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Missiles and National Survival

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we are both island peoples, placed in positions of great strategic value; that we both believe in the same traditions of democracy and the rule of law; that we support Christian principles and that we are both determined to preserve our own way of life intact, even if it entails great physical danger for ourselves. You pay us the vast compliment of knowing our language so well. We both have faith and courage and these are the most important attributes a nation which intends to survive can have. I personally see great hope in both our futures. You have certain advantages which we do not possess: your population in relation to your territory is relatively small; nature is exceedingly kind to you; you can be self-sufficient in food; you have the feeling that with a little effort everyone in the Philippines can better himself, and you have an admirable thirst for education. With your hybrid origins I predict a magnificent flowering of culture. We too share hybrid origins and we are proud of the achievements which they have enabled us to bring about. It is my great hope that both our countries may understand one another better. I feel that an Ambassador should build a bridge between the country he represents and the country in which he serves. If I can help to do this by encouraging both peoples to know one another better, I shall feel that I have at least achieved something worth while. I hope you will help me in this constructive task.

Lastly, I would like to express my gratitude for the friendship that has been so warmly extended to my family, to myself and to so many of my fellow-countrymen in your beautiful and hospitable islands. I say, to all members of your Association and to the people of the Philippines, "*un millón de gracias de todo corazón.*"

JOHN PILCHER

Missiles and National Survival

PRESIDENT Garcia made news last April when, in an exclusive interview with Stan Swinton, general news editor of the ASSOCIATED PRESS, he issued a strong invitation to the United States government to station atomic weapons, including missiles, in the Philippines. The President said that any decision to station these weapons here was up to Congress, but he added he was certain Congress would approve. The ASSOCIATED PRESS interview was the first time the President made public his desire to have atomic weapons available here, for instant use in the event of attack. As the AP observed, he chose his words carefully.

Garcia said the Philippines had learned from the disasters of Bataan and Corregidor that the weapon to defend the nation should be stationed right at hand. If the United States felt it necessary, the weapons "could be kept at American bases here rather than under the control of the Philippine government."

Reacting swiftly to President Garcia's proposal, Communist China declared the stationing of atomic weapons in the Philippine "may lead the country to disaster." The official NEW CHINA NEWS agency said a "scheme of Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia to turn his country into a U.S. nuclear war base and missile-launching site was brought to the open today." Garcia "did not even demand control by the Philippine government over these weapons, which may led the country to disaster."

The Soviet Union, through TASS, its official news agency, said Garcia's proposal "seriously affects the cause of peace and security in the Far East," and is "fraught with the grave danger of the Philippines being involved in a military conflict against the country's will." TASS added: "The point, of course, is not the defense of the Philippines, which is threatened by no one. Besides, the national income could not stand the burden of participation in the nuclear arms race. Garcia's statement was made rather in the interest of external forces, namely, American imperialism. The introduction of American atomic bombs and rockets to Filipino territory will in no way strengthen the country's security. American missile and nuclear bases will, on the contrary, tighten the grip on the Philippines' neck."

In Washington, U. S. officials welcomed "the spirit" of President Garcia's reported willingness to permit U. S. missile bases in the Philippines. But they said the United States has not requested this permission, and has no plans to base missiles here.

The first objective and incisive analysis of the Garcia plan was made on April 12th by Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson. He said: "President Garcia's interview with Mr. Stan Swinton, general news editor of the ASSOCIATED PRESS, has focused public attention on the question of maintaining missile stations in the Philippines. It is high debatable that President Garcia was misquoted, as he claims in a 'clarification' statement issued to newsmen at Baguio. Mr. Swinton is the general news editor of one of the world's major news agencies, not a cub reporter. It is obvious, on the other hand, that President Garcia is having second thoughts on his much-publicized proposal to establish missile stations in this country. It should be emphasized that, whether or not he invited the United States to set up such stations here, he is committed, at least in principle, to their establishment in the Philippines.

"It is apparent that President Garcia's pronouncement on the establishment here of U. S. missile bases was not the result of ob-

jective, sober, and mature deliberation. It has produced confusion at policy levels, while causing surprise at technical levels. The President should have spoken on such a delicate matter only after it had been threshed out at policy and technical levels. It does not speak well of the judgment of the President that he sounded off on a vital question of national security without seriously assessing, in consultation with other policy-making officials and competent military technicians, the policy and military considerations involved. As things now stand, Mr. Garcia still has to do all that.

"Granting that the United States government were of a mind to accept and implement Mr. Garcia's proposal, considering the proximity of existing U. S. bases to centers of population, our people would be exposed to the danger of an atomic holocaust. Fortunately, there is no evidence that the United States government contemplates taking immediate measures along the Garcia proposal. It is significant that press dispatches from Washington indicate that, in the judgment of official U. S. sources, there are no plans to set up missile or atomic stations in the Philippines.

"The embarrassment President Garcia has caused official Washington is shown by the guarded statement from responsible quarters in the American capital that 'the U. S. defense department, as a matter of custom, never discloses where A-weapons are placed.' President Garcia would not serve the ends of Philippine-American defense by tipping the hand of our ally. By his rash and injudicious open proposal President Garcia has provided the world, including those with aggressive designs on the Philippines, with a window on a question of immeasurable concern to mutual Philippine-American security.

"President Garcia would have been well advised to take up the matter with the United States government, through the channels ordained by the mutual arrangements between the Philippines and the United States, before sounding off as he did. I, for one, agree with the President on one fundamental point: Red China's opinion should not deter the Philippines from the course dictated by considerations of national security. It stands to reason that the Communists look on any defensive measures taken jointly by the Philippines and the United States as deterrents or road blocks to Communist expansionism in Asia, particularly along the Pacific basin. In any event, let us not play politics with national security."

It is to be noted that Mayor Lacson is not against the stationing of the latest and most modern military equipment in the Philippines. He made this abundantly clear in the foregoing statement and in a previous interview with the afternoon papers. As a matter of fact, he underscored his point by adding: "We cannot fight tomorrow's war with yesterday's weapons."

Senate Minority Leader Ferdinand Marcos later proposed that President Garcia convene the national security council "to thresh out the raging nuclear weapons controversy." In making this proposal, the Minority leader assailed the President as did Lacson, for making an injudicious and precipitate invitation to the United States to station atomic weapons in the Philippines. Marcos charged: "It is the height of irresponsibility for any Chief of State to place a subject on which hinges our national survival at the passionate level of public debate."

President Garcia's missile bases plan brought about a full-dress debate, not merely on the plan as such, but, over-all, on the existing mutual security arrangements between the Philippines and the United States. Foreign Secretary Felixberto Serrano and Press Secretary Jose Nable both tried to modify the terms of President Garcia's invitation to the United States government. They did this in separate formal press statements issued in Baguio, at the behest of the President, on April 14th. Both statements said, in effect, that the President had only called for conventional nuclear weapons and not inter-continental ballistic missiles or any such powerful weapons. Serrano and Nable took turns reassuring the public that the stationing of the weapons envisaged by the President would be subject to Congressional approval.

The observations offered in this note are based on the following premises: *First*, the course of mutual Philippine-American defense is dictated, as indeed it must be dictated, by considerations of mutual security; and *second*, Philippine participation in the historic Philippine-American alliance is predicated on overriding considerations of national interest, national policy, and national survival.

Opposition to the consideration of the Garcia proposal or any similar scheme has come chiefly from those who believe or feel that the United States has lost out to the Soviet Union in the missile race, and that "stockpiles of ballistic missiles are magnets for nuclear attacks against the countries possessing them." It is important to bear in mind that such opposition would ensue regardless of who advocated a plan or scheme for the stationing of atomic weapons in the Philippines.

Is the first assumption, namely, that the United States has lost out to the Soviet Union in the missile race, valid? In the quarters where this assumption is held and cherished, reliance is placed on reports about the missile gap between the United States and Soviet Russia which appeared in reputable U. S. publications, notably the NEW YORK TIMES and U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, during the early stages of the missile race between the two major powers.

Two authorities in particular are often quoted: Dr. von Braun, director of ballistics development for the U.S. Army, and Mr. Allen

Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. government. Dr. von Braun, appearing before a Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, agreed with Senator Johnson that "the Russians could send a hydrogen warhead 4,000 to 5,000 miles," and while he could not say for certain that they could hit, say, Washington, nevertheless "we should not underestimate their capability in the guidance system."¹ As for Mr. Dulles, he was widely quoted as saying that the "U.S. air bases abroad are now within the reach of the Russian operational-and-on-site ICBM's, and that the Russian operational missile system would reduce to a couple of minutes the all-important alert time required to get these U.S. bombers off their bases after a Soviet missile attack."²

Both these statements have been often cited by opponents of U.S. missile bases in the Philippines. It should be noted, however, that they were made in 1957, and it is not unlikely that the picture of the missile gap today may be somewhat different from what it was three years ago. It is, in fact, considerably different.

On 9 February of this year Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, made a statement to Congress which has gone largely unnoticed here. He said "The Polaris missile, developed by the U.S., is perfected, and by autumn will be ready for use. During this year, 32 of these missiles will be aboard two nuclear submarines, ready to be fired in anger. These missiles are powered by solid fuel and can be fired under water. Their range of 1,200 miles can reach any important part of Russia.

"The Polaris can be made in quantity. Its cost is relatively low—1.5 million dollars per missile. It can be mounted on railroad cars in Germany—movable bases largely invulnerable to destruction by missiles fired from Russia. It can be mounted on trucks. It can be mounted on innocent-looking freighters at sea. It can be mounted on naval cruisers.

"Each missile could blow up a Soviet city. By 1961 there can be hundreds of these Polaris missiles. Russia has no comparable missile. She has no atom-powered submarine."

To say that "stockpiles of ballistic missiles are magnets for nuclear attacks against the countries possessing them" is to contrive an adaptation of the old stereotype that "U. S. bases are an invitation to enemy attack." Both statements are dangerous oversimplifications which cannot stand examination.

Any country today that casts its lot with the free world and undertakes to defend itself or prepares to defend itself, runs certain calculated risks, among which are nuclear attack and other forms of aggression

¹ U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 27 December 1957.

² ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1 December 1957.

from the Communist orbit. To deny this is to fly in the face of current history—and to ignore the facts of life in the world we live in. The logical, indeed inevitable, inference of the above argument against the stationing of missiles in the Philippines is that, in the absence of such weapons, this country would not be exposed to Communist attack—or, to be precise, Communist nuclear attack. But is such a presumption valid?

I submit that such a presumption is erroneous and misleading. It erroneously rules out Communist expansionism in Asia, and misleads people into thinking that lack of defense is the best defense against Communist aggression. I submit further that such a presumption completely ignores the fact that the free world is engaged in a mortal struggle for survival in which it has no choice of weapons or battle-grounds. The free world, having no aggressive designs on anybody and constitutionally unable to engage in preventive warfare, does not and cannot have the initiative in a military conflict. The Communist orbit, being ruled by dictatorships and engaged in expansionism, has the initiative in what the masters of the Kremlin call "war to the hilt between communism and capitalism."

Anybody familiar with Communist tactics and methods will admit that the type of weapons the Communists will employ against a given country will be determined by their strategy and their objectives. As Secretary of Foreign Affairs Serrano tried to point out at the start of the missile controversy, the enemy would not stop to quibble over the presence or absence of missiles in a given territory once it is marked out for enemy attack. And the attack would be waged as the enemy wants, not as the "bleeding hearts" in that territory would have him wage it.

Those who think that the absence of atomic weapons and missiles in the Philippines would be insurance against nuclear attacks by the Communists lose sight of the fact that nuclear weapons are employed primarily for offense and for the achievement of military objectives. In answer to a statement by Aneurin Bevan, the British labor leader, that the stockpiling of atomic weapons in England would bring nuclear attack from the Soviet Union, Liddell Hart, the well-known writer on military affairs, said the Russian militarists, not British pacifists, would decide when and how to attack England. He reminded Bevan of the obvious fact that military weapons are used in the manner decided upon by those who wield them.

Those who advance the foregoing argument against the stationing of missiles in the Philippines should be asked, "Will a nuclear attack by the enemy, if it eventuates, be necessarily decisive and conclusive?" No reply other than an affirmative one is likely in the context of their whole position on the missile issue. So convinced are they of their

position that they have unabashedly put forward the craven alternative of surrender. But the following highlights of a study by competent military authorities and experts, *The Truth About Missiles*, published in U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, February 29, 1960, should refute the assumption of definite and irretrievable annihilation:

"The central point, in a nutshell, is this: Russia, with no overseas bases, can strike the U. S. only with long range missiles, manned bombers or missile-carrying submarines. As a practical matter, the U. S. has fairly effective defense against bombers, and Russia still has no Polaris-type missile with which to cover much of the U. S. from submarines—so that a Soviet surprise attack must rely mainly on a limited number of ICBM's.

"The U. S., on the other hand, has many ways to strike back at Russia in addition to its ICBM's, now few in number but to be increased in months ahead. There are more than a hundred bomber and missile bases abroad, ringing Russia. There are carrier task forces which can reach Soviet territory with jet fighter-bombers from the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific. There are squadrons of Matador and Mace pilotless bombers stationed in West Germany. There is a squadron of 6,000-mile, jet-propelled snark missiles now operational in Maine. And there are Allied forces, such as the 250 British H-bombers, able to strike retaliatory blows.

"In addition, there is the prospect of special, nuclear-powered submarines, each armed with 16 Polaris missiles, traveling undetected beneath the surface in waters near Russia, able to launch nuclear attacks while still submerged and invulnerable to Russia's arsenal of big and little missiles. It is these Polaris submarines which are counted upon to provide sure fire retaliation, regardless of how successful a Soviet surprise attack might be. At this time, four of the special subs have been launched—the U. S. S. GEORGE WASHINGTON, the U. S. S. PATRICK HENRY, the U. S. S. THEODORE ROOSEVELT and the U. S. S. ROBERT E. LEE.

The hope that the Philippines may be spared the horrors of war if she cuts loose from the defensive alliances and the security arrangements to which she is a party runs like a tenuous thread through the whole pattern of the spirited opposition to the stationing of U. S. missiles in the Philippines. Such a hope is quite obviously induced by thoughts and calculations which, in political terms, add up to non-involvement, neutrality, or neutralism. Yet, current history bristles with facts which conclusively show that such formulas for survival are a fuzzy and suicidal self-delusion.

India and Burma, the two most dedicated members of the neutralist bloc, have found to their misfortune and sorrow that they cannot ensure their survival merely through a policy of neutralism. This

policy, as Henry A. Kissinger points out in *NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY*, is based on the dogmas of late nineteenth-century liberalism, especially pacifism, and relies more on a sense of "superior spirituality" than on an evaluation of the power factors in world affairs. Nehru's doctrine of non-involvement was smashed to smithereens by Mao's armed encroachment on India's northern borders. Burma's concept of neutrality utterly failed to prevail against Peiping's demand for the cession to Communist China of a sizable portion of Burmese territory.

President Nasser, of the United Arab Republic, is today the prime example in the Middle East of the illusory character of the policy of non-alignment. By pursuing such a policy he unwittingly served, by his own testimony, the ends of the Soviet empire, whose divisive tactics succeeded in creating a power vacuum in the Middle East. It remains to be seen if Nasser—and possibly El Kasseem of Iraq—can keep the Soviet Union from finally moving into that power vacuum. Once it does, it will be more than a Middle Eastern power; it will be a Middle Eastern overlord.

Congressman Antonio V. Raquiza, the able Liberal spokesman in Congress, brought about a dramatic denouncement in the spirited opposition to the stationing of U. S. missiles in the Philippines by posing a fundamental question, namely, *What alternative, if any, is offered to the stationing of such weapons here?* "Surrender?" Congressman Raquiza asked.

Raquiza's pointed question instantly elicited the rejoinder that the alternative "need not be" surrender. "But supposing it were," Senator Claro M. Recto asked, "does the Congressman think there is any other alternative to physical annihilation?"

Pursuing the argument with his known forensic skill, Senator Recto said: "Did not the U. S. and the Philippines surrender in Bataan and Corregidor? Did not Germany surrender twice, in the First and in the Second World Wars? Did not Japan surrender in the last? Did not France, Belgium, and Holland surrender in two World Wars? Did not the English surrender to the Americans in the American War of Independence? In personal and individual matters it may be heroic and honorable to stand one's ground to the death, for a personal motive, but in international affairs a few men cannot adopt this attitude for the whole nation. We must be more realistic and we must measure our own strength and take stock of the situation. In an individual case, surrender may seem disgraceful, but this is not so in the case of a nation."

Two things, both borne out by indubitable historical facts, should be stressed at this point. *First*, surrender would have to be on Com-

munist terms. *Second*, such terms would spell Communist enslavement from which there would be no escape except genocide and death.

The stationing of U. S. missiles in the Philippines will come about when such a step is warranted by the strategic interests of both the Philippines and the United States. Already, Foreign Secretary Serrano and Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo, together with responsible Philippine defense officials, have placed the matter before official Washington. When and if U. S. missiles are stationed here, they will form part of the muscle and sinew of the defensive alliances and security arrangements that defend democracy and freedom in this corner of the globe. These defenses, it must be clearly understood, are part of the collective security system that alone can ensure the survival of small nations like the Philippines.

A Philippine-American decision to station U. S. missiles in this country would be an act of faith similar to that expressed by Gordon Dean, former Chairman of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission: "For most of us the mere survival of ourselves and our children is not sufficient. We think more in terms of surviving in freedom, and we believe that on this fast-shrinking globe our freedom is somehow bound up with the freedom of all people and particularly those who have it today or are determined to have it some day."

MELCHOR P. AQUINO

Post-Summit Reflections

The failure of the Summit Meeting to come off in Paris in mid-May raises the question of where the Philippines, as one of the world's nations, goes from here. Relaxed tensions and substantial agreement on disarmament between East and West would have permitted all countries to re-examine the goals of their foreign policy. Especially, a happy outcome would have allowed less concentration on preparedness against attack and more on the matters of peace, of increased national and personal freedom.

Unfortunately, defense must remain a large concern—collective readiness to repel attack. The first answer to the question raised is that we must continue to stick close to our friends. This means that we must be highly sensitive to detect what Nehru once called "fissiparous tendencies".

The Philippines can indulge a feeling of relief to this extent, that its biggest dangers do not seem to stem from within, but from