modest number of artisans, and very few farmers.<sup>34</sup>

It is hard to determine how many Christian Chinese were admitted to the Philippines under the new program in 1778, and how many were long-time residents who were exempted from expulsion. Rosters made from 4 May to the end of December 1778 listed 593 Christian Chinese and 138 non-Christians including twenty seven who were shipwrecked off the coast of Bolinao. This group was shipped back to China for illegal entry. No clear-cut distinction, however, was made as to how many of the 593 Christians were newly admitted, thus making this document ambiguous and open to interpretation.

Of the 576 Christian Chinese (no entry for the 17 from Cebu), 307 were married and their marriages were held in the following places (considered as their residence):

Arroceros	24	Dilao	2	Pasay	7
Baco[l]od	2	Gagalangin	1	Pasig	4
Bacolor	2	(sitio)		Polo	4
Bagumbayan	2	Ilocos	8	Quiapo	2
Bangcusay	20	Iloilo	4	Rio de Caña	2
Balayan	2	Laguna	10	Sta. Ana	7
Bata[a]n	4	Makati	4	Sta. Cruz	49
Batangas	4	Maragondon	1	San Juan del Monte	2
Bigaa	3	Marilao	1	San Pedro	1

# PHILIPPINE STUDIES

Binondo	32	Mariquina	3	Tambobong	22
Biñan	2	Meycawayan	11	Tarlac	2
Catbalongan	3	Pampanga	16	Tayabas	2
Cavite	1	Pandacan	14	Tondo	15
Camarines	4	Pangasinan	4	(no entry)	7
Cebu	7	Parian	2		

Note the big difference in the ages between the 576 Christian Chinese (307 married and 269 single) and the 138 non-Christian:

<u>Married</u>	<u>No.</u> <u>%</u>		<u>Single</u>	<u>No.</u> <u>%</u>		<u>Non-Christians</u>	<u>No.</u> <u>%</u>	
Teenager (19)	0	0	19	0	0	19	3	2.2
20's -	3	1.0	20's -	5	1.9	20's -	55	39.9
30's -	34	10.9	30's -	62	23.4	30's -	62	44.9
40's -	85	27.3	40's -	73	27.6	40's -	8	5.8
50's -	101	32.5	50's -	81	30.6	50's -	9	6.5
60's -	59	19.0	60's -	29	10.9	60's -	0	0
70's -	25	8.0	70's -	10	3.8	70's -	1	0.7
80's -	1	0.3	80's -	1	0.4	80's -	0	0
No entry	3	1.0		4	1.5		0	0
Total	311	100		265	100		138	100

From late 1778 to early April 1779, two hundred sixty-six immigrants arrived in eight sampans, 83 of whom were married and 183 single.<sup>35</sup> Some 898 more Christian Chinese settlers were admitted in 1779, of which 207 were married and their places of residence by provinces were as follows:<sup>36</sup>

Tondo	114	Camarines	2
Cavite	19	Tayabas	1
Bulacan	14	Nueva Ecija	4
Bataan	1	Ilocos	4
Batangas	5	Cebu	1
Laguna	14	Samar	4
Pampanga	15	Iloilo	5
Pangasinan	4		
		Total	207

Judging from the above figures, the New Chinese Policy fell far short of its stated goal. To stimulate the economy, Governor Basco wanted to promote the formation of a home-grown body of Spanish and Chinese mestizo entrepreneurs by recruiting mostly Chinese farmers and artisans from China who could serve as role models. Anticipating a mass influx of immigrants, Governor Basco prudently set a ceiling of 4,000 settlers, a number small enough in his estimate for the revitalized colonial army to subdue them easily in case of rebellion. Contrary to his expectation, the pace of immigration was so slow that Basco decided to admit non-Christians, but changed his mind when he found out in 1781 that the new immigrants moored aboard the sampans were offering sacrifices to idols on Easter Sunday. Thus, statistics show that by the end of 1788, there were only about 1,500 living in the environs of Manila, of whom 1,200 were Christians and the rest catechumens. In 1824, there were only 5,442 Chinese throughout the entire islands (Diaz-Trechuelo 1963, 208; 1969).<sup>37</sup>

## Conclusion

Several regulations employed in banishing the Chinese, such as allowing the wives and children under twelve years old to remain, were largely borrowed from the practice used in expelling the Moriscos almost a century and a half earlier. With all her experiences in the past including the expulsion of the Jews in 1492, Spain was expected to have developed a system that would cause the least harm to the evicted people. Yet when applied to the Chinese in the Philippines, numerous abuses and several heart-rending incidents still occurred.

Chinese properties in greater Manila were to a large extent protected, but those transported from distant provinces fared worse. Their owners were robbed or gouged by unscrupulous officials, escorting soldiers and boat operators. The expulsions of 1767 and 1768 were arbitrary because no preceding judicial inquiry was held to determine the guilt or innocence of the deported. Many men in their seventies, some sickly and decrepit, were forced to make the long trek to Manila. Although at least ninety-four of them were allowed to remain, they had to undergo again the rigors of travel to their respective home provinces. To compel entire families to accompany those expelled to the capital made no sense and caused untold physical and financial hardship to those who were forced to go by un-

bending *alcaldes mayores*. The most reprehensible was the sweeping round-up and general expulsion of the Chinese regardless of their geographical habitations. It is understandable to inflict such punishment on those residing in Manila and northern Luzon, but to banish also those living peacefully further south in Luzon and in the distant islands of Visayas and Mindanao, who had nothing to do with the British, was a gross miscarriage of justice.

Despite chronological and other favorable circumstantial coincidences, it is highly doubtful that the Chinese exodus from Manila in 1764 was a decisive factor in the rise of population of their kind in the Sultanate of Sulu. It is true that before 1750, Sulu had a tiny Chinese colony that began to experience remarkable growth in the late 1760s. During his visit in Sulu in 1774, Captain Thomas Forrest noticed "many Chinese being settled there" (Majul 1969, I, 153; Forrest 1971, 238). It is assumed that Dalrymple contributed immensely to this demographic change because his grand project was to attract Chinese immigrants to the newly British acquired island of Balambagan. The fact, however, is that a substantial number of the 1,000 to 1,200 Chinese he brought with him from Manila probably returned to China. The large group of Chinese he had induced to settle in that island never reached their destination. Captain Poqua who commanded the sampan that was supposed to take them to Balambagan disappeared, and was thought to have carried his human cargo back to China. Captain Alves, and probably Dalrymple himself, transported some discontented Chinese to Canton. In short, the presence of many Chinese in Sulu can be attributed probably more to immigrants from the southern islands like Borneo and Java, and to the Amoy junks that traded annually with the Sulu sultanate. These vessels brought around 18,000 Chinese between 1770 and 1800, many of whom were transients because by 1814, only about 1,000 of them remained and most of them were poor.<sup>38</sup>

Gov. Raon's mishandling of the Chinese expulsion tends to confirm his reputation as a lax and corrupt governor. Viewed, however, within the context of the time, one can better appreciate the daunting problems he encountered. During his administration, the colony was convulsed by three major issues. Besides the Chinese problem, the severely understaffed *audiencia* and the expulsion of the Jesuits, the furor caused by the fiery Basilio Sancho de Santa Rufina, the new Archbishop of Manila, worsened the situation in Manila. Upon his arrival in 1767, he immediately began a ruthless campaign to subject the religious orders to episcopal visitation and to hand over some of



their parishes to native secular priests. This ecclesiastical dispute alone generated enough controversy and passion to keep the islands in turmoil for almost a decade. This is not an attempt to whitewash Raon's over-all image, but in the case of the Chinese, he probably does not deserve to be treated harshly in view of the circumstances of the time.

For all his reported hatred of the Chinese, Gov. Anda was at least pragmatic, unless he also mellowed by the passage of time. In order to reopen the iron mine of Sta. Inés in the province of Laguna de Bay, he pressed into service six Chinese iron-masters and sixteen experienced assistants instead of deporting them. He also recruited seventy-two master founders and skilled workers from China, who arrived on 9 May 1773. At the request of Francisco Xavier Salgado, a noted pioneering industrialist who wanted to exploit a copper mine he had discovered in Masbate, the governor readily exempted from expulsion fourteen Chinese from Cebu to assist him in the enterprise (Diaz-Trechuelo 1965, 774, 776-77).

This study is incomplete without knowing the approximate number of Chinese in the Philippines before the British invasion in 1762. Statistics on the number of Chinese should always be regarded as estimates and therefore taken with *great caution*. Even official records are many times inaccurate. They may be correct on a given day, but the arrival or departure of a single junk or other similar contingencies could make the figures obsolete the next day. Official records and especially private reports are close approximations at best, or deliberately exaggerated at worst. Carelessness, duplications, and conjectures were common occurrences. Furthermore, some figures are ambiguous, and interpretation is needed to reconcile discrepancies. For instance, how many Chinese remained in the Islands after 1772 could be debated for years. There is usually a miscount of the number of Chinese in the Philippines, especially during this period.

With these difficulties in mind, here are the estimates of the number of Chinese in the Philippines in 1762 before the British invasion, those who left in 1764, and the Chinese permitted to remain in the following years:

Fled to China, Sumatra, and Sulu, 1764	3,000-3,100
Died, 1762-1778(estimate)	1,000?
Deported, 1767-1772	2,460
Deported(non-christians)	139 (known)
Remained in Islands(fugitives)	?

Remained in Manila, 1772 (official report)	103
Remained in Manila, 1778 (interpretation)	400?
Total	7,011
Reported number of Chinese before the British invasion in 1762 <sup>39</sup>	6,200
Immigrants during the British occupation of Manila, 1762-1764 (estimate)	1,000
Total	7,200

It should be borne in mind that during the two-year British occupation, many Chinese junks arrived in Manila carrying hundreds, probably thousands, of immigrants. Fully realizing the value of the Chinese as allies, the British sent agents to Canton and a few other places to recruit settlers to the Philippines. One source reported a surprisingly high number of "about 7,000 Chinese in Parian at that time."<sup>40</sup> Even if the estimate is correct, the sangleyes who lived in that district were generally non-Christians. After the war, those who remained were summarily expelled by the Spanish administration, usually with no rosters made.

The discrepancy between the two figures above—7,011 and 7,200—is small enough to be considered a virtual tally. Anyway, these numbers are estimates, including the number of fugitives and those who died during and after the war. With the approximate number of 500 Chinese permitted to remain in the Philippines, it can be rightly affirmed that the last expulsion of 1767-72 was not absolute or total in the strict sense of the word. A general or mass expulsion is a more appropriate term.

The periodic expulsions and massacres of the Chinese for the past two centuries have far reaching significance in Philippine history. The last purge of 1764-72 in particular was so thorough that it virtually wiped them out of the Islands. A conservative estimate puts the Chinese population at 41,035 in 1903 out of a general population of 7,635,426 (Wickberg 1965, 148n). The ethnic cleansing under Raon and Anda helped check the rapid growth of the Chinese that could have sinicized to a large extent the Philippines as it did some southeast Asian countries like Thailand and, particularly, Singapore and Malaysia.

On the other hand, the vacuum created by the absence of the Chinese accelerated the entrepreneurial spirit among the Chinese mestizos, who rose to social and economic prominence during this pe-

riod. Having emerged as a separate social class in the 1750s, the Chinese mestizo was gradually absorbed into Philippine society and culture. By 1850, there were 240,000 Chinese mestizos as compared to 4 million natives. This infusion of Chinese blood injected vitality into the native stock to form a unique character of Philippine ethnicity—a Filipino by national identity and dominantly Malayan in racial origin.<sup>41</sup>

### Notes

1. Anda to the King, Manila, 30 June 1764. Archivo General de Indias (Seville), Sección Filipinas, Legajo 713. (Hereafter AGI).

2. Governor Robert Palk to the Madras Board of Directors, 1 Oct. 1764, Oriental & India Office Collections (OIOC), London, P/251/51A, Madras Military Consultations (hereafter MMC), 1764, pp. 428, 442, 446. Francis Jourdan to Palk & Council of Fort St. George (Madras), 4 Feb. 1764; Palk to Roger Carter, Gov. of Fort Marlborough, 30 Sept. 1765 [extract], MMC, 1764, pp. 79–81; 1765, pp. 873–9. See also Nicholas Tracy (1995, 5, 106).

3. Captain Walter Alves to Palk, Canton River, 24 Dec. 1764; Dalrymple to Palk, Canton, 1 Jan. 1765, OIOC (MMC), pp. 226–28, 684–86. Tracy (1995, 101). Letter of Pedro Nebado, alcalde mayor de la Provincia de Pangasinan, to Governor Raon, 7 Dec. 1767; Francisco Andrade, alcalde mayor de la Provincia de Batangas, to Raon, 4 Jan. 1768, AGI, leg. 715; and Serafin D. Quiason (1966, 185).

4. Bando del Gobernador Francisco de la Torre, Manila, 10 abril de 1764; Francisco de San Juan to Raon, Tayabas, 4 Dec. 1767, AGI, Filipinas, leg. 713.

5. Testimonio literal del expediente formado en virtud de Supr. Provcia. sobre que el Cabildo Secular informe lo que constare sobre el porte y modo de vida que tuvieron los sangleyes en todo el tiempo que estuvieron los ingleses en esta plaza, 1775. AGI, leg. 713.

6. Testimonio del Fray Remigio Hernandez, Rector Provincial de la Provincia del Smo. Nombre de Jesus de Filipinas, Convento de San Pablo, Manila, 23 de junio de 1764. Ibid.

7. Testimonio del Padre Religioso, Bernardo Pazuengos, Provincial de la Compañia de Jesus, Santa Cruz, Manila, 26 junio 1764, AGI, Filipinas, leg. 713.

8. Testimonio del Fray Pedro de Yre, Provincial de la Provincia del Smo Rosario, Orden de Santo Domingo, Binondo, 2 julio de 1764, AGI, leg. 713.

9. Fray Roque de la Purificacion, Padre Provincial de la Orden de San Francisco, Polo, 21 junio de 1764; Fray Miguel de la Consolacion, Provincial de Recoletos, Convento de San Nicolas de Tolentino, 17 julio 1764; El Cabildo Secular, Manila, 11 julio 1764, AGI, ibid.

10. "Expediente del Gobernador y Fiscal de la Audiencia de Filipinas sobre la expulsión de los sangleyes, 1769-1770." AGI, Filipinas, Leg. 621.

11. Audiencia to the king, Manila, 20 Nov. 1764, ibid.

12. Testimonio del Expediente en virtud de la Real Cedula, Aranjuez, 12 de abril 1776, mandando la expulsion de todos chinos católicos que cometieron infidelidad, apostasia, y otros excesos durante la ocupación británica de Manila, sino quedando

en las islas sus hijos de doce años con sus madres, 1775. AGI, leg. 621. See also Guillaume Joseph Hyacinthe Jean Baptiste Le Gentil de la Galaisiere (1964, 79).

13. Gov. Jose Raon to Ignacio Miguel Mayoral Gauquiquia, principal cabecilla de los sangleyes. Manila, 7 Oct. 1767. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 715. Ignacio Mayoral Gauquiquia to Governor, Alcayceria, 8 Oct. & 3 Nov. 1767, *ibid.*

14. Representación de los cabecillas sangleyes al gobernador, 7 noviembre 1767; vista fiscal, 16 marzo de 1768; Bando del Superior Gobierno, Manila junio 18 y 25 de 1768. AGI, leg. 716.

15. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 715.

16. Jose Farando to Raon, Cavite, 20, 21, 22, 23, 27, Nov. 1767; Raon to Farando, 24 Nov. 1767, AGI, leg. 715.

17. Ignacio Fernandez to Juan Antonio Cosio, secretario del superior gobierno, Pagsanjan, 13, 15, 20, 27 Dec. 1767; Pedro Nebado, alcalde mayor y capitán de guerra de la Provincia de Pangasinan, Lingayen, 7 Dec. 1767; Decreto del Superior Gobierno, Manila, 16 Dec. 1767. AGI, Leg. 715.

18. Pedro de Yriarte to Raon, Vigan, 16, Jan., 5-6 Feb., & 14 March 1768. Bishop Luna to Raon, Nueva Segovia, 22 Jan. 1768; Raon to Bishop Luna, Manila, 4 Feb. 1768, *ibid.*

19. Gaspar de Ylagorri, Corregidor y Capitán de guerra of Yligan to Raon, Presidio de Misamis, 17, 26, 27 May; June 10, 1768. Ylagorri to Velarde, 18, 24 May 1768. Jose Andres Velarde, Comandante general de la Real Armamento de Pintados y Alcalde mayor de Cebu, to Ylagorri, Cebu, 20 May, 7 June 1768, *ibid.*

20. Antonio de Arguelles, alcalde mayor of Iloilo, to Raon, Iloilo Port, 12 March 1769; Fray Juan Miguel de Castillo to Raon, Catbalonga, 10 Jan. 1769. AGI, leg. 715.

21. Dionisio Muñoz, Castellano de Sta. Isabel de Paragua, to Raon, Taytay, 29 July 1768. Pedro Nebado, alcalde Mayor y Capitán de Guerra de la Provincia de Pangasinan, to Raon, Lingayen, 7 Dec. 1767, *ibid.*

22. Antonio Andrade to King, 31 May 1769, AGI, leg. 715.

23. Andrade to King, 24 July 1769, *ibid.*

24. Testimonio del memorial ajustado a las providencias dadas por el Señor Oidor Juan Antonio de Uruñuela . . . en virtud de la comisión que se le confirió el Superior Gobierno a fin de poner en ejecución . . . la expulsion de estos Dominios de todos los sangleyes cristianos que cometieron los delitos . . . en el tiempo del a pasada guerra, 1769. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 621.

25. Report of Uruñuela to the king, 27 July 1769, AGI, Filipinas, leg. 621.

26. Dionisio Muñoz, Castellano de Sta. Isabel de Paragua, to Raon, Taytay, 29 July 1768. Pedro Nebado, alcalde Mayor y Capitán de Guerra de la Provincia de Pangasinan, to Raon, Lingayen, 7 Dec. 1767, *ibid.*

27. AGI, leg. 716.

28. Uruñuela to king, Manila, 27 July 1769, AGI, Filipinas. leg. 621.

29. Audiencia to the king, 29 July 1769, AGI, *ibid.*

30. Expediente del Gobernador sobre los defectos que ha advertido en la conducta de Juan Antonio de Uruñuela, 19 de julio 1772; Cargos contra Raon, Villacorta, Galban, Basaraz, y Cosio, AGI, leg. 630.

31. The year-by-year expulsions from 1769 through 1772 were taken from AGI, leg. 716.

32. Extracto general de todos los sangleyes que se hallaban en el continenti de estas islas, asi de los remitidos por los alcaldes mayores como de los imposibilitados y muertos, Manila, 14 de diciembre 1772, AGI, Filipinas, leg. 716. See also Diaz-Trechuelo, "The Economic Background," AF, II, 22.

There is a discrepancy between the total number of 2,460 expelled Chinese (pages 16) and the "2,180" in this page probably because Uruñuela, who was not in the Philippines during most of the years 1767-68, did not include the Chinese banished during this period.

33. Uruñuela to the King, Manila, 17 Jan. 1773, AGI, leg. 716.

34. Diaz-Trechuelo, "The Economic Background," AF, II, pp. 22-25. For a detailed classification of their occupations, see pp. 26-27.

35. AGI, Filipinas, leg. 716.

36. Diaz-Trechuelo, "The Economic Background," AF, II, p. 27-29. These pages contain also a town-by-town distribution of the 238 married Chinese. The habitations of the remaining 660 Chinese were not mentioned in this document for the simple reason that they were unmarried. Marriage implies stability and the locality where one's wedding took place at that time was also considered his/her place of residence.

37. See also AF, II, 31.

38. For the Chinese returning to China from Sulu, see footnote 3. Dalrymple's grand project was taken from Tarling (1978), 23-24; and Tracy (1995, 5-7, 73, 123). For the Chinese presence in Sulu, see Warren (1985, 126).

39. Diaz-Trechuelo, "The Chinese in the Philippines," AF, I, p. 210. The figures above are approximations with the exception of the 103 officially reported by Uruñuela (p. 17). Nobody knows how many fugitives fled to the mountains and forests. Because of the many Chinese casualties, either killed during the war or those who died naturally, the number of 1,000 deaths is a reasonable estimate. It is possible that some of those who "remained in Manila" (1772 official report) are also included in the group that "remained in Manila in 1778 (interpretation, both in page 23).

40. Leebrick 1915, 117, 134. For the 7,000 Chinese in Parian, see Quiason 1966, 166.

41. For readings on the emergence and historical significance of the Chinese mestizo, see Wickberg (1964, 62-100); Merino (AF, II, 45-66); and Tan (1984).

## References

- Diaz-Trechuelo, Maria Lourdes. 1963. Economic development in the Philippines in the second half of the 18th century. *Philippines Studies* 11 (April): 208.
- . 1965. Eighteenth-Century Philippine economy: Mining. *Philippine Studies* 13 (October): 774-77.
- . 1966, 1969. The economic background. In *The Chinese in the Philippines*, 2 vols. Edited by Alfonso Felix, Jr. Manila: Historical Conservation Society.
- Forrest, Thomas. 1971. A voyage in New Guinea. In *Travel accounts of the Islands, 1513-1787*. Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild.
- Le Gentil de la Galaisiere, Guillaume Joseph Hyacinthe Jean Baptiste. 1964. *A voyage to the Indian sea*. Translated by Frederick C. Fischer. Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild.
- Leebrick, K.C. 1915. The English expedition to Manila in 1762 and the Government of the Philippine Islands by the East India Company. Ph.D. diss., University of California.

- Majul, Cesar. 1966, 1969 Chinese relationship with the Sultanate of Sulu. In *The Chinese in the Philippines*, 2 vols. Edited by Alfonso Felix, Jr. Manila: Historical Conservation Society.
- Quiason, Serafin D. 1966. *English "country trade" with the Philippines, 1644–1765*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines.
- Regla, Juan. 1953. La expulsion de los Moriscos y sus Consecuencias. *Hispania* 13: 215–68, 402–79.
- Roth, Dennis Morrow. 1977. *The friar estates of the Philippines*. Albuquerque: University of Mexico Press.
- Tarling, Nicholas. 1978. *Sulu and Sabah*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Tracy, Nicholas. 1995. *Manila ransomed*. Devon: University of Exeter Press.
- Warren, James. 1985. *The Sulu Zone, 1868–1898*. Manila: New Day Publishers.
- Wickberg, Edgar. 1965. *The Chinese in the Philippine life, 1850–1898*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.