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The Quezon-Osmeña Split of 1922

ROLANDO M. GRIPALDO

Manuel L. Quezon was primarily responsible for Francis Burton Harrison's selection as governor general of the Philippines to replace William Cameron Forbes. On 15 August 1913, Harrison agreed with Quezon's suggestion that he become the governor general of the Islands. Quezon suggested Harrison's name to Congressman William Jones who discussed the matter with Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. On 16 August Quezon talked with Bryan who sent Quezon's letter, endorsing Harrison, to the president on 19 August. Other leaders of the House and the Senate also worked on Harrison's behalf. The president signed Harrison's appointment on 21 August.¹

Upon his arrival in the Philippines, Harrison announced President Woodrow Wilson's policy of more autonomy for the Filipinos. He rapidly Filipinized the government despite Osmeña's advice to be cautious. He made the Filipinos the majority in the Philippine Commission and supported the passage of Jones Bill No. 2. He approved the Reorganization Act (Act No. 2666) in November 1916 and appointed a new Cabinet of six members, as against the original four, on 11 January 1917. He retired many American chiefs and assistant chiefs of executive departments by appointing Filipinos to head them, except for the Department of Public Instruction which was reserved for the

1. Quezon to Winslow, 22 August 1913. Quezon sent the report on how Harrison came to be appointed to H. Parker Willis and Moorfield Storey on the same day, 22 August 1913. See Quezon to Winslow, 27 August 1913 and M. Kalaw to Winslow, 10 October 1913. Quezon chose Harrison because the latter was for Philippine independence and neutralization. See Harrison to Quezon, 10 July 1911 and Quezon to Winslow, 28 August 1913. All from *Quezon Papers* (henceforth *QP*), ser. V. See also Rolando M. Gripaldo, "The Quezon-Winslow Correspondence: A Friendship Turned Sour," *Philippine Studies* 32 (1984): 143. Vicente A. Pacis erred on this matter. See his book, *Sergio Osmeña*, 2 vols. (Manila: Phoenix Press, Inc., 1971), 1: 215-21.

vice-governor by virtue of section 23 of the Jones Law. Harrison also introduced a budget system five years before the United States adopted such a system. He approved Act No. 2803 which authorized the Legislature to call upon department secretaries to report on matters related to their functions and activities thereby making the Cabinet more responsible to the legislators. He issued an executive order on 16 October 1918 creating the Council of State, composed of the governor general as chairman, the House Speaker, the senate president, and the members of the Cabinet. Among its functions were to draw up the policies of the various departments and to prepare and approve the budget before the governor general submitted it to the legislature. Harrison also approved in 1918 an act creating the Board of Control composed of the governor general as chairman, the House Speaker, and the senate president, whose major function was to vote control of stocks of government-owned or controlled corporations such as the Philippine National Bank, the Manila Hotel, and so on. He signed into law the independence fund bill (Act No. 2933) on 15 December 1920 providing for an annual appropriation of one million pesos for the Independence Commission.²

The government at this time was basically semiparliamentary, dominated by Osmeña and Quezon, with the executive a mere figure-head. To quote Milagros Guerrero:

The system of government resulting from Harrison's rapid Filipinization policy was neither "presidential," for his powers were greatly eroded by "local" legislation, nor, strictly speaking, "parliamentary" in form. Rather, it was a quasi-parliamentary form of government . . . Harrison sought the advice and consent of Osmeña on all important matters such that for all practical purposes, the latter was the prime minister of the colonial government. Osmeña aptly described the Philippine government in the following manner: "Our system of government is ours, truly ours, product of our policies and of the progressive evolution of the institutions of our country, the natural out-growth of our achievement in self-government."³

2. For an extensive treatment of Harrison's administration, see Napoleon J. Casambre, "Francis Burton Harrison: His Administration in the Philippines, 1913-1921" (Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1968), *passim*, and Francis Burton Harrison, *The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence* (New York: The Century Co., 1922), pp. 1-343. See Michael P. Onorato, "The Jones Act and Filipino Participation in Government," *Solidarity* 2 (1967): 86-93. See also Francis Burton Harrison, *Origins of the Philippine Republic*, ed. Michael P. Onorato (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1974), pp. 1-258.

3. Teodoro Agoncillo and Milagros Guerrero, *History of the Filipino People* (Quezon City: R. P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1970), p. 352.

QUEZON'S REBELLION

Quezon came home from the United States on 27 September 1916 and less than a week later, on 3 October, he was elected senator. Twelve days later, he formally tendered his resignation as Resident Commissioner to Governor General Harrison and the following day he was elected senate president.⁴

Quezon and Osmeña of the Senate and the House had various disagreements but these did not immediately cause the rift between them. Collectively, however, they contributed to the formation of Quezon's attitude of rebellion against Osmeña's leadership which eventually developed into a leadership crisis in 1921-22.

First, there was the issue of precedence. In May 1916 Osmeña sought Quezon's advice on whether he should run for the Assembly. Osmeña cabled that he should run for the Senate "if status Jones Bill demands." In July, Osmeña expressed the possibility of his retirement, but Quezon said that Osmeña should not leave public life yet. The following month Quezon told Osmeña that if the Senate President should rank higher than the Speaker, "as I think he should," then Osmeña ought to go to the Senate. He assured him, however, that whatever position he (Osmeña) might choose, arrangements should be made that the leadership of the party should go with it. Quezon reiterated that Osmeña should remain as the leader of the party, because neither Rafael Palma nor Teodoro Kalaw nor he himself could replace him. Six days later, Osmeña replied that Quezon's candidacy for the Senate had been decided: "My case will be decided Monday after hearing Palma." On 20 August Quezon firmly told Osmeña that the Senate presidency was the most important position and he should take it. After consulting some people, Osmeña admitted to Quezon the importance of the Senate but argued that many people, including Governor General Harrison, believed that party leadership should be in the House. He doubted that party leadership could be placed in the Senate because it would not renew its membership every three years as did the House. Suppose, Osmeña contended, the House majority belonged to a party different from the Senate majority. Then the will of the populace as expressed

4. Manuel L. Quezon, *The Good Fight*, (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1946; reprint ed., Mandaluyong: Cacho Hermanos, Inc., 1985), p. 132; Sol H. Gwekoh, *Manuel L. Quezon: His Life and Career* (Manila: University Publishing Co., Inc., 1948), pp. 79 and 81. In a wire to Osmeña on 29 January 1916, Quezon said that upon defeat or passage of the Jones bill, "I shall surely quit because I do not want the job for the sake of the job." See Quezon to Harrison, 15 October 1915. Both from QP, ser. V.

in the election of the House members should prevail. Quezon cabled back: "I think you're right in retaining party leadership in the House."⁵

As we can glean from the exchange above, both Osmeña and Quezon agreed that the Senate preceded the House in importance, but Osmeña believed that party leadership should be placed in the House, since it was the more representative body and therefore "the more sensitive to the popular will." In his inaugural address on 16 October 1916 Quezon emphasized that the Senate represented the "serene, mature and prudent judgment of public opinion," the "safe, immovable dam to contain the overflow of popular passion" in the lower house. In this regard the Senate should precede the House in both social and official functions, but because he had earlier assured Osmeña that party leadership should be placed in whichever position Osmeña would choose, he agreed in 1917 to grant him precedence in social functions, though not in official communications. Washington was properly informed about this. As the years went by, however, Quezon realized this arrangement amounted to the diminution of the dignity and the significance of the Senate. In order to avoid the uneasy experience of a situation where the Speaker of the House preceded the president of the Senate, Quezon expressed his desire to retire.⁶

5. Osmeña's wires to Quezon, 21 May 1916, 18 July 1916, 28 August 1916, and 8 September 1916. Quezon's wires to Osmeña, 20 July 1916, 11 August 1916, and 8 September 1916. Cited by Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, 1: 226-27. Quezon's wire to Osmeña, 22 May 1916 and Osmeña's wire to Quezon, 17 August 1916. Both from QP, ser. V.

6. Gwekoh, *Quezon: Life and Career*, pp. 81 and 83. See Quezon's cable to the Bureau of Insular Affairs, 14 December 1917, QP, ser. V. See also Rafael Palma, *My Autobiography* (Manila: Capitol Publishing House, Inc., 1953), p. 113. Later in 1922, Quezon would write Leonard Wood on the question of precedence: First, that Secretary of War W.H. Taft declared the House Speaker as second in rank to the governor general because the governor general at the time was the president of the Philippine Commission, so that had the head of the commission been other than the governor general, he would be second in rank; second, the U.S. Senate president preceded the House Speaker, and as was the case in every other country; third and most important, from the terms of the Jones Law it was evident that the Senate was the senior house, so that whenever the Senate president and the House Speaker were mentioned, the Senate or its President was always mentioned first. Quezon explained that Gov. Gen. Harrison did not approve this question of precedence because the Senate president did not demand that "he be given the rank due to his position." See Quezon to Wood, 3 March 1922. See also Quezon's wire to Gabaldon, 20 February 1922; Enage to Wood, 20 February 1922; and Wood to Quezon, 1 March 1922. All from QP, ser. V. It would seem from Quezon's arguments that the terms of the Jones Act imply that the leadership of the government resided in the Senate presidency. Maximo Kalaw believed that the Jones Act was silent on the leadership issue and this was one of the causes of the party split. See Maximo M. Kalaw, *The Philippine Question—An Analysis*, from the University of the Philippines Library

Second, there was the divorce legislation. Quezon, together with Governor General Harrison, favored absolute divorce and not just legal separation. Senator Filemon Sotto filed a divorce bill making adultery on the part of the wife the ground for divorce. Quezon supported him, but had the bill amended so that adultery on the part of either spouse would be grounds for divorce. The Senate passed the bill, but the House under Osmeña's leadership, reverted to Sotto's original position. Quezon was displeased. Harrison signed the bill into law (Act No. 2710) on 11 March 1917.⁷

Third, there was the issue of executive appointments. The senators in 1918 resented the Speaker's interference in the form of advice upon executive appointments. Since it was known that Osmeña advised on nominations in his capacity not as Speaker but as president of the Nacionalista party, the senators retorted that this was "invisible government." They wanted to exercise the prerogative inherent in their office. The administrative officials, on the other hand, felt that under the law they had the right to decide upon departmental policies through the members of the Cabinet. Since he was in an untenable position and in order to preserve the principle of responsible leadership, Osmeña suggested the creation of the Council of State to advise the governor general, who would become the president of the council. Since Harrison found this a good idea, he issued Executive Order No. 37 on 16 October 1918, creating the Council of State. Quezon, who wanted party unity, nominated Osmeña for the vice-presidency, thereby temporarily settling the issue of leadership in government.⁸

Fourth was the bill on woman suffrage. In his message to the Fourth Philippine Legislature in 1918, Governor General Harrison recommended that suffrage be granted to women. Nothing came out of it, however. In the following year, Harrison again emphatically endorsed the idea to the Legislature. It was at this time that Quezon openly supported woman suffrage. A number of bills were introduced in the

Collection, pp. 26-27. Reprinted from the *Philippine Social Science Review* 3 (1931). Quezon strongly felt that if there were no leader in government, through a natural process the leadership would eventually devolve on the Senate presidency because of the importance of the Senate, as Osmeña himself conceded. See Osmeña's wire to Quezon, 28 August 1916. Cited by Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, 1: 227.

7. Palma, *My Autobiography*, p. 113. See Joaquin Ramirez, *El Divorcio Relativo en Filipinas* (Manila: University of Santo Tomas, 1937), p. 44 and Carlos Quirino, *Quezon: Paladin of Philippine Freedom* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1971), p. 123.

8. Harrison, *Cornerstone*, pp. 211-12. Jose P. Laurel, Sr. held that except for its name the Council of State was nothing new, for it was then called the Philippine Commission and the only difference between the two was their respective compositions. He wanted the Council of State abolished because it encroached on certain powers of the Legislature. See "Scrapbook," *Laurel Papers*, Jose P. Laurel Memorial Foundation, Manila.

Senate like those of Pedro Sison and Rafael Palma. When the Senate passed the Sison bill, the House did not discuss it "as the anti-suffragists still dominated that body." Palma said at this juncture that Quezon felt his opinions, especially on divorce and woman suffrage, were secondary, as they were subject to the authority of Osmeña.⁹

Fifth, there was the presidency of the Manila Railroad Company. Acquired by the government from British management in 1915 because of construction frauds (the company's agents bought the necessary land at nominal prices from the owners and sold it to the Company at a high figure), the Manila Railroad Company realized a profit during the first three years of government operation and this was spent for the repair of roadbeds, station buildings, and rolling-stock. By 1918 the railroad company had been organized as an independent corporation owned by the government and controlled by a Board of Control composed of the governor general, the Senate president, and the House Speaker. Quezon decided to serve as the railroad's president without salary because he wanted to expand the railway to the Bicol region, but Osmeña believed that Quezon's presidency was unnecessary. Osmeña erroneously thought that Quezon was merely interested in the efficient control of the railroad stocks which could be taken care of by the Board of Control, of which Quezon was a member.¹⁰

Finally, there were Osmeña's threats of resignation. Harrison observed that discussions of the Cabinet or the Council of State were generally peaceful, but in 1919 a heated argument between Quezon and Osmeña arose. The issue pertained to a grant of government subsidy, through the National Development Company, to a private company to be established for the manufacture of cement, which the country needed. Quezon favored it while Osmeña opposed it. The other members of the Council of State were inclined to agree with Quezon. When Harrison was about to put the motion on the subsidy to a vote, Osmeña announced that if the motion were carried, he would resign. The meeting was adjourned and only later, when his feelings were assuaged, did Osmeña agree with the subsidy. The other inci-

9. Pura Villanueva Kalaw, *How the Filipina Got the Vote* (Manila: n.p., 1952), pp. 17-18. See Palma, *My Autobiography*, p. 113.

10. Harrison, *Cornerstone*, pp. 256-57; *Philippines Herald*, 9 May 1938; and Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, 1: 292. It is interesting to note that Joseph R. Hayden retracted for lack of evidence the accusation that the Manila Railroad Company issued 80,000 annual family passes to Quezon's political supporters in one year. See Hayden's "The Philippines: An Experiment in Democracy," *Atlantic Monthly* 137 (1926): 410, and its reprint entitled *Constitutional and Political Developments in the Philippine Islands 1921-1925*, from the University of the Philippines Library Collection, where this charge was deleted.

dent had to do with the judiciary reorganization bill of January 1921 which was introduced and passed in the Senate. Quezon and the Senate wanted the transfer of judges from one district to another to be made by the chief executive upon the recommendation of the secretary of justice, but Osmeña and the House wanted it made by the Supreme Court. A conference was called to settle the differences and when the House would not budge, the Senate Nacionalistas were prepared to secede. Thereupon Osmeña "resolutely opposed the senators and told them that if they insisted he was ready to resign."¹¹

All these contributed to the formation of Quezon's attitude of rebellion against Osmeña's leadership and led him to the idea of forming a new party. Rafael Palma, however, thought only of the divorce amendment and the woman-suffrage rejection, while Dapen Liang thought only of the judiciary-reorganization rejection as the immediate cause of the Senate rebellion against the House leadership.¹² As we shall see in the next section it was Osmeña's intervention in giving advice on executive nominations that was the bone of contention in the leadership crisis.

Coupled with Quezon's attitude of rebellion was the economic crisis that began in 1919 and worsened by 1921. In 1919 there was an "unprecedented rainfall which caused disastrous floods extending over a long period of time" in many parts of the country. As a consequence, there existed, firstly, a rice crisis brought about by bad harvests at home and also in Vietnam so that the Philippines could not import enough Saigon rice to feed the populace. Secondly, the Manila Railroad Company could not effectively operate in view of the floods and suffered a heavy loss. The government deficit was ₱7,055,666 which, to the discomfiture of the people, led to the raising of taxes. The following year was worse. Practically all government-owned corporations suffered losses. The Philippine National Bank lost ₱38 million due to mismanagement and to the postwar economic depression that caused the reduction of commodity export prices. Government critics blamed the Nacionalista party for too much politics in business, that is to say, for making political appointments based not on merits but on one's standing in the party.¹³

11. Harrison, *Cornerstone*, p. 215. Dapen Liang, *Philippine Parties and Politics* (San Francisco: The Gladstone Company, 1970), p. 121. *Philippines Free Press*, 22 January 1921 and *Manila Times*, 25 December 1921.

12. Palma, *My Autobiography*, p. 113. Liang, *Philippine Parties*, p. 110.

13. Philippine National Bank stockholders found out that the bank was in a bad shape as early as April 1919. On 30 November 1919 the Secretary of War sent bank experts headed by Francis Coates, Jr. to investigate the bank. But due to Coates's illness, the investigation was terminated on 11 April 1920 with the report that the losses could

THE QUEZON-OSMEÑA RIFT

In the 1920 presidential elections Republican Warren G. Harding (a former chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines) won over the Democratic presidential aspirant and the Republicans gained control of the American Congress in 1921. The Nacionalista Party held a convention in January 1921 and despite the strained relations between him and Osmeña,¹⁴ Quezon denied the rumor of a division between them which Palma had raised during the convention. Quezon insisted he had no ambition for the party presidency, or for any party position for that matter. Osmeña, on the other hand, refused to be reelected party President unless he would at the same time be made the leader of government. The convention elected Osmeña President and Quezon Vice-President while maintaining the position that the head of the party should continue as the responsible leader of government.¹⁵ When Harding, however, sent the Wood-Forbes Mission in April 1921 to conduct an investigation on the political and economic situation of the Philippines, Quezon began to worry that Osmeña's autocratic leadership would harm the Nacionalista Party because public opinion was critical about it because of the Philippine National Bank financial mess. Since Osmeña and Quezon were managing almost entirely the domestic affairs during the Harrison regime, the blame for the financial mess of the country would naturally fall on the Nacionalista Party. Quezon believed Osmeña was primarily responsible for the country's economic crisis, and that the Philippine National Bank was the achilles heel of the Harrison administration.¹⁶

be blamed on lack of well-trained and experienced personnel in key positions of the bank, lack of responsibility, lack of strict supervision, and excessive political interference, apparently by Osmeña and his henchmen, in policy and administration. A team of auditors examined the bank and reported after a month that the bank's total loss was ₱75,089,000 with over one-third of this amount incurred from loans granted to sugar centrals and oil mills. See Casambre, "Harrison Administration," chap. 5, pp. 17-20.

14. It is important to note that in 1920 Quezon and the senators began to gain control of some appointments. No Justice of the Peace could be confirmed unless he was recommended by the senator from the district he came from. Harrison supported this scheme. See Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, p. 267.

15. Liang, *Philippine Parties*, p. 123. Quezon did not accept the Nacionalista Party vice presidency. See *Manila Times*, 22 December 1921.

16. Quezon to Osmeña, 23 December 1921. Cited by Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, p. 287. In a letter to Harrison in December 1921, Quezon questioned the Speaker's right as head of the Nacionalista Party to dictate both the policies and nomination for appointments of the party. See de Veyra's wire to Quezon, 24 March 1921; de Veyra's wire to Quezon from Melencio, 8 April 1921 and Quezon to Harrison, 11 July 1921. All from QP, ser. V. See also Michael P. Onorato, *Leonard Wood as Governor General: A Calendar of Selected Correspondence* (Manila: MCS Enterprises, Inc., 1969), p. 20.

Because of the economic crisis and his opposition to Osmeña's leadership, Quezon decided to see Juan Sumulong, the leader of the Democrata party, for a possible alliance. But nothing came out of this because (using Sumulong's own word) of Quezon's "indecision." Quezon was politically undecided, for there were risks. To form a new party, as in Teodoro Sandiko's case, or a party alliance or fusion, as in the Democrata case (i.e., the merging of the Terceristas and Progresistas) would not necessarily mean one would win in an election, nor would it mean he would get the majority vote that would enable him to lead the country. He might lose or be in a minority. Osmeña, in Quezon's view, was still politically strong as an opponent, since he had a huge following and political machinery. Quezon was not himself perfectly sure that his alliance with the Democratas would indeed bring about the defeat of Osmeña.¹⁷

Since it was rumored in March 1921 that influential Americans like William H. Taft had suggested the abolition of the Philippine Senate, and fearing the Harding administration would reverse the policy adopted by the preceding Democratic government, the Legislature decided to send Quezon to Washington to ascertain the policy of the new President.¹⁸ Quezon left Manila on 12 July 1921 aboard the *Shinyu Maru*. On board, he read the two-volume biography, *Roosevelt and His Times*, by Joseph Buklin Bishop. Quezon noted that Theodore Roosevelt "was a man of great capacity for work . . . a man of ideals and principles and consistently stood for them . . . a man of action [who] was not very particular about the law, provided there was no specific injunction against the action he proposed to take . . ." Quezon then continued:

One should have principles and must fight for them, but at the same time should be practical trying to get results: therefore one must try to be with his party organization as long as it is possible to do so without authorizing any real wrong.¹⁹

17. *Tribune*, 12 August 1933. Quezon was said to be afraid that Osmeña, together with the Republicans, would sink him and so he wanted to form an alliance with the Democratas. In this way, Osmeña and the Republicans would be forced to respect the new party. See Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, 1: 273. I do not see any logical basis why Quezon should think and fear Osmeña, together with the Republicans. See Manuel L. Quezon, "I Never Submit to Humiliation," in *The Speeches of Manuel L. Quezon*, eds. Pedro de la Liana and F. B. Icasiano (Manila: State Publication Co., 1937), pp. 30-31.

18. De Veyra's wire to Quezon, 10 March 1921. See McIntyre to Quezon, 2 April 1921 and Quezon to Towner, 11 June 1921. All from QP, ser. V.

19. Untitled Quezon manuscript, 12 July 1921, QP, ser. VIII. See Gerald E. Wheeler, "Manuel L. Quezon and the American Presidents," *Asian Studies* 2 (1964): 236-37.

In other words, it was not necessary for someone to be very strict with the letter of the law, provided he acted within its spirit and no specific judicial injunction was raised against such action. In this sense executive orders and local legislations creating such special bodies as the Council of State, the Board of Control and the like, were justified in Quezon's mind because they were within the spirit of the preamble of the Jones Act. Secondly, one must have ideals and principles (e.g., the ideal of independence) and must fight for them, but at the same time he must be realistic and practical enough to study the existing circumstances and, should the ideal be difficult to obtain, he must determine what course of action was best under the situation, provided that "best action" was a step in the right direction, i.e., it would, for instance, lead to absolute and complete independence. Quezon's preferences for the ideal of independence were: "immediate," "definite," and "ultimate" independence in that order. Thirdly, as much as possible, one must stay with his party, provided the party committed no wrong. If it made mistakes, then he must endeavor to remedy them. But if the party, as represented by its leader, refused to listen, he may then leave or form his own party in the same way that Theodore Roosevelt, in disagreeing with Taft, caused the split of the Republican Party and formed his own Bull Moose Party.²⁰ Of course this must be resorted to as a last recourse, since it was risky. In fact, Quezon's fear of the political risks in forming a new party was confirmed. Not only was Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party defeated, its mother party (the Republican Party headed by Taft) was likewise defeated by the Democratic Party.

In the United States Pres. Harding told Quezon that although he could not as yet commit himself to any definite policy on Philippine independence on the basis of the Jones Law, since he still awaited the Wood-Forbes report, he nevertheless wanted to assure Quezon that Filipino control of domestic affairs would not be diminished through radical legislation and that he intended the Philippine administration to be in harmony with Filipino interests and desires.²¹ With this assurance Quezon left for Manila on 15 September 1921.

THE LEADERSHIP CRISIS

When Quezon went home his decision was to stick with the Nacionalista Party, and not to force a break with Osmeña and his

20. Quezon to Winslow, 8 March 1911 and Quezon to Roy Howard, 11 July 1933. Both from QP, ser. V. See Wheeler, "Quezon and the American Presidents," p. 236.

21. Quezon's wire to Osmeña, 28 August 1921, QP, ser. V.

faction, but to find a solution to the leadership crisis. Quezon had manifested his loyalty to the Nacionalista Party as far back as 1912. In May 1912 Quezon wanted the Nacionalista Party to be credited with the introduction in Congress of Jones Bill No. 1. Irving Winslow, Quezon's friend, had ambitions for Quezon. He wanted Quezon to lead the Philippines and even expected Quezon's statue to be erected at the Luneta someday. So Winslow wanted Quezon to get the credit and not the Nacionalista Party because, according to him, credit for Quezon, who was a Nacionalista, was credit for the party. He wanted the Filipino people to know that Quezon was responsible for fighting for the Jones Bill. Since Quezon was a Nacionalista member, they must support the party. Quezon disagreed. He wanted the credit to go to the party and not to himself, because he was only a spokesman of the party and was dispensable. It was the party that had the platform of independence and, for as long as the party survived, as leader in the country, the fight for independence would go on even if America were to stay in the Philippines for a hundred or a thousand years.²²

When Quezon reached Manila on 4 October, he had stomach trouble, complicated by bronchitis. He failed to attend Governor General Leonard Wood's inauguration on 15 October because of illness. Wood visited him three times while he was sick and on 1 November Quezon went to Baguio to recover.²³ All this time Rafael Palma acted as senate president.

It is important to note that while Quezon was in the United States and Wood had announced in September his acceptance of the governor generalship, a campaign in the Nacionalista Party was launched "to compel" Quezon to return to America as a resident commissioner.²⁴

22. Quezon to Winslow, 18 May 1912; Winslow's wire to Quezon, 20 May 1912; Quezon's wire to Winslow, 20 May 1912; Quezon to Winslow, 21 May 1912; and Quezon's wire to Osmeña, 21 October 1914. All from *QP*, ser. V.

For the possibility of replacing Quezon as resident commissioner by another Nacionalista, Teodoro Sandiko of Bulacan, see Harbord to Quezon, 2 December 1912, *QP*, ser. V. Sandiko later bolted from the Nacionalista Party and established on 2 April 1914 the Partido Demócrata Nacional, otherwise known as the Third Party or the Terceristas. He was the first to charge Osmeña with autocratic leadership. Later the Terceristas and the Progresistas merged on 22 April 1917 to form the Partido Demócrata. See Liang, *Philippine Parties*, pp. 89-92.

23. Jose Sanvictores to Morgan Shuster, 19 October 1921; Quezon to Osmeña, 1 November 1921; Quezon to Bandholtz, 9 November 1921; Quezon to Wood, 15 October 1921. All from *QP*, ser. V.

24. F. Buencamino to Quezon, 10 September 1921, *QP*, ser. V. See *Manila Daily Bulletin*, 10 September 1921. Osmeña might have gotten wind of Quezon's attempt to form an alliance with the Democrats and in order to avoid a possible leadership conflict with him, wanted Quezon to become a resident commissioner.

But this fizzled out. Harrison wrote Quezon in Manila in October that if they (Quezon and Harrison) had taken the advice of a friend "about Venancio Concepcion [Philippine National Bank Manager] in September 1918, we might have saved the disaster which overtook the administration," and if it were not for the bank situation "our administration would have been nearly unassailable." He emphasized, however, that the "American critics in the Philippines were surprisingly local in their views; all the countries in Europe, including Great Britain, are in worse shape today than the Philippines."²⁵ Quezon, however, could not escape the blame either because he had allowed Osmeña's autocratic manner to go on, i.e., with his knowledge and consent, or at least with his tolerance.²⁶ As a matter of fact, in confirming the appointments recommended by Osmeña and submitted by the Governor General, the Senate was also responsible. But Quezon and his colleagues were passive participants—somewhat akin to a rubber stamp—with much responsibility but without asserting the inherent authority of their office. What the Senate did while Quezon was still sick was to assert its authority to confirm appointments. The senators, most likely with Quezon's consent, created a committee in late October 1921 whose function was to confer with Wood on matters pertaining to appointments.

Two days after Quezon left for Baguio, on 3 November, the Nacionalista members of the legislature held a caucus where Osmeña tendered his resignation as leader in government, thereby raising the issue of confidence. Those present unanimously gave him a vote of confidence as party president; but suspended the settlement of the issue of leadership until Quezon would be in a position to resume his duties in government. Six days later the Senate froze Wood's first set of appointments, except the Justices of the Peace, many of whom were senatorial recommendees, because the senators were not consulted

25. Harrison to Quezon, 6 October 1921, *QP*, ser. V. Harrison only referred to his friend as "Archy." In the following year, Harrison told Quezon: "I cannot possibly overlook the fact that Venancio Concepcion was his [Osmeña's] man all through that scandalous bank affair which has done so much to damage the reputation of the Filipino people. The speaker backed him up in every possible way, in opposition to your judgment and mine, and thus contributed to giving a regular blackeye to our administration." Harrison to Quezon, September 1922, *QP*, ser. V. See William H. Anderson, *The Philippine Problem* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), pp. 126–27. Harrison said: "The Philippine National Bank dealt out loans as though the supply was inexhaustible." The chief mistake, he believed, was when the bank withdrew the government deposits in New York, which formed part of the existing reserve fund, and lent them out in the Islands to construct a string of sugar mills. Peter Stanley, *A Nation in the Making* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 240–48.

26. See Quezon to Osmeña, 23 December 1921. Cited by Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, 1: 287.

and more qualified personnel were available. On 14 November Quezon denied the reported Senate opposition to Wood.²⁷ After the publication of the Wood-Forbes Report, Quezon publicly campaigned for a collective leadership, so that he, at least, would be consulted in all matters, especially on appointments, and the near-bankruptcy of the Philippine National Bank could be avoided. Quezon wrote Osmeña that, since the establishment of the Philippine government under the Jones Act, most members of the Legislature and the Cabinet had allowed him (Osmeña) to direct and control legislation in the country and administration of public affairs. Practically all the measures which Osmeña approved were enacted into law and no law was approved without his consent (e.g., the divorce, woman-suffrage, and judicial reorganization bills). Department secretaries, individually and collectively, acted under his inspiration, and nothing contrary to his opinion was done by them. Appointment recommendations made by these secretaries to the Governor General were made upon Osmeña's initiative, or at least with his consent. As Quezon stressed:

Your veto on these matters was final and definitive. The majority of the Senate, with the exception of its President, were not aware of these recommendations before they were submitted to the Governor General. Yet, it was pretended that each and every one of these appointments was to be confirmed by the Senate, as in fact they all were.²⁸

27. *Manila Daily Bulletin*, 4 and 9 November 1921. It must be noted that at this time Quezon was still in Baguio and Palma was the Acting Senate President. In all probability Quezon did not engineer the holding up of Wood's appointments on 9 November, for he appeared to have a sketchy knowledge of the incident. He had no comment regarding the alleged Senate opposition to Wood's appointment except to deny it because, as far as he was informed, the Senate had not taken that attitude. Some of the appointments were confirmed, he said, while others were under study in accordance with the Senate's inherent duty to examine the qualifications of the appointees and so far no one had yet been disapproved by the Senate. He did not seem to know that the confirmed appointments were those of the Justices of the Peace, most of whom were senatorial recommendees. See Quezon's wire to Benet of the *Manila Daily Bulletin*, 13 November 1921, *QP*, ser. V.

28. *El Ideal*, 23 December 1921. See "Memorandum," 21 March 1922, *Bureau of Insular Affairs Records* 3427-A-15. See also Henry Stimson, *Diaries*, vol. VI-A, 10 August 1926, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, p. 12. A microfilm copy is in the National Library, Manila. Wood said that Quezon discussed with him the matter of appointments and remarked that the trouble with Osmeña was that he demanded to be consulted on appointments, insisted on making the Senate entirely subordinate to the House, and wanted him (Quezon) to come out with a public declaration admitting the subordinate position of the Senate president to the House Speaker. See Leonard Wood, *Diary*, 22 December 1921, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. A few extracts can be found in *QP*, ser. IX.

The solution which Quezon envisioned consisted in not having a leader of the party in the government, "selected and recognized by the majorities in both Houses, because . . . the existence of such a leader would bring . . . the concentration in a single individual of all the powers of government that were in the hands of the Nacionalistas." Osmeña would remain President of the party, but in government there must be decentralization of powers so that both the House and the Senate could act on a particular measure in the interest of the nation and not necessarily in the interest of the party. This was what Osmeña had in mind during the Harrison administration and it eventually led to the existing financial crisis.²⁹ What was therefore needed was the creation of committees in both Houses, for then "the powers of the heads of both Chambers will be withdrawn, and it will no longer be possible to say that they possess greater powers than any other legislative head in the world."³⁰

Earlier, on 16 December, the senators and representatives held separate caucuses. The following day they held a convention. When the issue of leadership was raised, no solution was in sight. Osmeña resigned as leader in the government to secure a vote of confidence. On 18 December the representatives approved a resolution expressing confidence in Osmeña as the leader in government, but the senators did not take action.³¹

When Osmeña informed Quezon on 20 December of the internal reform of the House where political power now resided in a steering committee composed of the heads of all standing committees and where the Speaker became a mere presiding officer,³² Quezon issued a statement. He said that the fight was over. The Speaker himself vindicated the principles for which the Senate members had fought when he proposed that the political and legislative control of the House be turned over to a committee chosen by the House itself, "the theory of leadership of one man being thereby abandoned." Quezon praised Osmeña and the assemblymen for heeding public opinion. He firmly believed that the Nacionalista party would be strengthened thereby.

29. Osmeña once remarked, "I have always held that loyalty to party is part of the larger loyalty to country." Quezon believed that loyalty to party need not be loyalty to country. See Carlos P. Romulo, "Foreword," in *Sergio Osmeña*, by Pacis, 1: viii. See *Manila Daily Bulletin*, 20 December 1921.

30. *Manila Times*, 20 December 1921.

31. *Ibid.*, 18 December 1921. See Liang, *Philippine Parties*, p. 123. Quirino, *Paladin*, p. 142.

32. Osmeña to Quezon, 21 December 1921. Cited by Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, 1: 279. On the same date Osmeña tendered his resignation as vice-president and member of the Council of State in which he was currently a mere presiding officer.

Since there was nothing personal in the contest, Quezon said that the party could now continue to carry out its promise to fight for Philippine freedom. The Senate would take similar action by giving control of the Senate policy to committees selected by the Senate itself, "thus the powers of the presiding officers of the chambers are eliminated from the latter."³³

Osmeña, however, declared that the fight over the leadership of the Nacionalistas in government was not yet over, because the House majority still believed it was "essential for united action of the members of the party in power that there be leadership, recognized and responsible."³⁴ He explained that the reason he withdrew the power from the speakership was to render unnecessary the vote of confidence he had earlier raised.

On 23 December Quezon wrote Osmeña that since the Senate and the House had made certain reforms, and since Osmeña had withdrawn the question of confidence he had raised earlier, all discussion of leadership was, therefore, purely academic. Quezon said that public opinion was against the previous procedure of the party leader directing the affairs of the government and Nacionalista senators, "feeling the influence of that opinion, showed themselves more opposed than ever to its continued toleration." Even some representatives had protested over the procedure. Quezon explained that as the senators were themselves responsible to the people for Senate action, they should resist every attempt at outside intervention in cases of appointments. The senators would, of course, consult Osmeña's opinion, for everybody knew it was valuable, but they wanted to decide for themselves how they should act. It was not justifiable, by law or sound principles, that both Osmeña and the senators would be responsible for what should only be the Senate action to confirm appointments or pass legislations. If the Senate did not give Osmeña the vote of confidence he solicited, Quezon went on, it was not because the Philippine government "had been badly administered when you had been permitted practically to manage it alone," but because the senators could not confirm by their vote a practice they considered to be against good principles, and which in their opinion had already been condemned by the country and "would bring defeat to the Party if permitted to continue." Quezon argued that if every government organ

33. *El Ideal*, 20 December 1921. *Bureau of Insular Affairs Records* 3427-A-15. Quezon said he would not resign as vice-president of the Nacionalista Party and as member of the Council of State because "he had not accepted the former and had stopped attending the latter." Quoted by Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, 1:280-82.

34. *Manila Times*, 20 December 1921.

controlled by Nacionalistas "should exercise its respective functions under its own responsibility, harmoniously and coordinatedly, the people will be more than ever with the Party, and its victories always greater." Unless given a really popular and democratic government, the country would seek another party that would do so. Then in a very conciliatory tone, Quezon concluded, "My colleagues in the Senate sincerely hope that the Nacionalista Party may continue the aforesaid policy for the good of the Party itself."³⁵

Osmeña's reply was evasive. Since Osmeña was for party unity, he should have accepted the party presidency. But, as a compromise, he should have allowed each House of the Legislature and each executive department to function harmoniously and in coordination with its presiding officer or head with full authority and responsibility, in accordance with the party platform and in the interest of the nation. But instead Osmeña tried to refute some minor points of Quezon's letter, such as citing occasions where Quezon had his way, as in the establishment of the Press Bureau in the United States which Quezon believed was necessary for the independence campaign, the presidency in the Manila Railroad Company, and the management of the National Guard. At the same time he insisted on party leadership in government and on the view that there was "perfect decentralization" of both Houses.³⁶ Osmeña never mentioned anything about his role or his "final say" in appointments that the governor general submitted for confirmation by the Senate, which was the underlying cause of the current political crisis. Quezon noted on 25 December that Osmeña's denial could "only be explained by the fact that he did not realize the extent to which he had gone into the exercise of those powers which he claimed for himself as leader."³⁷

QUEZON'S NEW PARTY

The debate continued until February 1922 and attempts at reconciliation were made. The Council of Ten was formed in late December to conciliate, but when Quezon realized that all its members were

35. *El Ideal*, 23 December 1921. Bureau of Insular Affairs Records 3427-A-15.

36. See *Manila Times*, 25 December 1921 and "Notes" on Quezon's letter to Osmeña, 23 December 1921. Cited by Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, 1: 289-95. Osmeña wondered why Quezon constantly blocked bringing up of the issue of leadership in the convention of the Nacionalista Party. Either Quezon wanted the issue settled between Osmeña and himself alone, or he believed the cards were stacked in Osmeña's favor, considering the fact that there were more Osmeña followers (representatives and governors) than Quezon's (senators) in case the issue were put to a vote.

37. *Manila Times*, 25 December 1921.

Osmeña's men, he resigned the Senate presidency on 10 January 1922 for reasons of ill health. Osmeña tried to convince Quezon to withdraw his resignation, but Quezon insisted he would always stand by collective leadership. When the party leadership was offered to him, Quezon declined, because the issue was not party leadership, but that there should be no leader in government. Besides, he could not lead a party whose majority were hostile to him. He expressed willingness, however, to head a mission abroad, provided it would be fully supported at home. When Osmeña sensed the seriousness of the situation, he tendered his irrevocable resignation as party leader and the Nacionalistas reluctantly accepted it. On 12 January twelve senators headed by Quezon and seven representatives formally agreed to form a new party. In late January Quezon resigned from his various positions in the Nacionalista Party, such as chairman of the Platform Committee and member of the National Committee. He also resigned as president of the Manila Railroad Company, as member of the U.P. Board of Visitors, as member of the Philippine National Bank Board of Control, and as director of the National Development Company. In early February another reconciliation attempt initially succeeded through the intercession of Governor Manuel Roxas of Capiz. The Quezon and Osmeña factions agreed on a declaration of principles. When Osmeña, however, attributed the party division, not to "fundamental differences" but to Democrata intrigues, and stated that some Nacionalista Party members wanted to seize power indirectly, the Colectivistas, as the members of Quezon's faction were called, resented Osmeña's address. It implied that they were like little children. They, therefore, refused to ratify the approved resolution for unity of the two factions. On the evening of 15 February, Quezon tried to save party unity through resignation. Quezon and Osmeña agreed to retire and Osmeña assured Quezon that Palma "is ready to support the ticket for the Executive Committee that you [Quezon] sent me through him." This agreement was put in writing on the next day, but there was a catch in Osmeña's intention to retire. "It is one thing that I voluntarily wish to retire and another that my retirement may appear now or later as having been imposed, directly or indirectly, by our colleagues."³⁸

38. Ibid., 23 December 1921. Quirino, *Paladin*, pp. 16 and 144; Isabelo P. Caballero and M. de García Concepcion, *Quezon: Story of the Nation and Its Foremost Statesman* (Manila: The United Publishers, 1935), pp. 211-14; Liang, *Philippine Parties*, p. 129. *La Vanguardia*, 27 January 1922; *Bureau of Insular Affairs Records* 3427-A-15; Marcial P. Lichauco, *Roxas* (Manila: Kiko Printing Press, 1925), p. 27. See Quezon to Fasset, 11 March 1921, QP, ser.

The following day Quezon changed his mind and "forced the break" with Osmeña. That morning a group of student leaders had gone to Quezon and expressed their support for the new party.³⁹ Other possible reasons for the break, aside from the fact that student power supported the Colectivistas and that Quezon's colleagues indirectly, and he himself directly, had pressured Osmeña, and in the process, also himself, to retire were that public opinion disapproved of Osmeña's leadership, and more importantly, the party without a clear leadership, would be fragmented rather than unified and the campaign for independence jeopardized.⁴⁰ Quezon thought the interest of the country should not be sacrificed for the interest of party unity.⁴¹

In formally launching the *Partido Nacionalista Colectivista* at the Manila Grand Opera House on 17 February, Quezon declared that his loyalty to his party ended where his loyalty to his country began.⁴²

V. Quezon said that the Nacionalista convention took place during the last part of January and the beginning of February 1921. Osmeña to Quezon, 16 February 1922. Cited by Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, 1: 299-300.

39. See Jose E. Romero, *Not So Long Ago: A Chronicle of My Life, Times and Contemporaries* (Quezon City: Alemar-Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., 1979), pp. 26-27.

40. It was only on 17 February 1922 that Quezon "forced a break" with Osmeña, when he was convinced that "things had gone too far and the division, in fact, existed, and all attempts to stop it were useless." See Quezon to Osmeña, 18 February 1922. Pacis insinuated that Quezon was insincere in the last attempt at reconciliation by resignation, because of the hectic preparation for the 17 February Colectivista convention. But I give Quezon the benefit of the doubt because it was not physically or logically impossible for Quezon to invite Osmeña and then proclaim in the convention their decision to retire in order to ensure party unity. See Pacis, *Sergio Osmeña*, 1: 301-302.

41. Earlier Quezon said: "I will always stand by my theory of collective leadership even if I have to leave the Nacionalista Party." *Manila Times*, 23 December 1921. See Liang, *Philippine Parties*, p. 128.

42. *La Vanguardia*, 18 February 1922. *Bureau of Insular Affairs Records* 3427-A-15.