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The Japanese Propaganda Corps in the Philippines

MOTOE TERAMI-WADA

The two main fleets carrying the Japanese soldiers destined for the Philippine invasion approached Luzon's Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay on 22 and 24 December 1941, respectively. Along with the soldiers making the landing was a small group of less than 200 men who were the members of the Propaganda Corps attached to the Fourteenth Imperial Japanese Army. They were civilians who had been engaged in cultural work like literature, music, photography, theater, and visual arts until just before the war broke out. Without any prior notice, at the end of November 1941 they were drafted into the Army.

This was the first attempt on the part of the Japanese military to recruit a large number of civilians for propaganda work. The military had a propaganda organization earlier, but its duty was limited to

accompanying the Imperial Army so as to persuade the inhabitants [in the occupied areas] to return to their houses, to disseminate the true intention of the Imperial Army, to obtain their [local populace] cooperation, and to establish peace and order.¹

The military wanted propaganda work to include the difficult goal of leaving a lasting impact on the people about to be conquered. There was a realization from the previous experience of occupying Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria that cultural maneuvers concurrent with the military campaign were very crucial.²

As a manifestation of this line of thinking, the military established a special training group to groom military personnel engaged in

1. *Shunō* [Weekly periodical of the Newspaper Corps of the military and Department of Information], no. 76, 30 March 1938, p. 8

2. "Cultural propaganda" refers to the promotion of a given culture and ideology. Specifically, it alludes to Japan's attempt to conquer the Philippines by means of culture. Therefore, it can also be termed the "war of culture." This type of war was to be launched in the religious, political, and educational fields, as well as the cultural.

intelligence work, or "thought war." This group was established in 1938 under the supervision of the Bureau of Military Affairs of the Department of the Military. Its emphasis was to engage in information-gathering and propaganda activities in Russia and China. In 1940, it was transferred to the General Staff Office and was commonly referred to as the Nakano Gakko (Nakano School), named after the school's location. The subjects taught included propaganda skills, strategy, various foreign languages, intelligence work, administration of occupied areas, communications and secret codes. Needless to say, graduates of the school played important roles in the General Staff Office and later in what was called the Southern Area.³ For the Japanese military, the Southern Area was composed of four Southern Regions, namely the Philippines, Singapore, Malay, and Burma.

Meanwhile, the Information Department of the General Staff Office had been collecting data from various countries, including China, Russia, the United States of America (U.S.), Great Britain, and the Southern Area. In 1939, an independent section which specialized in the Southern Area was organized, which meant that the military had begun to realize the importance of cultural maneuvering there.⁴

Sometime in June 1940, the General Staff Office began discussions on the cultural maneuvering campaign plan for the Southern Regions. Around eight military personnel were sent there for two months with the mission of gathering data necessary for the planning.⁵ By September 1941, the General Staff Office was prepared to launch hostilities against the the U.S.⁶

Eventually, the General Staff Office decided to establish the Propaganda Corps, said to be patterned after the German model.⁷ First, the

3. Utsunomiya Naokata, *Amerika "S" Haken Tai* [The US Army's "S" Detachment] (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1983), p. 23; and Kusakabe Ichiro, *Rikugun Nakano Gakko Jitsuroku* [A True Record of the Military Nakano School] (Tokyo: Besuto Bukku, 1980), p. 9. In this article, all the Japanese names, both in the text and in the footnotes, are written with the family name first, followed by the given name, as is done in Japan.

4. For more on this Department's activities, see Utsunomiya, *Amerika "S" Haken Tai*, pp. 40-50; and Tsuneishi Shigetsugu, *Shinri Sakusen no Kaiso* [Recollections of the Psychological Maneuvering] (Tokyo: Tosen Shuppan, 1978).

5. Tsuneishi, *Shinri Sakusen no Kaiso*, p. 56.

6. See "Teikoku Kokusaku Suiko Yoryo" [Points for the Execution of the Imperial National Policy], in *Daitoa Senso Kaisen Kei* [Details on How the Great East Asia War Was Started], 4 vols., ed. National Defense Institute (Tokyo: Asagumo Shuppan, 1973), 4:505-6. The first point stresses that Japan is prepared to go to war against the U.S., Great Britain and Netherlands, for reasons of survival and self-protection. It added that preparations for the war would be completed by the end of October.

7. Tsuneishi, *Shinri Sakusen no Kaiso*, p. 7, 56, and 109; Ozaki Shiro, "Nihon no PK Butai" [The Japanese Propaganda Corps], *Kaizo* (May 1953): 217; and Machida Keiji,

necessary equipment had to be put together, and a list of the people who would be working in this field had to be drawn up. The Corps' main duties were to engage in propaganda campaigns for the local people and enemy soldiers in the would-be occupied areas, report to the Japanese at home the state of the Southern Area so as to keep up morale and heighten the fighting spirit of the Japanese soldiers in the field. A proper implementation of these duties required the services of the best intellectuals. Writers, painters, journalists, religious personnel were to be recruited, enough to form four groups (150 for each of the four Southern Regions). The groups would have some 250 soldiers each to assist them. When the decision to go to war against the U.S. was made in December 1941, the General Staff Office was more or less ready for the cultural operations to accompany the armed military invasion.⁸

Meanwhile, the Government Information Bureau, propaganda organs of the Admiralty, Ministry of House Affairs, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Communication, Domei News Agency, Japanese Broadcasting Association or NHK, Japanese embassies abroad and the future Ministry of Great East Asia, set up in November 1942, were given the additional task of assisting the invading forces in the Southern Area. These were the propaganda organs responsible for the control of the thought of the Japanese at home.⁹ The long term plan was that after a return to normalcy in the occupied areas had been achieved, the cultural policy would be under the Ministry of Great East Asia. This did not come about, for the Japanese Occupation was over before the Ministry could fully develop.

The basic plan of the cultural operation was prepared by the General Staff Office, but the Corps was given a free hand in some activities and its initiatives were encouraged. The rationale was that the Corps needed to be able to easily make adjustments to the daily changes brought about by the war situation. The result was that most of the propaganda operations in the Southern Regions were undertaken by the Propaganda Corps, especially at the start.

Tataku Bunka Butai [Fighting Cultural Corps] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1967), pp. 21–22. The following account of the preparation for the Propaganda Corps' birth is taken from this reference.

8. As of November 1941, a month prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the policy makers were still trying to negotiate with the U.S., in the hope that a peaceful solution could still be worked out. The step-by-step decision-making process is seen in National Defense Institute, *Daitoa Senso Kaisen Kei*, 4:505–506.

9. Tsuneishi, *Shinri Sakusen no Kaiso*, pp.155–64; and Peter de Mendelssohn, *Japan's Political Warfare* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1944), pp. 20–30.

This article looks into how the cultural campaign of the Japanese military unfolded during the three-year occupation of the Philippines, and examines how creative and unique its activities were vis-a-vis the General Staff Office's basic cultural policy. To achieve these goals, the activities of the Propaganda Corps must be looked into. The article concentrates on the Propaganda Corps' activities for the first half of 1942, or until the fall of Bataan and Corregidor. Its main duties during the period were to persuade the local people to resume their normal lives and to urge the USAFFE soldiers to surrender. After these had been accomplished, an all-out culture campaign would commence.

The first six months of 1942 can be divided into the following stages: (1) pre-landing; (2) from the landing points to Manila; (3) reconstruction work in Manila; (4) propaganda activities targeting the USAFFE soldiers in Bataan and Corregidor; and (5) good will missions to the provinces.

THE PROPAGANDA CORPS OF THE FOURTEENTH ARMY

In the middle of November 1941, several writers, poets, painters, photographers, actors, religious personnel and the like received requests from the military office for them to report to a designated place for interviews. During the interview, they were asked such questions as "Do you know how to carry a canteen?" or "Have you ever worn a saber before?" The successful interviewees then underwent a simple physical examination. Those who passed both the interview and examination were immediately divided into four groups by secret code, one for each Southern Region. They came to know of their destination only much later.

The Philippine group left Japan and arrived in Taiwan's Chirun Port on 29 November. The members did not know where they were headed nor what their duties were supposed to be. They did know vaguely that they would be working for the military in the cultural field, not realizing that Japan would enter into a war against the U.S. In Taipei, they met their superior, who confirmed that they had been drafted into the Propaganda Corps of the Fourteenth Army. The Corps was headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Katsuya Tomishige, assisted by Captain Hitomi Junsuke, Second-Lieutenant Mochizuki Shigenobu, and Kirito Takeo, among others. It turned out that these officers were neophytes in propaganda work.¹⁰

10. Hitomi Junsuke, "Hito Sensen ni Okeru Mochizuki Shigenobu-kun [Mr. Shigenobu Mochizuki at the Philippine War Front], in *Hito no Kunibashira* [The Pillars of the

Captain Hitomi had received an order while on duty in Manchuria that he had been drafted into the Fourteenth Army Propaganda Corps. Even though he had no idea what the Propaganda Corps was supposed to do, or where the Fourteenth Army was destined, he went at once to the Military Headquarters in Taiwan on 26 November 1941, as ordered.¹¹ There, he was informed by a fellow military officer that the Fourteenth Army was going to the Philippines and that it was assigned propaganda duties. He did not know that he was going to be in the Philippines throughout the whole occupation as one of the leaders for the propaganda activities.

The Propaganda Corps members thought Col. Katsuya, the first head of the Propaganda Corps, had some experience in this field, having been the head of the Department of Information assigned in Shanghai. However, they were disappointed by his statement: "It is true that I have worked in the Information Department, but I don't know anything about propaganda work. It is all up to you to do the job."¹²

The Philippine group included six novelists and poets, four painters, nine newspaper and magazine writers, five cameramen, two broadcasting technicians, four printing technicians, fourteen Catholic priests, twelve Protestant ministers, and five movie people, including a cameraman. They were joined by about 100 correspondents sent by the various newspaper companies.¹³

On 4 December, after several days of rest, the Propaganda Corps members left Taipei for a still undisclosed destination. On the morning of 8 December, they learned via radio that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor and that the war between the U.S. and Japan had begun. That was when they were told that they were headed for the Philippines.

DUTIES PRIOR TO REACHING THE PHILIPPINES

The group members were immediately given copies of a thin booklet of around fifty pages. The booklet described the politics, economics, races, religion, customs and national characteristics and was intended

Philippines], ed. N. Mochizuki (Nagano: privately published, 1980), p. 8. Also, interview with Hitomi at his residence in Kyoto, 2 July 1982.

11. Hitomi, "Mochizuki." Also, interview with him, 2 July 1982; and in Manila, 12 March 1989.

12. Ibid., p. 8.

13. Ozaki, "Nihon no PK Butai," p. 217. Also interviews with Hitomi.

to acquaint them with the country. There were so few copies that each one had to be shared by ten or more people.¹⁴

The first job of the Propaganda Corps was to think of propaganda texts for dissemination through leaflets or aired over loudspeakers. They were immediately divided into subgroups in charge of interpreting, writing, and painting. The writers' group composed the texts, which were immediately translated into English by the interpreters' group. Meanwhile, the painters' group had to design propaganda posters.

The messages to be carried were: that Japan was compelled to start the war in order to establish peace in East Asia, that Japan had sincere intentions in its bid to create a new order in East Asia and that the U.S. did not try to understand Japan's stand and continued to harass her.¹⁵ Updates on Japanese successes since the Pearl Harbor attack were also given out. They stressed that it was just a matter of time before the Philippines would surrender, judging by Japan's war progress. In addition, special notes were addressed to President Manuel L. Quezon, urging him to surrender.¹⁶

Some of the leaflets had been produced earlier in Taipei and others even before the war had started. The rank and file Corps members were not aware that the General Staff Office had set up an office to produce leaflets for the Southern Area as early as August 1940. The Office had commissioned five well-known cartoonists to draw pictures with propaganda lines written in one of eleven different languages—English, Malay, Tagalog, Visayan, Hindustani, Bengal, Tamil, Urdu, Burmese, Indonesian, and Vietnamese. Political refugees as well as students from the countries involved were consulted, not only for the language but also for the national costumes and customs. The total number of leaflets intended for the Southern Area amounted to a few million sheets.¹⁷ On 18 December, the battleship carrying the Propa-

14. Hitomi to Motoe Terami-Wada, undated letter received on 20 February 1989.

15. This first assignment is related in Kon Hidemi, *Hito Jugun* [Serving with the Forces in the Philippines] (Tokyo: Sogen Sha, 1944), pp. 82, 87, and 101. These points must have been based on the "Teikoku Kokusaku Suiko Yoryo," which emphasized that the war's purpose was to protect Japan and to establish Great East Asia's new order. For more details, see National Defense Institute, *Daitoa Senso Kaisen Kei*, 4:505-506.

16. Kon, *Hito Jugun*, p. 94

17. For details see Tsuneishi, *Shinri Sakusen no Kaiso*, pp. 7, 89, 92, and 94. Hitomi revealed in his letter to Terami-Wada that there were half a dozen sealed wooden boxes labeled "Military Secret." He was allowed to open these after the ship had left Taiwan. Carlos P. Romulo himself was impressed by the neatly printed leaflets he and his comrades received later. He confessed that he was impressed by the Japanese's thorough preparation. See Romulo, *I Saw the Fall of the Philippines* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1943), pp. 109 and 146.

ganda Corps members, more aptly called "cultural fighters," left for the Philippines and landed a few days before Christmas, either at Lingayen Gulf or Lamon Bay.

FROM THE LANDING POINTS TO MANILA

The Propaganda Corps members who went via Lingayen Gulf landed in the middle of the night on 22 December in the small village of Santiago, Bauan, La Union without much enemy resistance. Bauan was a deserted town, heavily damaged by the crossfire between the USAFFE and the Japanese Imperial Army, which had landed ahead of the Propaganda Corps.¹⁸

The Corps members had the immediate task of distributing the leaflets prepared beforehand, and then to produce more. Then they were ordered to make within one day 15,000 leaflets, this time with the message of urging the town's inhabitants to come down from the nearby hills and mountains where they had sought refuge. Specifically, the writers' group was given the task of composing, appealing and convincing texts. The gist of the message they came up with was that the Japanese Army had no intention of harming those who were good, and therefore the people should return to the town center immediately. The message was then translated by the interpreters' group.¹⁹

Meanwhile, the procurement group went around looking for printing machines; they found some in San Fernando, La Union. Even before the ink had dried, the leaflets were brought to the Naguilian Airport and loaded on planes so that they could be scattered over the countryside.

The painters had their own job to do, churning out thirty to forty posters a day. Again the procurement group had to look around for needed materials such as paper and brush, since they had brought only crayons and tube colors. These posters, along with some leaflets, were pasted on the walls of empty schools, churches, and other prominent buildings in the town plaza. The barrios within a two-kilometer radius from the Bauan town center were likewise reached. Their efforts were not in vain, for the local inhabitants did start to return to their homes the following day.

18. Kon, *Hito Jugun*, p. 110; Ozaki, *Senki, Bata'an Hanto* [War Record, Bataan Peninsula] (Tokyo: Keibun Kan, 1962), p. 12; and Department of Information Sent to the Philippines, ed., *Hito Senki* [The Philippine War Record] (Tokyo: Bungen Shunju Sha, 1943), p. 23.

19. Their activities between Bauan and Manila are found in the accounts in Kon, *Hito Jugun*; Ozaki, *Senki, Bata'an Hanto*; and Department of Information, *Hito Senki*.

General Artemio Ricarte made his first speech on Philippine soil after a forty-year absence in front of captured Filipino soldiers in Bauan. This was on Christmas Day, Ricarte having arrived by plane the night before.

The above activities served as a pattern for the corps on its way to Manila. The group split up for this trip. Some went through Binalonan, Cabanatuan, and Baliwag. Others went via Binalonan, Tayug, Unigan, Lupao, San Jose, Talavera, San Miguel, and Baliwag. Another group went through Tarlac and San Fernando.

After the military had effected a peaceful entry into Manila on 2 January, the Propaganda Corps followed a few days later. They entered Caloocan and started toward the Rizal Avenue Extension.²⁰ They made a convoy of twenty vehicles, headed by the car carrying Col. Katsuya. This was followed by twenty trucks and around thirty sidecars. As the convoy approached Jones Bridge, people stormed toward the cars in order to get copies of the leaflets being distributed. The people wanted to know what the new occupiers of their city had to say.

A smaller batch of Propaganda Corps members landed in Atimonan on 24 December and went through Malikboy, Pagbilao, Tayabas and Lucban distributing leaflets as they proceeded.²¹ In Lucban, a Filipino prisoner-of-war (POW) joined the Corps as an interpreter. In Candelaria, the first speech explaining the purpose of the Japanese Occupation was made by Capt. Hitomi in Japanese. This was translated by a Corps member into English, before being translated by the Filipino POW into Tagalog.

On 28 December, the Corps left Candelaria and went through Sariaya and Tiaong. On the first day of 1942, they reached Cabuyao, where Corps members were accommodated by a sugar factory owner. They proceeded to Biñan, where the local inhabitants lined up along the road and shouted "Mabuhay." The next day in Parañaque, they were treated with the traditional Japanese New Year's delicacy, rice cakes, by the Japanese residents there. On the same day, they made their entry into Manila.

20. Ozaki and Ono say it was 4 January. Ozaki, *Senki, Bata'an Hanto*, p. 39 and Ono Toyoaki, *Hito Senbu to Shukyo Han* [Propaganda in the Philippines and the Religious Group] (Tokyo: Chuo Shuppan, 1945), p. 37. Kon and Mukai say 5 January. Kon, *Hito Jugun*, p. 166; Mukai Junkichi, *Hito* [The Philippines] (Tokyo: Shin Taiyo Sha, 1943). Terashita says 3 January. Terashita, *Sanpagita Saku Senseide*, p. 127. Tsukamoto says 2 January. Tsukamoto Shoji, *Jugun Shisai no Shuki* [A Note of a Priest Who Served in the Army] (Tokyo: Chuo Shuppan, 1945), p. 31.

21. The group's travel from Atimonan to Manila is related in Kinoshita Jiro, "Achi-monan Joriku Butai" [The Unit Which Landed in Atimonan], in *Hito Senki*, ed. Department of Information, pp. 45-50.

REBUILDING MANILA

The Propaganda Corps members held their first meeting as soon as the members had settled in the newly occupied city. During this meeting, the Corps was reminded of the official decisions of the "Nanpo Senryochi Gyosei Jisshi Yoryo" (Summary for Administering the Occupied Southern Area). This document states that bringing back normalcy to the citizenry was of utmost importance. The reason was that the purpose of the military power's advance toward the South was to obtain natural resources for Japan's survival, as well as for supplies of the occupying forces. Another important point stressed was the need to cultivate among the "natives" the feelings of trust toward and reliance on the Imperial Japanese Army.²²

To achieve these ends, it was deemed vital that the hearts of the people should be captured first. This was seen as the only way to secure material resources needed for continuing the Great East Asia War.²³ This was the rationale for the maximum utilization of press, radio and film enterprises. A Planning Committee serving as a nucleus for the entire Propaganda Corps was set up for the implementation of the above. During one of the first meetings, the following actions were decided on:

1. Seize the newspaper companies and reopen them as soon as possible so that Japan's motives could be propagated.
2. Seize the radio stations and repair broadcasting equipment so that the stations could function again.
3. Immediately reopen all movie theaters to regain an atmosphere of normalcy.²⁴

The military authorities paid special attention to the press, radio and film because they regarded the Filipinos as "cultured people with little reading." The occupiers observed that the average Filipino read only newspapers and magazines. Filipinos preferred to spend their time listening to the radio or watching movies, "swallowing whatever entered the eyes and ears." It was for this reason that the newspapers, magazines, radio programs and films were seen as influential propaganda tools in the Philippines. The tendency among Filipinos to believe

22. Approved by the Liaison Council on 20 November 1942. *Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo Oyobi Shuyo Bunsho* [A Chronological Table for Japanese Diplomacy and Important Documents, 1840-1945] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1978), p. 562.

23. Takeda Mitsuji, *Nanpo no Gunsei* [Military Administration in the Southern Area] (Tokyo: Senryo Sha, 1943), p. 28.

24. Hitomi, "Mochizuki," p. 71.

what the mass media dished out was considered a manifestation of the negative influence of Americanism.²⁵

By this time, the Propaganda Corps was augmented by two Filipino USAFFE prisoners-of-war who had surrendered to the Imperial Army on its way to Manila and by expatriate Japanese volunteers. These additions were to be of great help, since the new arrivals had neither a geographical sense of the localities nor knowledge of the local languages.

Shohei Sasaka, an NHK personnel assigned to the Propaganda Corps, led the radio team which went around the city to visit four radio broadcasting stations, namely KZRH, KZND, KZRF, and KZRM. Later, they went to the RCA transmitting station in Quezon City under the guidance of a certain Mr. Kamizuma, an expatriate Japanese connected with the trading company, Misui Bussan Kaisha.²⁶

All facilities had been destroyed except for the antennae. However, the inspection team soon discovered that the USAFFE "destroy" orders given prior to the invasion had not been strictly followed. Hidden in the basement of the Heacock Building was the radio equipment of the KZRH, the Voice of the Philippines. It had been brought there by Bert H. Silen, one of the store's managers.

When the Japanese authorities learned that two mobile broadcasting units could be found somewhere in Manila their problem of securing transmitting was solved. On 9 January, they found one of the transmitters concealed at the Jai Alai. Underground elements had been using it to communicate with Corregidor until it was found. Personnel of the NHK immediately transferred this vital piece of equipment to the Manila Yacht Club. The day 13 January was used to set up a test studio and install cable for a transmitting station. Using the Yacht Club's long pole as an antenna, the first broadcast in occupied Manila was made the next day, 14 January. The broadcast featured news dispatches by the Domei News Agency.

The Japanese authorities continued to use the prewar call letter and frequency of KZRH for this temporary station. Broadcasting was in the evening from 7:00 to 11:58, with news in English, Tagalog, and Japanese. The first program schedule was as follows:²⁷

25. Takeda, *Nanpo no Gunsei*, pp. 803-804.

26. The account of how the radio stations were reopened in the newly occupied city is based on the diary of Sasaka. Part of the diary is in Kimura Ki, *Minami no Shinju* [Pearl of the South] (Tokyo: Zenkoku Shobo, 1942), pp. 189-209; and interview with Sasaka in his residence in Yokohama, 5 August 1987.

27. From the "Daily Record of KZRH," found in Katsuzo Sato, "Hito Hoso Kanri Kyokai no Aumi" [The Development of the Broadcast Control Bureau in the Philippines], *NHK Broadcast Control Culture Research Annual Report* 18 (1972):222.

TIME	P R O G R A M	ANNOUNCER
7:00	Station identification	J.H.
7:02	News in Japanese	Sasaka
7:10	News in English	Y.P.
7:17	Music	
11:23	Special News	
11:30	Notices in Japanese regarding automobiles and gasoline	Sasaka
11:34	Music	
11:37	Notices in Japanese regarding automobiles and gasoline	Sasaka
11:39	Music	
11:44	Notices in Japanese and English	Sasaka Y.P.
11:58	Sign off	

With the completion of repairs on the KZRH station four days after the first day of broadcasting (18 January), broadcasting time was extended from 7:55 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. First on the schedule was the Domei-dispatched news in English, Tagalog, Spanish, and Japanese. For each language, fifteen minutes were allotted. Later on news was also broadcast in Visayan. News reports were aired three times a day. The time 7:30-7:50 p.m. was reserved for the announcement of notices from the military.²⁸ Frequently, messages appealing to the USAFFE soldiers in Bataan and Corregidor to surrender were aired. After the station had been moved back to its former quarters and with the addition of more personnel, new programs were added.

The movie team of the Propaganda Corps met strong opposition from the Manila Defense Headquarters, Military Police (Kempeitai), Public Peace section of the Military Administration, and the Special Service Agency (Tokko).²⁹ They had two main fears. First, from the point of view of security, reopening theaters was not advisable. Since a movie theater was a closed, dark place while a film was in progress, it would be difficult for only a few soldiers to cope with possible disturbances. They were not capable of posting enough soldiers at each movie house which could accommodate fifty or more people. Second, they questioned why U.S. films should be shown when there was a state of war between Japan and the U.S. The movie team insisted that the most urgent need was to create an atmosphere of normalcy

28. *Tribune*, 18 January 1942. Hereafter, the *Tribune* issues cited are all in the year 1942, unless otherwise stated.

29. For this section on film and theater information is from Kon, "Hito no Eiga Kosaku Byoton" [A Sketch of Movie Maneuvering in the Philippines], *Sunday Mainichi*, 24 January 1943.

and the most effective way to do this was to reopen the theaters. Finally they were allowed to reopen theaters by the end of January 1942.

The following procedure was instituted. Theaters which wanted to show films had to first register with the authorities. After the background of the owners as well as of their employees was checked, permits were issued. Those granted permission showed censored U.S. or Filipino films and had to close at 6:00 p.m. Kon says that as of 1 January, he allowed sixteen of the forty-eight movie theaters in Manila to reopen. However, according to the *Tribune*, Vargas recommended the theaters' reopening toward the end of January (*Tribune*, 28 January). They did reopen on 11 February (*Tribune*, 12 February). For the month of February alone, the Propaganda Corps viewed at least 150 films for censorship.³⁰

While the films were being censored, local production of movies was temporarily suspended. This resulted in the same prewar American and Tagalog films being shown over and over. This pushed the Propaganda Corps to provide other forms of popular entertainment.

Meanwhile, the Propaganda Corps office was visited daily by production managers of show groups, musicians, theater owners, and others inquiring about available job opportunities. Among them was a certain Carpi, an Italian national, who owned the Carpi Opera Group. Due to the outbreak of the war, the group had been stranded in the Philippines. When the Japanese entered the Philippines, Carpi was detained as an enemy national by the American authorities. He was released by Japanese troops soon after the latter entered Manila.

Kon Hidemi, who was in charge of entertainment, knew of this show group since he had seen it perform in Japan before the war. He urged Carpi to organize a revue company and guaranteed the support of his office. Kon even accompanied Carpi in going around Manila to recruit performers. He relates:³¹

We went as far as Tondo where the poor and the scoundrels live, to talk to a girl singer who was taking care of her younger sister in bed with tuberculosis. We met an acrobat who worked as a blacksmith in Pasay, a Hungarian dancer who lived in a tenement house in Plaza Santa Cruz, a meter-tall dwarf who was the caretaker of a huge mansion, a Russian dance couple, and others.

The group thus formed numbered nearly thirty, with several nationalities, among them German, Italian, Hungarian, Spanish, White

30. See Kon, "Hito no Eiga Kosaku Byoton," pp. 15-16.

31. Kon, *Hito Jugun*, pp. 212-16.

Russian, Chinese, Indian, Filipino, Czechoslovakian. Hence its name, "International Revue Company." The Revue's first performance, advertised as a "Grand Stage Show," was held on 23 February (*Tribune*, 25 February). For the finale, all the performers appeared on stage carrying a Japanese flag in each hand while they sang the Aikoku Koshinkyoko (Patriotic March). A total of 50,000 copies of the song's music and lyrics had been printed, and these were distributed among the audience during each performance.³² Meanwhile, displaced movie people organized their own groups and began performing around the middle of 1942.

As soon as Manila was occupied, all publishing firms, except for a few prewar newspapers, were ordered by the Japanese military authorities to stop printing. The authorities also arrested press people who were enemy nationals, mostly Americans. Among them were A. V. H. Hartendorp (*Philippine Magazine*), R. McCulloch Dick (*Philippines Free Press*), D. J. Boguslav (*Manila Tribune*), Bessie Hackett, and R. C. Bennett (both of the *Manila Daily Bulletin*).³³

A military proclamation dated 7 February 1942 decreed that anyone who wished to publish a newspaper, magazine, book, or pamphlet should first apply for and obtain a permit from the Military Administration. After this they would be subject to censorship by the authorities.³⁴ On 26 May of the same year, the military issued police orders for the registration of mimeograph machines and any other apparatus which could use stencil paper for the printing of literature, correspondence or illustrations (*Tribune*, 27 May). The inspection of all printed matter in Manila bookstores began in March.³⁵ There were, according to the inspectors, nearly forty bookstores. But if the stores which sold books along with other merchandise such as toys and office supplies were included, the number would be around 125. It took the inspectors almost a month to go through all the printed matter in one store. Of all the published materials examined, 70 percent were in English, 10 percent in Spanish, 12 percent in Chinese, and 8 percent in Tagalog. Any printed item containing anti-Japanese propaganda, advocacy of democracy, attempts to alienate the Axis powers from one another, repudiation of the war, opposition to the fundamental principles of the educational renovations in the Philippines, or expo-

32. Ibid., p. 215.

33. A. V. H. Hartendorp, *The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines*, 2 vols. (Manila: Bookmark, 1967), 2:50.

34. *Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration*, 13 vols. (Manila: Niti Niti Shinbun Sha, March 1942–July 1943), 1:14. *Tribune*, 27 May 1942.

35. Based on Instruction No. 16 in *OJJMA*, 1:11.

sure of alleged improper conduct of the Japanese Military Administration was confiscated. Using the above criteria, many Chinese books were banned. Most English books were considered harmless, and Tagalog and Spanish books offered very few problems.³⁶ The Manila bookstores were allowed to reopen right after the Easter vacation of that year.³⁷ The guidelines continued to be in effect for future publications.

DUTIES IN BATAAN

Not all Corps members were preoccupied restoring the propaganda machinery in Manila. Many others were involved in the very urgent task of persuading the enemy soldiers in Bataan Peninsula to surrender. They left for San Fernando, Pampanga, site of the military headquarters. After they reported to the headquarters and procured materials necessary for their propaganda work, they left for Dinalupihan, Bataan.

More leaflets were produced through the joint efforts of writers, interpreters and painters. This time the leaflets and handbills targeted the USAFFE soldiers. They tried to appeal to the Filipino USAFFE soldiers by citing incidents of racial discrimination perpetrated by U.S. soldiers against Filipino men in uniform. The leaflets also pointed out that Filipinos were merely being used as a shield by the Americans and that the "cowardly" US General Douglas MacArthur had escaped and forsaken them. In addition, the leaflets appealed to the soldiers' homesickness by saying that their parents, wives, and other loved ones were waiting. Some showed lewd pictures of naked women, with captions like "Why stay in that foxhole when you can enjoy life?"³⁸ Other leaflets appealed to the Filipinos' national pride and patriotism. Some leaflets said, "Remember the gallant Filipinos who fought America for the honor of Independence 45 years ago!" or "Now

36. Shibata Kenjiro, "Tosho Shuppan Kenetsu Shido Kacho no Ki" [Record of an Officer Who Censored Printing Materials], *Weekly Mainichi*, 14 March 1943, pp. 27-29. See also OJJMA, 4:11.

37. Kimura, *Minami no Shinju*, p. 173.

38. Hitomi, "Mochizuki," p. 74; and Terashita, *Sanpagita Saku Sensende*, p. 297. One of the soldiers recalls that some leaflets had pictures of *adobo*, a popular Filipino dish, as well as of beautiful women. Interview with Attorney Leocadio de Asis in his office in Manila, 7 December 1988. Other examples of leaflets and handbills are seen in Uldarico S. Bacalagon, *Last 130 Days of the USAFFE* (Metro Manila: privately published, 1982), pp. 146, and 159-72; and Romulo, *Fall of the Philippines*. These illustrations were said to be taken from *Esquire* magazine. See also Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years: Japan's Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-1945*, 2 vols. (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1965), 1:77.

the Philippines rises again once and for all to put an end to the American atrocities!"³⁹

The leaflets were printed not only in English, Spanish and Tagalog, but also in Ilocano and Visayan.⁴⁰ After tens of thousands of these leaflets had been printed, some were immediately taken to the San Fernando airport, where planes dispersed them over enemy front lines. Others were carried by trucks to the war fronts, where they were dropped by hydrogen balloons. These balloons also dropped letters from the soldiers' loved ones. Even Jorge Vargas' eldest son received a letter from his mother. Someone managed to pick it up and it eventually reached the Vargas boy.⁴¹

At the end of March, the Japanese announced via leaflets the ultimatum to surrender. The ultimatum was signed by Commander-in-Chief General Masaharu Honma. He urged US General Jonathan Wainwright to be sensible and follow "the defenders of Hongkong, Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies in the acceptance of an honorable defeat." If Honma did not receive a reply by a certain date, he would consider himself at liberty to take any action whatsoever.⁴²

"Armistice tickets" or "surrender tickets" encouraging the Filipino soldiers to surrender were also circulated. These tickets contained the following instructions:

1. Come towards our lines waving a white flag.
2. Strap your gun over your left shoulder muzzle down and pointed behind you.
3. Show this ticket to the sentry.
4. Any number of you may surrender with this one ticket.⁴³

More propaganda pieces were delivered over loudspeakers. In the afternoon of 24 January, for instance, just before an all-out attack was

39. A picture of some of the leaflets can be seen between pages 138 and 139 in Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years*, vol.1.

40. Romulo, *Fall of the Philippines*, pp. 109 and 146.

41. The invitation to the public to send letters to Filipino soldiers in Bataan and Corregidor appeared in the *Tribune*, such as on 11 March. For the incident regarding Vargas' son, see Kon. *Hito Jugun*, p. 219. The young Vargas received the letter, as confirmed by his brother, Ramon (Nene). Interview with him at the Vargas Museum, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, 22 August 1988.

42. See Manuel A. Buenafe, *Wartime Philippines* (Manila: Philippine Education Foundation, Inc., 1950), p. 103; Louis Morton, *The Fall of the Philippines*, p. 418; Celedonio A. Ancheta, ed., *The Wainwright Papers*, 4 vols. (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1980), p. 24; and Donald Knox, *Death March: The Survivors of Bataan* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), pp. 90-91.

43. Agoncillo, *The Fateful Years*, 1:177.

to be launched against the USAFFE, a popular Bing Crosby song was heard over the loudspeaker. This was followed by other popular U.S. songs. Then a voice called to the USAFFE in English: "We, the Japanese Imperial Army, are speaking to you, American soldiers. Abandon this useless struggle immediately. . . ." After being repeated several times, a Tagalog *kundiman* by a female vocalist was aired. To the Filipino soldiers, this message was conveyed: "What do you, Filipino soldiers, fight for?"⁴⁴ The announcer was hidden in a trench, with branches and leaves falling on top of his head every time bullets hit the trees above him. By the time this particular broadcast was over, the loudspeaker had three bullet holes.⁴⁵

Sometimes romantic music was aired during the night. To foster feelings of homesickness, a mother's voice would appeal to her son. Or an ex-USAFFE soldier would ask his fellow soldiers to surrender immediately. One of the USAFFE soldiers reminisced:

Out of the night came a woman's voice, sweet and persuasive. In sentimental words, it announced the dedication of a program to "the brave and gallant defenders of Bataan." Songs followed, quivering through the forest. They were selected to arouse nostalgia to a breaking point in a boy facing death and longing for home. "Home, Sweet Home," "Old Folks at Home"—these were the kinds of songs the Japanese broadcast in the dead of the night, alternating heartbreak with horror. These sounds were being broadcast from Japanese sound trucks on the very front of the enemy soldiers' lines.⁴⁶

The newly reopened radio station in Manila, KZRH, was also used for this purpose. On 28 January, KZRH aired a twenty-minute message in English and Spanish urging the soldiers to surrender. Part of that broadcast was as follows:

Do you remember that hundreds of Filipino laborers were murdered right after the completion of the Fort? There were about 300 laborers engaged in this undertaking. However, all of them except for three were killed by the American soldiers. These three were saved after jumping into the Manila Bay. The American Army committed this kind of atrocity because they did not wish the secret of the Fort to be known by outsiders. Twenty years have passed and today why do you still allow yourselves to be the slaves of the American imperialists who betrayed you? If you have any patriotism and self-pride at all, you should leave the American Army and surrender to the Japanese who came here to assist the Philippines.⁴⁷

44. Department of Information, *Hito Senki*, p. 55. See also Buenafe, *Wartime Philippines*, p. 96.

45. Romulo, *Fall of the Philippines*, p. 158.

46. Ibid.

47. Kimura, *Minami no Shinju*, pp. 132-33.

The Propaganda Corps also utilized well-known Filipinos such as General Emilio Aguinaldo and Jorge Vargas. Aguinaldo addressed his speech specifically to Gen. MacArthur on 1 February. He spoke in Tagalog, which was translated into English. He said, "My country had to take up arms against the Japanese Army for the simple reason that the Philippines was under the American flag." Then he urged Wainright to stop resisting immediately to save the lives of the Filipinos.⁴⁸

KZRH broadcasts addressing the soldiers continued. The destruction brought about by the war and the sufferings of the civilian victims were reported by a Filipino newspaperman. The military authorities strongly denied that the Japanese did not take prisoners. Instead, they insisted that enemy soldiers would be treated in the *Bushido* way; that is, justly and nobly. (*Tribune*, issues for 15 and 16 April)

The radio broadcasts emanated not only from Manila. The NHK International reached Bataan and Corregidor as well. Tokyo Rose, a lady announcer, jeered at the enemy soldiers' predicament: "Get smart and give up. Why starve in the stinking jungle while the folks back home make big profits?" She also announced the names of those who had left with MacArthur and those who were allegedly killed by the Japanese forces, in order to make the soldiers lose their morale.⁴⁹

DUTIES IN THE PROVINCES: GOOD WILL MISSIONS

While an all-out propaganda war was being fought in Manila and Bataan, yet another method was initiated by the Propaganda Corps. Called the "Good Will Mission," its primary duty was to promote normal conditions in the provinces by informing the people about the "real" aims and purposes of the Japanese Army and asking them to return to their homes and resume their peaceful prewar pursuits. From

48. The date of Aguinaldo's speech is seen in *Tribune*, 2 February. Its content is mentioned in MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (n.p., 1964), pp. 134-35.

49. *Tribune*, issues of 15 and 16 April. Stephen M. Mellnik, *Philippine War Diary, 1939-1945* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1981), pp. 99 and 102. Also see Carlos Quirino, *Chick Parsons: America's Master Spy in the Philippines* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1980), p. 69. There were a number of counterattacks made by the USAFFE soldiers in the field of propaganda. They set up a radio station called "The Voice of Freedom." They also published world news taken from the radio and entitled it "The International News Summary." They utilized the Japanese-American citizens of the USAFFE to translate messages into Japanese. These messages appealed to the occupying soldiers to surrender. There is also the case of Yay Panlilio, a KZRH female announcer who tried to convey messages to the soldiers in Corregidor. All these counter offensives comprise a separate topic.

the end of January onward, Good Will Missions were sent to several places, among them Batangas, Bicol, Zambales, Southern Tagalog, Mountain Provinces, Ilocos Norte, and Mindoro.⁵⁰ Following are accounts of two such missions; one went around the Tagalog region, the other to the Bicol region.

One of the first Good Will Missions was that which left for Laguna on 26 January, and was led by Capt. Hitomi. He had a number of Filipino staff, one of whom was the novelist Manuel E. Arguilla. Arguilla was introduced to the Corps by Yay Panlilio, a radio announcer. Among the speakers were Dr. Julio Luz, a medical doctor who had studied in Nagoya, Japan and could speak Japanese, and Francisco Villanueva, a *Tribune* staff writer. Arguilla himself did not make speeches. He distributed leaflets and observed how the people reacted.⁵¹ The first stop was Biñan. From Manila to this town, life along the main road was rapidly returning to normalcy, according to Arguilla's report. The Corps distributed leaflets and copies of the *Sunday Tribune* and *Taliba* on the way. In Biñan, free movies were shown at Cine Ligaya, which was packed during the night and the following morning. Speeches were made between film showings. The speeches exhorted the people to resume their work and help encourage others to do likewise. The speakers gave full assurance of their protection by Japanese forces. It was reported that whenever Dr. Luz called for a "Banzai Nippon" cheer, the people responded willingly.

All through Tanauan and Malvar, and until Lipa, the Propaganda Corps saw empty houses along the road. Only a few men were to be seen, but no women were about. The following morning, they went around the Lipa town center and its outskirts to look for those who were hiding. The people they managed to find were urged to return to the town center.

Captain Hitomi spoke two times to those who had gathered, with Dr. Luz translating into Tagalog. At least 750 men and a few women applied and obtained safe conduct passes, which were issued free of charge by the Corps.⁵² People in the province seemed to be hungry for news, since everybody scrambled for the leaflets and newspapers being distributed.

50. The Good Will Missions were reported in the following *Tribune* issues: To Batangas (5 February), to Bicol (11, 15–19, 21–23 March), to Zambales and Southern Tagalog (3, 17 May), to Bontoc (7 June), to Mindoro (10 June), to Ilocos (19 July), to Nueva Ecija and Bulacan (17 August).

51. Kon, *Hito Jugun*, p. 207.

52. This is according to Arguilla, whose reports on the mission appeared in the *Tribune* issues for 5 February, and 15–17 and 19 of March.

The Good Will Mission sent to the Bicol region was one of the largest, with over fifty members, seven of whom were from the Propaganda Corps. It made a twenty-day tour covering the entire Bicol region and reaching as far as Sorsogon. Again Capt. Hitomi was the head.⁵³ Also with the group were two from the Religious Section of the Military Administration, namely Reverend Father Francis Ito, a Catholic priest, and Reverend John Fujita, a Protestant minister. By this time, the Religious Section was no longer under the Propaganda Corps but was under the supervision of the military administration. The Propaganda Corps, on the other hand, received orders directly from the Commanding General. Some Filipino government officials also came along, such as an assistant director of the Bureau of Local Government and two representatives of the National Rice and Corn Corporation. In addition, press people accompanied the group as participants and observers. Military police were there to protect them from guerrilla attacks. (*Tribune*, 11 March)

Public speaking was a main feature of this trip, aside from the distribution of leaflets and newspapers. Among the Filipino speakers were Minviluz Dominguez, (granddaughter of General Ricarte), Bibiana Tuazon (a former Sakdalista), Nene Moreno (Dominguez's cousin), and Fruto R. Santos (a revolutionary figure). They all spoke in Tagalog. The Japanese speakers were Hitomi, and the two religious personnel. Other propaganda activities included the showing of movies and posting of posters. The group left Manila for Bicol on 17 February and made a stop in Biñan for lunch. The next day, they were in Lucena distributing leaflets and newspapers, and delivering speeches at the plaza and market place.⁵⁴ On the 19th, they arrived in Atimonan.

Each speaker stressed a different point. Dominguez, Ricarte's granddaughter, talked about the struggle for independence at the turn of the century. At the same time, she exposed the "deceptive" and "hypocritical" actions of the U.S. regarding the Philippines. She concluded that real independence may be achieved through the establishment of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS).

53. An account of this trip is seen in Izhizaka Yojiro, *Mayon no Kemuri* [Smoke of the Mayon] (Tokyo: Shuei-Sha, 1977).

54. The following is a description of the meeting from the point of view of a Lucena native: Everybody in town was compelled to attend the meeting at the town plaza, which was guarded on all sides by Japanese sentinels. Before the meeting started, the people were told to face toward the East and make a deep bow. This was followed by one-minute prayer for the victory of Japan. The Propaganda Corps reiterated the appeal for the resumption of normal life and vouched that the Japanese Army would protect the lives and properties of peaceful citizens. See Leonida E. Acuña, "The Years under the Slit-eyed Conquerors," in *The Longest Night*, comp. Alfonso P. Santos (Quezon City: privately published, 1979).

The Propaganda Corps had first approached Ricarte to join the Good Will Mission. But his old age and asthmatic problem prompted him to decline the invitation. He sent in his stead his eldest granddaughter named Minviluz. She spoke good Japanese, since she had resided in Yokohama for ten years. Ricarte coached his granddaughter on which topics she should expound. She should emphasize that Japan is not the enemy and it will recognize Philippine independence in due time, that Japan has a strong military force, as proven by its victory over Russia in 1905, and that because of this, the Filipinos should cooperate with Japan.⁵⁵

In Atimonan, a man in his fifties cried upon seeing Dominguez, saying that he was a Ricartista. An old woman approached her after the speech and introduced herself as a former acquaintance of the General. Ricarte had stayed in her house when he visited the area during the Revolution.

Tuazon talked about Filipino women. She declared that the Filipina should shed the flippant U.S. influences and become a real Asian woman with lofty morals and virtues. She added that women should participate in the establishment of an "Asia for Asians" and a "Philippines for the Filipinos."

For the Japanese members of the Propaganda Corps, Tuazon was like a typical Japanese woman. She wore only a little make-up, and was on the main a quiet and soft-spoken person. But once on stage, she spoke with passion and strength.

Earlier, Tuazon, encouraged by her father, had joined the Propaganda Corps on its way to Manila after having landed at Lingayen Gulf. She said that she was glad to join the pacification campaign because she would then have the opportunity to tell the people that it was time to obtain independence under Japan's guidance.⁵⁶

Santos had gone with Tuazon on that trip to Manila. During the Good Will Mission in Bikol he shared with the audience the historical background of the struggle for Philippine independence. He said that defeating the Anglo-U.S. powers was necessary in order to obtain real independence. Therefore, the Filipinos should cooperate with Japan so as to win the war. Hitomi spoke of Japan's sincere intentions in waging the war, and he asked for the Filipino's understanding and cooperation.

55. Tape-recorded reminiscences of Minviluz Dominguez's experience with the Good Will Mission sent to Motoe Terami-Wada on 24 April 1989, and telephone interview by Terami-Wada on July 1989.

56. Interview with Ms. Bibiana Tuazon-Ihita, at her residence in Osaka, 15 April 1989. Also see Horikawa Shizuo, *Manila e no Michi* [The Road to Manila] (Tokyo: Tokyo Shiryu-sha, 1961), pp. 203-4.

Several times, the public speaking engagements were sponsored by the provincial governor and held at the town plaza in the evenings. On these occasions, Filipino folk dances, songs, and even plays were performed, not only by the Corps members but also by local talent. For instance a play presented in Naga City showed a greedy merchant taking advantage of the situation by hoarding food. In the play, he was arrested and executed by the Japanese Army.

These occasions usually attracted audiences as large as 3,000. One time, a young local Indian male joined and spoke of the plight of his countrymen under the British. During the speaking engagements, designated Propaganda Corps members circulated among the audience to note the people's reactions. They reported later that the listeners felt as if they were listening to a sermon by Jesus Christ.

But the people had their own grievances to share. One of them was the soaring prices of commodities, especially after the Japanese had landed in the country. Other complaints were the rising unemployment rate and the hoarding of food by Chinese merchants. These problems were discussed during the meetings with local politicians, religious figures, and expatriate Japanese residents. The films which the group brought were all documentaries, such as "Heavy Industry of Japan" and "Japanese Navy." Occasionally, Tagalog films were shown if these happened to be available in the towns visited.⁵⁷

CONCLUSION

Until the middle of May 1942, the Propaganda Corps had concentrated on bringing back normalcy to the citizenry, at the same time persuading the USAFFE soldiers in Bataan and Corregidor to surrender. This was the General Staff Office's order from Tokyo, transmitted to the General Headquarters in Manila, which in turn was conveyed to the Corps.

However, the Propaganda Corps members themselves concretized this basic order so as to reach out to the people and soldiers. As seen earlier in this article, the composition of pictures and captions for the posters and handbills was left entirely to the painters and writers of the Corps. Their cultural offensive against the Filipino and U.S. soldiers proved to be effective, based on the latter's postwar reflections. For instance, MacArthur said he was "greatly disturbed" when Aguinaldo appealed for the soldiers' surrender over KZRH.⁵⁸

57. Ibid., pp. 168-69

58. MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 134.

In another instance, the Corps was ordered to describe the aims of the GEACPS. The members felt that such an abstract idea was difficult to explain. Instead, they pointed out that

the skin color of the Filipinos and the Japanese is the same. Therefore we should be friends. The white-skinned Americans are our common enemies, and together we shall get rid of them.⁵⁹

In yet another case, Corps members were ordered to highlight the fall of Singapore so as to make people realize the strength of the Japanese military. But they believed that the most important and urgent task at that time was not to emphasize the power of the Army. Instead, they concentrated on persuading the anti-Japanese guerrillas to surrender in order to prevent innocent civilians from being caught in the crossfire.⁶⁰

They also realized the effectivity of making speeches in the local dialect. They hired Tagalog interpreters, among whom were Japanese expatriates as well as Filipinos who had studied in Japan. Their choice of speakers was also correct from the Japanese point of view, given the official policy of accentuating the independence and patriotism of Filipinos. Among the speakers were Ricarte, his granddaughter, and former members of the Sakdal movement, all of whom were staunch advocates of Philippine independence and possessed a strong anti-U.S. sentiment.

The Propaganda Corps was a unique entity within the military establishment because it was composed of intellectual civilians who could have had a different outlook on the war. Some of them, in fact, had been sent to the war front in the Southern Area as punishment for their liberal political ideas.⁶¹ Their impact on the course of the occupation in the Philippines is an interesting footnote to the history of the war.

59. Interview with Hitomi, 12 March 1989.

60. Ibid.

61. A good example is Miki Kiyoshi, a philosopher who had been active in the anti-Fascist movement and was imprisoned for some time before the war. Eventually he was sent to the Philippines as a member of the Propaganda Corps. Upon returning to Japan, he was rearrested. He was released at the end of the war, but died a month later because of harsh treatment in prison.