Squatter Access to Land in Metro Manila

Ton Van Naerssen


Copyright © Ateneo de Manila University
Squatter Access to Land In Metro Manila

Ton van Naerssen

Like many capital cities in developing countries, Metro Manila is a huge and fast growing metropolis. The agglomeration which was established in 1975, consists of four cities (Manila, Quezon City, Pasay and Caloocan) and thirteen municipalities. The present number of inhabitants is estimated at eight million, which is about fifteen percent of the population of the Philippines and forty percent of the total urban population. In 1960 the number of inhabitants was around 2.5 million. Migration from the countryside for a major part explains the growth of population.

Shortly after the Second World War spontaneous settlements or squatter areas came into existence. Many refugees settled at Tondo Foreshoreland, a reclaimed area north of Manila which was earmarked to become a port district, or they built their shelters within the walls of Intramuros, the original Spanish colonial town. Official estimates were 46,000 squatters in 1946, 98,000 in 1956 and 283,000 in 1963. The tremendous increase since then is evident in an estimate made in 1981, when the National Housing Authority identified 415 areas with a total of about 1.6 million urban poor. In 1990 there were 654 squatter areas. Many squatter families, however, live in small numbers outside these squatter areas. Research on urban poverty in 1986 indicated that nearly 45 percent of the households in Metro Manila lived below the poverty line. The number of squatters, therefore, can safely be estimated at two and a half million, around one-third of the population of Metro Manila. They live in shacks of a few square meters, in areas with a very high population density. Tondo, for example, has a population of 57,000 per square km. The density in the whole of Metro Manila is 9,300 and it is, of course, much lower in the neighborhoods of the elite like

Acknowledgements should be made to Drs. Titus Meijer and Peter van Vooren who generously permitted their research findings to be used extensively. This article first appeared in The Netherlands Review of Research and Development, 3 December 1991.
Forbes Park and Dasmariñas Village, where a house plus garden occupies an average 3,500 square meters. The ownership of the land in Manila is concentrated in the hands of a few families. Land speculation plays an important role in urban land use. Much land is not utilized or is utilized insufficiently.

For poor families, access to land is very limited. Contractors are building for the middle class and the higher social strata of society. Squatting on land and building a shelter on it is not easy. By consequence, many poor families try to find a place in already established spontaneous settlements, where the population density steadily increases. What happened shortly after the fall of dictator Marcos, during the “February revolt” of 1986, is significant. In the expectation that land owned by Marcos and his clique was free to be occupied, land invasions took place in many cities of the Philippines. In Marcos’ times, for example, Roxas boulevard was meant to be a prestigious entrance to the city and its tourist center, but within one year much of the narrow pieces of land between the boulevard and the Bay of Manila were invaded and added to already existing squatter areas. Some invasions were really spontaneous in character, other ones were organized by syndicates to which the squatters had to pay rent.

Squatter organizations aim to improve the access to urban land for the urban poor in two ways. By putting pressure on the administration, both at the level of the local governments of the cities and municipalities and at the level of the metropolis and nation, they try to get squatter areas legalized. In case of eradication of settlements, they aim to relocate squatters within the boundaries of Metro Manila. Besides that, neighborhood organizations strive for improvement of public facilities, such as water, electricity, sanitation, schools and health clinics.

This article refers to two themes which are being discussed within the theory of the urban social movements. The first theme concerns the autonomy of the urban movements, a question dealt with by Burgess (1982) and Castells (1983). On the basis of two decades of urban struggle for access to land in Metro Manila, we will describe how the squatter movement evolved from being autonomous to politically linked. The second theme concerns the question of the emergence of militant squatter organizations within neighborhoods. The findings of research by Meijer and Van Vooren (1986) in two squatter areas in Metro Manila will be used. The researchers assumed that the class composition within squatters settlements decisively influ-
ences the nature of squatter organizations. It appears, however, that the legal status of the settlement, the degree of government control and activities of outside support organizations are of more importance.

Government Public Housing Policy

In 1947, the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) was set up by the government of the Philippines to provide for cheap houses. In 1969, the Corporation administered nineteen projects. Approximately 12,000 sites for housing had been prepared or sold to put up relocated squatter families. However, the prices were based on the actual costs and therefore out of reach for poor families. In fact, middle income families took advantage of the schemes. PHHC’s annual report 1956 shows that the Corporation was aware of this situation. According to the report “... public housing should serve families who cannot afford decent dwellings, and therefore should charge lower rents than private housing. Unfortunately, however, public housing in the Philippines ... is financed and treated like private housing and consequently must operate like one” (cited in Ocampo 1978, 11).

As a matter of fact, the strategy of eradication and relocation must be considered as more important than the efforts to realize public housing for low income groups. In 1950, the Slum Clearance Committee was set up. In cooperation with PHHC, squatter families from Manila and Quezon City were evicted and transported to sites outside the metropolitan area. In 1960, Sapang Palay, a small settlement 40 kms. north of Manila, became the destination of relocated families. Large scale evictions in 1963 and 1964 drew much attention. In December 1963, 4,000 families who lived within the walls of Intramuros, were moved by truck to Sapang Palay. In the following months 11,000 squatter families, mainly from Tondo and the nearby North Harbor Area, suffered the same fate. Sapang Palay was not prepared for invasions of this size. Thanks to an emergency committee, consisting of representatives of several governmental and non-governmental organizations, the removals did not end up in disaster (Juppenlatz 1970, 135). Besides insufficient preparation of land, Sapang Palay did not provide for employment, and the cost of commuting meant a heavy burden for the new inhabitants who had their work in Manila. Because of these circumstances about half of the families returned to Manila in due course.
Public housing on behalf of the middle classes, but propagated as low cost housing, small and large scale evictions, and ambiguous, badly administered relocation plans characterized government policy. Under President Marcos (1973–1986) slum improvement was added to the already existing policy instruments. In accordance with the international trend, housing policy focused on “sites and services”-projects (prepared lots, simple structured “core” houses and support to self-help housing) and “upgrading” or “on-site development” programs providing urban infrastructure to existing squatter areas. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank supported this policy. Another important development concerned measures at the level of centralization and legitimation of the policy. The government also introduced a system of neighborhood (barangay) councils with a president (the barangay-captain) enabling the government to exert firmer control over the squatter areas (Rüiland 1982).

Squatter Resistance

In the early seventies, organized squatter resistance came into being. It is difficult to estimate the real support in numbers of people, while in the course of time cooperation between the organizations often underwent changes. However, the continuity and development in aims and methods (petitions, demonstrations, barricades and so on) are remarkable. It can be considered as an urban social movement in Manila, the only one in South-east Asia.2

In the area of Tondo Foreshoreland, presumably the largest blighted area of Southeast Asia (147 ha., 175,000 inhabitants) squatters started to organize themselves around the land question. At the end of the sixties, social workers, student activists, and nuns and priests entered the area. They organized the people, particularly in Zone One, the southern part of Tondo Foreshore. Twenty organizations linked together in Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO), which tried to improve the local urban environment by self-organization and self-help. The right to live in Tondo was recognized in 1956 by Republic Act 1597. This Act promised to give squatter families the opportunity to buy land at the cost of 5 pesos (a quarter of one US dollar) per square meter. But the Act, proclaimed shortly before the end of the presidential elections, was not implemented. On the contrary. In 1973 Marcos proclaimed the eradication of the settlements
at Tondo Foreshore in order to build an international port and a highway with financial support from the World Bank. Half of the inhabitants would be transferred to areas outside Metro Manila, the other half would meet slum improvement programs. This plan met wide resistance, organized by ZOTO. ZOTO demanded implementation of Republic Act 1597, optimal maintenance of the area's housing function, on site-development programmes, relocation (if unavoidable) to areas situated nearby, and, as a general demand, participation in decision-making.

In November 1974, some 5,000 inhabitants marched to the presidential palace and six leaders of the umbrella organization, Federation of People's Organizations of Tondo Foreshoreland, negotiated with the president. The march became legendary, not the least so because leaders from the ranks of the urban poor proved to be capable negotiators. The squatters could take advantage of the earlier mentioned newly introduced trend of that time to tackle the problem of slum areas by on-site development. The World Bank, therefore, tacitly supported the squatter organizations. In 1975 the parties involved reached an agreement. The plan to build a port and highway would be implemented, but at the same time squatter settlements would be preserved as much as possible. Instead of urban renewal, slum improvement became the leading principle. Dagat-Dagatan, near Tondo was designed as a relocation area. No agreement was reached regarding Republic Act 1597. By Presidential Decree 814, squatters were offered the right to leasehold the land they occupied "with or without options to purchase" for a period of 25 years. It was considered as an attack on the existing right to buy, and so squatter resistance continued.

The movement even broadened, due to large-scale eradications and evictions elsewhere in Manila. The events during the Miss Universe contest in Manila in 1974 are notorious. Approximately 100,000 people were evicted. After a similar campaign one year later, squatter organizations in the whole of Metro Manila united in an umbrella association: the "Alliance of the Urban Poor of Manila and Suburbs against Demolition and PD 814." This Alliance demanded upgrading for all squatter settlements and participation by way of a special commission consisting of representatives of both government agencies and the Alliance. At the international Habitat Conference of the United Nations in Vancouver (1976) the people of Tondo presented their "People's Decree." They argued that PD 814 implied
land ownership by the state instead of the people. Land should be sold to cooperatives with land occupants as shareholders. At the same time, a large demonstration was held in Manila, leading to mass arrests and detention of 3000 demonstrators.

Evidently President Marcos had lost patience with the only public opposition of those days. The urban social movement had been widened but radicalized too. The social workers, in the beginning, had been led by the non-intervention strategy of the American "community development" expert, Saul Alinsky (1972). Concepts of self administration and autonomy dominated. Besides, ZOTO aimed at pressuring the government agencies to realize physical improvements and to solve the land question in Tondo. In the course of time, the movement became more and more politicized (Honculada 1985), and the squatter organizations, no longer focusing on matters of habitat only, fought against dictatorship too. On the other hand, Marcos had strengthened his position. The barangay-system by which he wanted to control the neighborhoods was more or less established. Several laws and regulations allowed for repressive government action with regard to squatting. The most important among them were the Letter of Instruction (LOI) 19 of 1972, which ordered the removal of all dwellings built without a permit on public and private lands, especially alongside rivers and railroad tracks, Presidential Decree (PD) 296 of 1973, which ordered all squatters living along rivers, canals and railroads, to leave and which imposed penalties for violation, the notorious PD 772 of 1975, affirming LOI 19 and PD 296 but adding that squatting is considered as a crime instead of being a "public nuisance," and LOI 691 of 1978 ordering all local governments to carry out PD 772.

During this period, guidelines for public housing were devised and a newly formed body, the National Housing Authority (NHA), was given central responsibility for coordinating the policy. The majority (253) of the 415 blighted areas, identified by the NHA in 1981, with a total population of one million had to be considered for on-site development. The other areas would be eradicated in accordance with PD 772 and LOI 691. World Bank finances were obtained to realize slum improvement projects. The Bank, however, used the principle of cost-recovery, which means that each project had to pay for itself. In other words, squatter families carry the burden of paying for improvements in the urban infrastructure. Since they often cannot even meet their basic needs (food, clothing, edu-
cation, health), it is clear that on-site development resulted in pushing the poor families out of the improved areas. Like the squatter families from other eradicated settlements, they had the opportunity to opt for relocation outside Manila, in Sapang Palay, Carmona, San Pedro and Dasmariñas, 20 to 40 kilometers outside the metropolis. But there, too, they had to pay for the land, and the transportation costs to their place of work in the capital caused a continuous pressure on the family budget.

The logic of a policy consisting of eradication, slum improvement and relocation is easy to understand, particularly because of the support of international agencies. On the other hand, it is not surprising that this policy met resistance, since it substantially decreased the access to urban land for the poor. Incidents often occurred during evictions and processes of on-site development.

It was not until 1982 that the squatter movement recovered from the blows of the mid-seventies. It was Imelda Marcos, the president’s wife and governor of Metro Manila, who brought new life to the movement. In June 1982 she proclaimed a “last campaign” to drive the squatters out of Metro Manila. They had to leave “before the end of the month.” Shortly after this proclamation, seven federations of squatter organizations all over Manila created ALMA, the Alliance of the Poor against Demolition. They were supported by several nongovernmental organizations, among which the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA) of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) and the National Council of Churches of the Philippines (NCCP). ALMA and its supporting organizations did not restrict themselves to eradications and other public housing matters. According to their analysis, squatter families had to leave because Imelda Marcos wanted to transform the metropolis into a prestigious center (“Los Angeles of Southeast Asia”) capable of attracting foreign investors. For this reason ALMA chose to oppose the whole socioeconomic policy of Marcos.

During a conference on problems of the urban poor, the supporting organizations stated that “... community organizing should reflect an analysis that will link particular problems of the community to the basic problems of the larger society, contextualizing these problems against the background of dominant social structures—economic, political and cultural—that have spawned these problems.” (National Consultation on Urban Poor 1983, Appendix D). In other words, the squatter movement had to start from a political analysis
of the national situation. This implied a platform, and a coalition with trade unions and peasant organizations with a common political philosophy. The murder of Benigno Aquino, one of the main leaders of the opposition, in August 1983, caused general discontent in the Philippines and strengthened this strategy.

After the February revolt of 1986, the urban poor movement maintained its political character. During a short period, it seemed as if a new all-embracing organization, "The National Congress of Urban Poor Organizations" (NACUPO) would restrict itself to problems of habitat. But soon an important bloc broke away from NACUPO to follow its own, politically articulated course (Anawim 1987, 1(3), Van Naerssen 1989).

The squatter resettlement areas:
1 = Sapang Palay, 2 = Dasmariñas, 3 = San Pedro, 4 = Carmona.
Class Consciousness and Militancy

Which factors explain why in some squatter settlements militant neighborhood organizations exist while they are absent in other areas? In this connection Meijer and Van Vooren in 1985 carried out research in Dapo and San Fernando, two squatter areas of about 200 families each. Neighborhood organizations were considered as "militant" in case a political analysis was used as a starting-point and as a reference for activities. The organization should also maintain links with squatter organizations outside the neighborhood. Two neighborhoods were selected, one with a militant organization (San Fernando) and one without (Dapo). Meijer and Van Vooren assumed that the composition of social classes and (in connection with this) "social consciousness" explained the different nature of the existing neighborhood organizations. In emphasizing these two factors they used earlier work by Roel Janssen in Bogota (1978a) as their foundation.

However, the composition of the social classes in Dapo and San Fernando did not show significant differences, although in the latter, more workers were employed in large-scale industries (50 or more employees) (table 1). Meijer and Van Vooren supposed that "radical" social consciousness particularly would be found among the workers, who, consequently, would be over-represented in militant neighborhood organizations.

Table 1: Social classes in the squatter settlements Dapo and San Fernando.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class</th>
<th>Dapo</th>
<th></th>
<th>San Fernando</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>number</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory workers</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>(49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeoisie</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>(19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed informal sector</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The researchers distinguished three types of social consciousness:
1. People with a dependent consciousness accept existing power-relations and economic inequality,
2. In the case of fragmented consciousness, contradictions and inequalities in the society are criticized, but no attempts are made to change the situation and
3. Radical consciousness, on the contrary, which leads to protest and action. It appears that dependent consciousness dominated in Dapo, the neighborhood without a militant organization. In San Fernando, domination of fragmented consciousness was found. But the data from table 2 do not affirm the hypothesis that dependent or fragmented consciousness are significantly less among factory workers.

Besides, in the active core group of the militant organization in San Fernando, factory workers were not strongly represented. Only four out of the twenty members of the core group were employed in factories. An explanation of why a militant neighborhood organization exists in one squatter area but is lacking in another should apparently be found elsewhere. Titus Meijer, who stayed in San Fernando, attached much value to the fact that the four factory workers were the leaders of the core group and that they had obtained political experience in trade unions. This certainly could have been of influence, but in our opinion the description of the history of the squatter settlements and their organizations (either supported by local governments, neutral, or allied with the political opposition) reveals other factors which are of more importance.

Table 2: Social class and social consciousness in the squatter settlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social class and unemployment</th>
<th>Social Consciousness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory workers</td>
<td>Dapo 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeoisie</td>
<td>Dapo 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed informal sector</td>
<td>Dapo 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Dapo 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Meijer and Van Vooren (1986), tables 3.10 and 4.18
Dapo and San Fernando

Dapo is an old squatter settlement situated in Pandacan, one of the thirteen municipalities of Metro Manila. Approximately 220 families (1,500 people) live on one hectare of land owned by the local government of the City of Manila. The first occupants arrived shortly after the Second World War, when the land was still in the hands of private owners to whom rent had to be paid. In 1951, 122 families already lived in the area. One year later, the land was sold to a company and thereafter, in 1967, the City of Manila bought the land. The neighborhood had no legal status, and the occupants had no claim on the land. About half of the families, however, obtained the status of "awardee," implying that they were nominated to obtain land-ownership in due course. They were made to pay P2 (10 U.S. dollar cents) per square meter a month. Some families had been paying rent for twenty years, as no limit was set for the conversion of their right. In the course of time, many families left the area to settle elsewhere, while their places were taken by others. At the time of the research, almost forty percent of the inhabitants rented their dwellings from the "absentee awardees."

On the whole, the quality of the dwellings is bad. The materials mostly used are of the nondurable kind. The houses often show cracks and holes. Inside they are covered with wallpaper and cardboard. Nearly half of the households do not have a lavatory, a quarter lack a connection to main electric lines and use kerosene which is dangerous because of fire risks. There is no garbage collection. Garbage is often dumped in the river nearby, which, especially in the dry season, causes unhygienic and unhealthy situations. The main complaint of the inhabitants, however, concerns water facilities. There are only three public taps outside the settlement which have to be shared with people from other neighborhoods. Some of the public services are relatively good. The Department of Public Works in 1965 paved the main roads. In 1977 a drainage system was constructed. It was partly paid for by residents. A children's playground was initiated by the barangay-captain and the government-supported youth organization. In 1985 volunteers built an Infant School. Funds were raised by residents, with support of the nongovernmental organization ERDA (Educational Research and Development Association, a national organization). A health clinic, three primary schools and two high schools are to be found near the neighborhood. Although the matters of land titles and the provision of collective consump-
tion goods, such as water, have not been solved, according to Van Vooren, unemployment, financial problems in general and matters like theft and drug abuse, are considered of at least the same importance.

Several organizations aim to combat neighborhood problems. The largest one is the Tambakan Home Association (THA) which looks after the interests of the awardees. THA is managed by the barangay-captain. It actually serves to strengthen patron-client relationships between the captain and the families of the neighborhood, i.e., award-holding families. The barangay captain held a very self-evident view about nonmember families: the families who are not awarded are squatters, and since squatters live from one day to the other, they are not interested in continuity and had better leave the community.

A similar organization is "The Ladies Auxiliary Brigade" which aims to mobilize women on behalf of community development projects to improve the neighborhood. The brigade is also needed to welcome official guests from the local government. Mention should also be made of TANOD. In each urban district of Manila members of TANOD function as para-police forces, reporting breaches and, in some cases, arresting people. In Dapo the organization is controlled by the barangay captain.

A political neutral organization is the neighborhood branch of the earlier mentioned ERDA, active in the field of education and health. Samabahay (the Union of Parents of the Neighborhood) opposes the barangay-captain and his supporters. It is associated with the federation of squatter organizations in south Metro Manila PADER (People Against Demolition and Relocation) and as such part of the urban movement. Samabahay counts a membership of fifty people and has its own youth organization. Its aim to increase political consciousness, but it does not mobilize inhabitants to exert pressure on the government by demonstrations or other actions. Actually the organization is forbidden. In 1982 an accusation of squatting under PD 772 was lodged by two policemen against twenty-four families, who supported Samabahay. The accusation was backed by the barangay captain and five months later a warrant for the arrest was issued of the twenty-four heads of the families concerned. Thanks to the efforts of a progressive group of lawyers the case was dismissed one year later, but the effects of the intimidation were felt long thereafter.
San Fernando is located in Marikina, a fast growing municipality on the east fringe of Metro Manila. Based on PD 772, 125 squatter families living on the banks of the Marikina river were evicted by the municipality and the NHA in 1976, and relocated along a tributary. This was the origin of San Fernando. It was considered an "Emergency Relocation Center," as a temporary site where families had to wait for final shelter elsewhere. At the time of the research by Meijer and Van Vooren, San Fernando accommodated 200 families, who, on an average, earned more than the inhabitants of Dapo (table 3).

San Fernando is part of barangay Parang, where several large factories are located. Nearly one-third of the jobs in San Fernando are provided by these factories. There are some other temporary relocation centers in Parang. A community center gives support to trade unions, women's and neighborhood organizations. Shortly after the relocation, a core group of twenty squatters decided to approach the municipality in order to obtain collective facilities. Therefore they started to organize a neighborhood organization in 1978, shortly before the parliamentary elections. San Fernando got three water taps in exchange for the promise to vote in favor of Marcos's party. The lobby continued to obtain electricity and succeeded in obtaining a connection one month before the elections for the municipal council.

Table 3: Households profiles in the squatter settlements Dapo and San Fernando.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Dapo</th>
<th>San Fernando</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of persons (median)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly income* (median)</td>
<td>250 pesos</td>
<td>386 pesos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income earners (median)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land title</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership dwelling</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floor space dwelling (median)</td>
<td>21 m²</td>
<td>20 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of water</td>
<td>public taps</td>
<td>46% deep well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* 1 peso = 5 U.S. dollars)  
Source: Meijer and Van Vooren (1986), table 5.3
Since the number of votes in both cases did not live up to the expectations, and the captain of barangay Parang apparently did not get a hold on the settlement, the municipality supported the creation of another neighborhood organization, called Samahang Bagong Diwa (SBD, Organization of the New Spirit) one year later. It also supported a new Mothers Club to which the tasks of welcoming official guests and distributing food packets were assigned.

At about the same time, forty new families arrived in San Fernando. The core group started another organization to look after the interests of newcomers. In this way it succeeded in increasing the number of supporters in the neighborhood. The new organization also participated in elections for the Board of the SBD. Members of the core group were elected and in this way infiltrated the SBD. At the end of 1983, when discontent with the regime of Marcos was widespread, they even obtained the majority on the board. The organization at that time was already aligned with the Marikina People's Assembly, a militant member of the umbrella squatter organization of Metro Manila, ALMA. Actions focused on the land question, for the time being without much results. Nevertheless, the case of San Fernando demonstrates how a group of squatters succeeded in activating the neighborhood and making certain gains regarding the provision of collective consumption goods. This was achieved by the creation of neighborhood organizations and by making use of the mechanism of clientelism (votes in exchange for favors).

In the two settlements discussed above, the explanation for the observed difference in militancy has been sought in the different composition of classes and consciousness. However, the results of the research did not affirm the suppositions. A closer look at the settlements revealed several striking differences in the history, the official status and the nature of the neighborhood organizations.

Dapo is an established squatter area. Many families rent their shelters, about half of whom expect to obtain land titles in the future. In San Fernando, the inhabitants collectively feel insecure about the future, since they are accommodated in an "Emergency Relocation Center" and their site is defined as temporary by the government. In Dapo the barangay-captain controlled the neighborhood. He had initiated projects and was supported by a part of the inhabitants. Dapo could be considered as integrated in the governmental system of controlling the neighborhoods.
San Fernando, on the contrary, is part of a barangay (Parang). The local government had to create its own neighborhood organization without giving it the status and power of a barangay. Moreover, this organization was infiltrated by people opposing the government. A progressive community center, linked with nongovernmental organizations, supported the core group of the militant neighborhood organization in San Fernando. These circumstances seem of more importance for explaining the differences in militancy than the class composition of the two squatter areas concerned.

Conclusion

The question of autonomy is one of the main points of discussion in the theory of the urban social movement. In "The city and the grass-roads" (1983), his influential cross-cultural study of urban movements, Castells argues that only politically autonomous movements are able to achieve structural changes in the role of cities, and in this way to realize transformation of the existing society. In practice, however, it appears that in developing countries squatter movements can only maintain their autonomy during short periods (Schuurman and Van Naerssen, 1989). The state attempts to eliminate social movements by repression, or uses patron-client relationships to co-opt them within the existing system (Burgess 1982). Sooner or later autonomous urban movements will be confronted with the power of the state apparatus. For this reason, squatter movements will strategically align with other social groups in opposition.

At the beginning of the seventies, ZOTO could declare itself as independent. It defended the ideology of autonomy in the neighborhoods. But after some years the neighborhood organizations had to choose either for adaptation to the barangay system, which meant integration into the system of the government, or for continuation of opposition. The neighborhood organizations which opted for the latter were confronted with repression and subsequently moved to take a stand in political matters. This became clear when political circumstances in the Philippines changed and, triggered by the murder of Benigno Aquino in 1983, discontent with the Marcos regime substantially increased.

The question of the political alignment could also be approached from the other side. Organized resistance of peasants, factory work-
ers and the churches became interested in activating neighborhoods and including the squatter movement within the nationwide opposition to Marcos. This led to the question of factors explaining the emergence of militant squatter organizations in the areas of the urban poor. "Militant organizations" are understood as organizations that put their efforts into improving the urban (neighborhood) environment within the framework of existing socioeconomic inequalities, and are linked to other neighborhood organizations with whom they form an urban social movement.

The explanation of militancy in squatter settlements could be sought at different levels. The research by Meijer and Van Vooren in two settlements did not prove the determining influence of class composition, although that can be one of the factors explaining militancy. At this level of actors in the urban social movement, however, one should also take into account the strategies of national governments to control the areas of the urban poor. Contradictions within neighborhoods such as between owners and renters or, as in the case of Dapo, between "awardees" and other households, could be exploited. Incorporation within state patron-client relationships is a common phenomenon. On the other hand, nongovernmental organizations could in one way or another support squatter organizations and act as countervailing forces. At the level of socioeconomic conditions in squatter areas, it seems obvious that one must look at the degree of unemployment, level of income, availability of services and so on. But at least the history and the prospects for legality of the area are as important, since the struggle for a place to live is crucial for any urban social movement.

What does all this mean for development strategies? In this respect we want to comment on the role of support organizations. In an article based on experiences in the United States, Zald and McCarthy (1977) argue that in each society enough potential is available to generate social movements. But they will only unfold and develop if enough resources are mobilized: money, human resources, legitimacy and facilities. Schuurman (1989) is of the opinion that these resources are lacking in the Third World. Social movements precisely try to bring these resources within their reach. He attaches more value to consciousness, or, in his terms, there should be enough militancy. Support organizations in Metro Manila are active on both levels. With community development programs they make efforts to increase consciousness, the actual meaning of which concept depends on the type of support organization and the political conjunction.
SQUATTER ACCESS TO LAND

Besides they put finance, volunteers, organizational skills and social networks at the disposal of neighborhoods. The importance of these nongovernmental organizations in the emergence and function of squatter organizations should not be underestimated. This is an important field for further research and development policies aiming at increasing access to land for the urban poor as well.

Notes

1. The poverty line in Metro Manila was estimated in 1986 at P3,282 (about US $150) a month for a family of six persons. See Anawim (1987–89)

2. We define urban social movements as movements with an urban territorially based identity, striving for emancipation via collective actions to improve their local environment (Schuurman 1989, 9). The territorial identity of squatters refers to their consciousness of being illegal occupants of pieces of urban land.

3. I am well aware of the difficulty that in developing countries the job mobility of the active urban population adds to the usual problems of distinguishing classes. Any classification is artificial and debatable.

4. During his research in the neighborhood of Santa Rosa de Lima (Bogota) Roel Janssen (1978) used the same classification, which he derived from a study of Verschueren (1971), Pobladores y consciencia social, Santiago, CIDU.

References


