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## Philippine Resistance in Candon, 1942

*Donald Chaput*



Because of some of the oddities of the Philippine Resistance Movement, an examination of factors leading to contradictory conclusions is worthy of consideration. In the Pacific theatre of operations, no guerrilla or resistance movement could match that of the Philippines in size or significance. Local resistance in Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, French Indochina, and China pale by comparison. Even when set next to numerous guerrilla operations in Europe, the Philippine events do not suffer. The French *maquis* received considerable wartime and postwar acclaim, but those fighters seldom controlled geographical areas, and never had the command and supply structure evident in the Philippines. In fact, in all of Europe, only the large, impressive partisan armies of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia produced the type of impact against the German forces that the Philippine Resistance Movement inflicted on the Japanese occupiers.

In trying to grasp the reasons for this Philippine significance, the logical starting point is to query how and where this resistance movement originated. The first significant anti-Japanese blow by guerrillas occurred in Candon, Ilocos Sur, one January morning of 1942. Answers to the Who, Why, Where, and With What about this important Candon ambush go far towards understanding events that would soon unfold in other parts of the Islands, from the hills north of Manila to the Leyte coasts, to the mountains of Mindanao.

Candon, a municipality of about 15,000 at the outbreak of the war, was the second city of size in the province, located about 25 miles south of the capital city Vigan. Candon was also about 60 miles north of the major Japanese landing sites at Lingayen Gulf. The important coastal road passed through Candon, wending from the south in La Union Province almost due north to Appari, at the tip of Luzon. Although I had long been familiar with the Candon ambush, I

have been blessed with the rich documentation and interviews provided by Benjamin A. Gray. Mr. Gray, a Candon native, was a secret service agent of the 121st Infantry Regiment during the war, when he was manager of a cooperative venture that supplied the guerrillas. After the war Mr. Gray became editor in Manila of *Bannawag*, an Ilocano periodical. Mr. Gray was a close friend of Lt. Marcelino Carino, a key figure in the ambushade, and over the years they exchanged considerable correspondence on this and other war-time events, which Mr. Gray has made available to me.

The sparkplug, the initiator for the Candon resistance effort was Lt. Feliciano Madamba, a Philippine Army intelligence officer of the Thirteenth Infantry Regiment, Eleventh Division, whose responsibilities included the three Ilocano coastal provinces of Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, and La Union. Shortly before the outbreak of war, Lt. Madamba went to many of the communities and organized local militias, air warden crews, and other potential resisters, as units of civilian or volunteer guards (Willoughby 1972, 488).<sup>1</sup>

### Gaerlan in Candon

In Candon, Lt. Madamba selected Candonino Gaerlan as his leading contact. Gaerlan, a graduate engineer of the Mapua Institute of Technology in Manila, was the manager of the Candon Electric Company. Marcelino Cariño, Gaerlan's military assistant, was his foreman, college mate, and long time local acquaintance. Madamba was not exactly a stranger in these parts. He was an Ilocano from Abra and in the 1930s had been a local forest ranger and was known to both Gaerlan and Cariño. Madamba's theory was that Gaerlan, in charge of the local electrical supply, was in the best position to handle air raid warnings. However, the Japanese attack and quick successes after the Lingayen Gulf landings made such units superfluous. Nevertheless, in Candon, Gaerlan and Cariño still recruited a few dozen local civilians, determined that when an opportunity arose, they would strike a blow at the Japanese. Much of what follows comes from personal correspondence between Cariño and Benjamin Gray.

On 9 and 10 December, only days after the initial attack on the Philippines, Gaerlan and Cariño accompanied Lt. Madamba north to Vigan and Sulvec, a port near Santa Maria, to follow up on rumors of a Japanese landing there. There the trio made sketches of the Japa-

nese positions, which Lt. Madamba then took back to headquarters. They did not see action at the time, but this was their initial military activity. There were scattered Japanese aerial attacks at this time, and on 10 December the bridge near the Candon Sugar Central sustained some damage. A few days later, Gaerlan told Lt. Madamba of his need for weapons. Madamba enquired, and he assigned Alfredo Gray and a few other Candonians to accompany Gaerlan to Carlatan, in San Fernando, La Union. There, from the U. S. Army stores, they were issued a few hundred Enfield rifles, other weapons, and some ammunition.<sup>2</sup>

The Gaerlan outfit, now, had changed from a few fellows with air warden hats to a unit of volunteer guards, officially recognized by the Chief Intelligence Officer of a Philippine Army unit, and every man in the unit was armed with a rifle, and some also carried pistols. Gaerlan had assumed the rank of captain of this volunteer outfit, with his assistant Marcelino Cariño as his lieutenant. Two other employees of the Candon Electric Company, Eugenio Gonzalo and Santiago Guerzon, were appointed sergeants.

Meanwhile, cut off by the initial Japanese thrust from the coast down to Manila, scattered remnants of United States and Philippine Army troops were in the hills, as were a few hundred American civilians, notably those involved in mining, lumbering, and transportation. The 1930s had seen this part of Luzon become a world leader in copper and gold production, notably in the Baguio, Benguet, and Lepanto areas, which accounted for so many of the engineers and other civilian personnel.

### **Cushing in Candon**

Among them was Walter Cushing, a native of El Paso, Texas, who had been raised in Los Angeles. Cushing's father, George, had been a mining man, and had married Cushing's mother, Simona, in Mexico. Walter Cushing and brothers James, Charles, George, and Frank were all fluent in Spanish and all came to the Philippines in the mining boom of the 1930s. In the mid-1930s Cushing worked at, developed, and managed the Southern Cross Mine, the Batong Buhay Mine, and the Rainbow Mines at Baay, Abra, where he was working at the outbreak of war. There is considerable information on the Cushing brothers in the mining literature and directories and gazetteers of California. There is also important Cushing family material

scattered throughout the Gen. Courtney Whitney Papers, MacArthur Memorial Library, Norfolk, Virginia.

Not wishing to be taken by the Japanese, and interested in doing something dramatic, Cushing rounded up more than fifty miners and laborers, gathered a supply of rifles, pistols, dynamite, and gasoline, and headed for the coast to get the lay of the land. There are conflicting details about where Cushing was working at this time. In the *Mines Register* (New York, 1940, 802), Cushing was listed as manager of the Southern Cross Mining Co. Along the way he met up with a Signal Corps unit of USAFFE troops, numbering between twenty-five and thirty, and headed by Lt. Robert Arnold. Cushing, not encumbered by modesty, had by this time assumed the rank of captain. He adopted Arnold and his men, shared food and supplies, and the enlarged force continued to head for the coast (Arnold 1979).

As Cushing's force came to the Pacific near Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, he came in contact with Lt. Madamba. By this time, Cushing had determined to fight the invaders. Such a blow might be beneficial, a help to those forces beginning the final struggle in the Bataan Peninsula. To Lt. Madamba, of course, this made sense. Furthermore, the north-south highway along the Ilocos coast was becoming a major Japanese artery, and the enemy was already amassing troops and supplies in Vigan, the provincial capital. A useful deed could be to cut the road, or at least temporarily paralyze it by a military action.

Lt. Madamba then told Captain Cushing of the obvious next move. A few miles down the road was Candon, which sat astride the coastal highway. And in and around Candon was Candonino Gaerlan and his armed volunteer guards, just itching for action. Furthermore, most of the residents of Candon had taken to safety in the hills, and so would not be endangered by any action.<sup>3</sup>

### **Cushing and Gaerlan**

Unaware of Cushing's force, Gaerlan was at that very moment planning an attack in or near Candon. One mid-January day, a messenger arrived in Candon with a note from Cushing for Gaerlan. The messenger reported, "Captain Cushing is waiting for you at the Salcedo school building." Surprised and pleased, Gaerlan and Cariño met with Cushing and twelve Americans in Salcedo three hours later. Cushing mentioned his previous meeting with Madamba, and Gaerlan asked if Madamba had told him of the planned attack on

the Japanese in Candon. Cushing replied, "Precisely, that is why we came rushing to see you. We want to be of help." Cushing wanted to know about Gaerlan's force, and was told that he had forty men and that he would see them tonight. Cushing wondered why the men were not with him. The reason was that Gaerlan knew nothing in advance about Cushing or his force, and told his men to follow later, so that if it were a trap they would be forewarned. After a brief discussion in which both Cushing and Gaerlan became excited and enthusiastic, Cushing asked: "If we team up we may strike together. Are you game?" Gaerlan replied: "Game! Sir, on Monday, four days from now, our band will strike. If you want to team up with us, let us join our forces. We will ambush the enemy on Monday. Everything is prepared."

Cushing assumed that the attack was planned for someplace in the center of Candon. Gaerlan, though, had different plans. He had pinpointed the southern part of town, where the Candon-Salcedo Road met the Provincial Road, in front of the Gabaldon School. Gaerlan pointed out that the center of Candon did not provide good cover for an ambush, whereas in the southern part of town, opportunity for a fast exit was there in case a running battle ensued.

Furthermore, Gaerlan had already installed sets of telephones from his house, as well as to Cariño's hideout near the cemetery near his home, which was a kilometer north of the town. Cariño's hideout was the lookout post which would monitor vehicles coming from the direction of Vigan. The plan, then, was to have Cariño telephone Gaerlan's house with news of the arriving Japanese. Then Gaerlan would run a short distance to the Gabaldon School where the men would be lying in ambush.

So, a few days before the projected ambush, Cushing and Gaerlan worked with the combined force, Cushing trying to give the men the few bits of military lore he had. In spite of Lt. Arnold's later claims, he played no leadership role in either the planning stages, or in the ambush. To Marcelino Cariño, there was never any doubt who was in charge. Cariño, who was Gaerlan's lieutenant, stated emphatically: "It was Cushing who was the leader of the band and its organizer." Although Candonino Gaerlan was in charge of the local Candon group, there was another volunteer unit present, from Narvacan, midway between Candon and Vigan. This group of a dozen or so men was headed by a school teacher named Peralta. This presented no organizational problem, as they accepted Gaerlan's leadership.

## The Candon Ambush

The ambush plan was entirely that of Candonino Gaerlan, with a few refinements introduced by Cushing. And, when the ambush would take place, everyone present—the Ilocanos, Lt. Arnold's USAFFE troops, and the miners and laborers from Abra—all accepted that Captain Walter Cushing would be in command. The ambush was scheduled for a Monday, 19 January.

On the Saturday preceding the ambush, Gaerlan and Cariño, with pride, showed Cushing their telephone system. Cariño explained the situation:

It was Cushing who instructed us to double check our telephone lines. Our tel station was at Ninoy's [Gaerlan's] house—near the church. We had been using the gov't telephone and telegraph lines. We did really have a good warning system. But that Saturday, as Guerzon called from Station No. 1, we heard "*Moshi, moshi*" [Japanese for 'hello'] right in our phone. The goddam Japs were also using our telephone lines!"

When told of this, Cushing became uneasy, suggesting that they might have to postpone "the picnic" on Monday. Gaerlan and Cariño persisted, claiming that Gaerlan had more electric wire, and that on Sunday night, during darkness, they would install another line linking the cemetery hideout with Gaerlan's post. Gaerlan, being an engineer and manager of the Candon Electric Company, had easy access to such communications equipment. Cushing agreed, and the work crew put in a busy few hours in the dark. At 2:30 a.m. Monday, Cariño called from his cemetery outpost to the command post, stating that the line was in place. Cushing answered, "Okay, son, take a rest, we'll be coming soon." The stage was being set for the first guerrilla ambush in the Philippines.

Before sunrise of Monday, 19 January, about 100 men had gathered in front of the Gabaldon school house. There, Cushing and Gaerlan distributed the men. The specific ambush plan was to position the men in houses and grounds on the east side of the Provincial Road. Thus they would be facing the Gabaldon School and its grounds. As the Japanese trucks approached, the entire guerrilla force would be firing from the east side of the road towards the west, thus avoiding any chance of hitting each other. Meanwhile, Cariño and Santiago Guerzon were in their post at the north of Candon,

standing by their telephone set, awaiting the approach of Japanese vehicles.

Cariño, at his hideout-outpost, had precise instructions. He was to determine how many vehicles were in the convoy, whether or not they were troop carriers or supply trucks and then to telephone Gaerlan, who would notify Cushing who would then order the attack. As the trucks would enter Candon, the northernmost ambushers would open fire at the last truck, and at the same time the main or southernmost group would fire at the approaching vehicles.

According to an eyewitness account, that of Lt. Cariño, at 8:00 a.m. he telephoned Gaerlan, stating "two open trucks coming, moderate speed; there are soldiers in the back." A few minutes later, as the trucks approached the Gabaldon School the ambush was perfectly executed. Rifle fire from the rear [the north] and the east side of the highway splattered the two trucks, which lurched, then one crashed into a large acacia tree near the school gate, and the other smashed into a concrete post of a nearby fence. There is some confusion of the weapons used by the guerrillas. Arnold (1979) mentions Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs), but he was the only one to do so; his account is so riddled with errors and exaggerations that it is next to useless. Lt. Cariño mentions only rifles and pistols, and a few other accounts state that the guerrillas also had gasoline and dynamite.

There was but a moment of silence, then Cushing ran into the street waving a revolver, with a stick of dynamite hanging out of his pocket, moved up and down the blocks shouting, "That's the way, boys, give 'em hell!" This action, the first, became a Cushing hallmark: great enthusiasm, and much praise for the troops. One of the few postwar accounts to highlight this action was by James Dean Sanderson (1959), and the chapter on Cushing is entitled "Wild Man in the Philippines." The Sanderson account is fairly accurate, though somewhat exaggerated. In less than half an hour there was another telephone ring from Cariño, announcing the approach of two more trucks. The scenario was repeated, as those two, also, were quickly dispatched. Around ten in the morning, five more Japanese trucks approached, still unaware of any trouble in Candon. The guerrillas, working with confidence now, opened fire, this time on vehicles containing almost forty Japanese soldiers. The trucks crashed, most of the soldiers were immediately killed, and four of them managed to flee. They got as far as the water, where local fishermen and farmers quickly dispatched them with bolos.



Smiling and congratulating everyone, Cushing called Gaerlan over: "Son, we bagged a big fish!" Cushing pointed to a Japanese officer, probably a colonel or general, whose papers showed he had been in the Manchurian campaign. He was also carrying a magnificent samurai sword, which Cushing brandished, then "liberated." Another victim of interest was a German soldier, who had aviator's insignia on his uniform. The guerrillas assumed he was an air warfare advisor to the Japanese.

The body count was sixty-seven dead Japanese, which included the four killed at the beach, and the destruction of nine vehicles [several of them were captured U. S. Army trucks]. The guerrilla injuries were practically non-existent. Only Fennington, a soldier with Lt. Arnold's group, had a mild thigh wound. Among the ambushers, the Gaerlan outfit and Cushing's men did most of the fighting, while among Lt. Arnold's USAFFE group, Clyde McHenry was the most vigorous participant.

In the skirmishes of that morning, only two homes were burned, that of Vivencio de Peralta on the west side of the Provincial Road, which received heavy fire from the guerrillas, and the home of Marcelo Gray, local printer and publisher. Part of the Gaerlan forces had been hiding in the Gray home, attracting some enemy fire. Around noon, Cushing told the men to burn the corpses, so some were placed in trucks, which were then set afire. The remaining corpses were thrown into the already damaged Gray home, which was again torched, making a spectacular funeral pyre.<sup>5</sup>

By mid-afternoon, subsequent convoys of Japanese troops and supplies arrived, and by that time the guerrillas had disappeared. Furious at the resistance forces, the Japanese soldiers torched half the town, including the public market, the Methodist Episcopal Church, and the Chinese retail stores near the plaza. The Municipal Hall, with all the town records, also went up in smoke, but the Roman Catholic church, the convent, and the main school building south of the plaza were spared.

These, then, were the circumstances and the personnel who were involved in what most authorities claim was the first guerrilla attack on Japanese forces in the Philippines. Colonel Russell Volckmann (1956, 36), who later headed all guerrilla forces in North Luzon, praised Cushing, calling him the "granddaddy" of the resistance in northern Luzon. In the military literature, the statement by Colonel Baclagon in *Philippine Campaigns* (1952, 232) is typical, referring to

Cushing as having "the distinction of being the first guerrilla leader to lead an ambush against the Japanese."

### Later Events

The subsequent careers of Cushing and Gaerlan were exciting, brilliant, deadly, and brief. They participated in more than a dozen vicious attacks on the Japanese in the following months, and in many of them the two worked their forces in tandem. Cushing soon became the favorite of Colonel John Horan, who in early 1942 was the senior United States Army officer in the area. In fact, Horan arranged for Cushing to succeed him, if he were killed or forced to surrender. This did happen, as in May Horan reluctantly agreed to General Wainwright's order to surrender, which he did, and he was escorted to the Japanese quarters in Candon. Col. Horan took no troops with him. The troops, and the command, went to Cushing, whom Horan had promoted to major. In one account, Horan wrote: "You may have heard of Walter Cushing, the finest officer of our Regt." Horan's memoirs list twenty-one actions against the enemy by Cushing.<sup>6</sup>

Cushing's career, which is outside the scope of this article, came to a bloody end on 19 September 1942, at Jones, Isabela, where he was finally surrounded by Japanese forces. After shooting a few of the enemy, Cushing killed himself, which apparently so impressed the Japanese commander that he permitted the villagers to give Cushing a formal funeral and memorial service.

Candonino Gaerlan, too, never stopped fighting after the ambushade at Candon. He was quickly recognized throughout the area as a brilliant organizer, a fearless fighter, a leader of men. When Col. Horan's 121st Infantry Regiment got its official blessing from General MacArthur, Candonino Gaerlan was acknowledged as a captain and was appointed commander of the Third Battalion.<sup>7</sup> In late 1942, while visiting his sister Lily at San Juan, La Union, Gaerlan was betrayed by the local chief of police. The Japanese surrounded the house, and Gaerlan was killed in a gunfight. The Japanese exhibited Gaerlan's head, stuffed in a jar of alcohol, in town plazas enroute to Candon. Finally, Mayor Garrido of Candon convinced them that this was in poor taste, so the container was thrown in a rice paddy west of town.<sup>8</sup>

Walter Cushing received some recognition in the postwar literature, largely because he was a founder of what became a major resistance unit, Col. Russell Volckmann's USAFIP, NL, that huge force

in North Luzon which gave the Japanese so much trouble in the last year of the war. These troops figured prominently in the victory at Bessang Pass and in the dismemberment of Gen. Yamashita's Army and his eventual capture. Volckmann never met Cushing, but inherited some of his key personnel, especially a few of the mining engineers. Volckmann's comment:

He was described by his subordinates as a veritable powerhouse of energy, a dynamic personality, self-sacrificing, utterly fearless, and bold to the point of foolhardiness. He was a great hero and a tremendous moving force behind the early resistance movement in North Luzon (Volckmann 1956, 36).

Volckmann apparently got the correct measure of the man. Marcelino Cariño, who was an officer in the guerrilla troops during this important Candon ambush, used similar language in describing Cushing's personality. He had a magnetic aura, was indeed without fear, was compulsively active and restless, always in a good mood, and was first in line to praise and congratulate his men.<sup>9</sup> Dowling, the *Chicago Sun* man-on-the-scene, spared no adjectives in commenting on him: "The mother and father and brains and guts of the guerrilla warfare in North Luzon was a man named Walter Cushing."<sup>10</sup>

Unhappily, Captain Candonino Gaerlan was not to receive many postwar accolades. His name does not appear in Col. Horan's memoirs. Although Horan and Cushing were very close, Horan never met Gaerlan. In the two well-known resistance accounts prepared during the war, Gaerlan is not mentioned. There are confused names, such as "a Maj. Gaular; a Maj. Gadlar (Ganlan?)" who was said to be fighting in the Ilocos country until 1943. This was most likely Candonino Gaerlan (Willoughby 1972, 488). Lt. Marcelino Cariño mentions that after the war, Gaerlan's father wrote to the War Department in Washington regarding the service of his son, but they replied that there was no record of such a person.<sup>11</sup>

### **Guerilla Fighting in North Luzon**

An unusual and enlightening account of the guerrilla fighting in North Luzon was provided by columnist John Dowling of the *Chicago Sun*, who was in the area for the last campaigns and who inter-

viewed many participants. The members of the veteran 121st Infantry Regiment told Dowling many incidents of the early phase of the war. He wrote: "In this war, the Filipinos have given us new heroes. . . . Captain Candonino Gaerlan stands to become the new national hero of the Philippines."<sup>12</sup> Dowling's enthusiasm and prediction did not stand the test of time, as there were many candidates for heroism in this bloody conflict.

An unusual aspect of this first resistance effort in the Philippines was how parallel it was with many subsequent events. First, it was a finely executed attack by a combined Filipino and American force. There were slightly more Ilocanos than Americans. The commander-in-chief was Cushing, the American, whereas the second in command, and the man who planned the ambush, was Gaerlan, a local resident. Providing a model, this ambush was the first of hundreds of skirmishes, ambushes, and pitched battles in the coming years that involved combined Filipino and American units against the Japanese occupiers.

Mining personnel were a key to the success of the ambushade. Cushing, a mine owner and manager, tapped his staff and mining neighbors to form his outfit. This would be repeated countless times during World War II in the Philippines, as mining personnel were the most numerous of the occupational types that led or participated in the guerrilla organizations, aside from military personnel. From Walter Cushing in the north to Harry McKenzie near Luzon to Wendell Fertig on Mindanao, mining engineers and foremen were in the forefront of resistance leaders. For example, in North Luzon alone, by the end of the war, Colonel Volckmann's leading commanders were a combination of military personnel and miners. Individuals like Alipio Cubas and Donald Blackburn were Philippine Army or U. S. Army officers. Yet, George Barnett, John O'Day, and William Peryam were mining men. Wendell Fertig's brother, Claude Fertig, a gold mine manager before the war, was very active on Panay and Masbate, leading a crew of surveyors and engineers that studied Japanese movements and establishments. On Palawan, where the local population revolted in the Busuanga manganese mine and killed the entire Japanese staff, the ambush was led by Carlos Amores, in charge of mine security (Chaput 1987, 51-70).

Leadership in the Philippine resistance movement did not depend on nationality. Whether or not the United States Government supplied some units had nothing to do with stature and command. Col. Volckmann in North Luzon, Capt. Robert Lapham and Major Edwin

Ramsey in Central Luzon, Col. Fertig on Mindanao were United States Army officers who rose to the top on talent or luck. Wendell Fertig presents a bit of confusion with these parallels. Although he was a key mining figure in the Philippines in the 1930s, he also held a reserve commission as a lieutenant colonel, was serving on active duty as such when Wainwright surrendered. Yet, Col. Peralta on Panay, Col. Kangleon on Leyte, Capt. Pedro V. Merritt on Samar, and Col. Agustin Marking northwest of Manila ran tough, successful operations. Captains Guillermo Nakar and Manuel Enriquez were among the earliest of the resistance leaders in North Luzon, and they had been officers of the Philippine Army. James Cushing, Walter's brother and a mediocre mining administrator in prewar times, gradually gained control of the Cebu resistance forces and made their presence a major obstacle to the Japanese occupiers. There may have been many factors that contributed to leadership in the resistance movement, but Filipino or American origins of an individual did not seem to be major considerations.

Candonino Gaerlan would also set a pattern for many of the Filipinos who took the path of resistance. Gaerlan had an electrical engineering degree from a Manila college, was known throughout Ilocos Sur and La Union, and at the outbreak of war held the responsible position of manager of the Candon Electric Company. To have such a man of talent to defy the Japanese invaders gave resistance hopes a tremendous boost. From north to south, there were to follow many other individuals of talent and reputation who would not accept Japanese rule. Governor Roque Ablan in Ilocos Norte formed a guerrilla band and was killed in mid-war. In north Negros, the inspiration for effective guerrilla organization was Alfredo Montelibano, a leading planter and local politician. Governor Tomas Confesor on Panay not only took to the hills but became a philosophical and ethical giant who mocked both the Japanese and the collaborationist government. These and others may have taken to the hills, but the overwhelming number of Filipino politicians, especially those of ilustrado background, opted for collaboration. Practically the entire Senate, most provincial governors, most mayors, served in the puppet regime. There is an extensive literature on the topic, of which the first was Hernando Abaya, *Betrayal in the Philippines* (New York, 1946).

Another townmate of Gaerlan was indicative of the type of talent and drive that fueled resistance hopes. Dr. Alejandro A. Dario was one of the first physicians to join Cushing, and following Cushing's

death Dr. Dario worked with his successor, Capt. George Barnett, of the 121st Infantry Regiment. During the war Dr. Dario served as interpreter, chief executive officer, set up dozens of hospitals, organized medical training and first aid stations in three provinces, and by the end of the war was a captain in Col. Volckmann's USAFIP, NL. I have interviewed Dr. Dario several times, and he has provided me with his wartime diary, and many official documents, correspondence, and military orders. Lt. Marcelino Cariño was his nephew.

## Conclusion

The Philippine resistance movement, which by the end of the war had grown to over 200,000 men and women organized into vigorous, effective fighting units, was a force the Japanese war planners had forgotten to consider. If anything, this estimate is conservative, as some U.S. and Philippine sources claim the figure is over 400,000. The entire topic is controversial and is related to the postwar claims of guerrilla "recognition" and back pay. For estimates based on sound sources, see Col. Simeon Medalla (1972, I, esp. part III). These guerrillas caused many deaths, interrupted key supply and transportation routes, provided important intelligence to MacArthur's headquarters, and in general caused chaos and worry for the Japanese. Such an important resistance movement was probably bound to begin and evolve, whether in Luzon, Samar, Cebu, or Mindanao. It is interesting to consider that the first armed resistance, that of the Cushing-Gaerlan ambush in Candon in January of 1942, contained so many elements of what would characterize much of the Philippine resistance movement. Baclagon in *Philippine Campaigns* (1952, 251, 253) stated several times that the Cushing-led attack was the key, and Cushing's later successes finally convinced MacArthur and the USAFFE headquarters that a guerrilla movement in the Islands was not only possible but would be a tremendous aid to the "return."

## Notes

1. This, a wartime roster, listed a "Maj. Madamba," from Abra, working in Ilocos Norte with the forces of Gov. Ablan; Madamba was captured and most likely killed early in 1943.

2. Cariño to B. Gray, 10 August 1980; wartime reminiscences, typescript, by Alfredo Gray.

3. Cariño, letter to B. Gray, 10 August 1980 and 20 October 1981.

4. Unless otherwise noted, the details and quotes regarding the Candon ambushade are in letters from Cariño to B. Gray, 10 August 1980 and 20 October 1981. For some of the town details, and the local geography, I am indebted to Benjamin and Alfredo Gray. Their home was one of the few destroyed in the action.

5. Information from several interviews with Benjamin Gray, son of Marcelo Gray. Mr. Gray also prepared a detailed map of the ambushade for me. At the time of the incident Mr. Gray was in Manila, trying to arrange a return to Ilocos Sur; he arrived in Candon several weeks after the ambushade.

6. In the early 1950s Col. Horan prepared a hand-written account of the first year of the war, with most important details of the founding of the guerrilla units. In 1981, from his home in San Antonio, Texas, Col. Horan sent me a copy of this report, along with other documentation and correspondence.

7. The commanding officer of this unit, known often as the La Union Infantry Regiment, was Captain George M. Barnett. I have a copy of his regimental organization chart dated "In the Field, La Union, 1 October 1942," where he lists Capt. C. V. Gaerlan as commander of the 3rd Battalion.

8. Mentioned in *Chicago Sun*, March 11, 1945. I have talked to several people from Candon, including Alfredo and Benjamin Gray, on some of these grisly details.

9. I have several letters of Cariño to Benjamin Gray, outlining the early phase of the guerrilla movement, and there is total respect and admiration for Cushing, whom the men referred to as "The Old Man."

10. *Chicago Sun*, 7 March 1945.

11. Cariño to Benjamin Gray, 10 August 1980.

12. *Chicago Sun*, 11 March 1945.

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