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"I am here by the order of the Kaiser, Sir!" These were the words allegedly spoken by the German commander of the East Asia Squadron, Vice Admiral Otto von Diederichs, during a talk with Rear Admiral George Dewey, commander of the United States Asiatic Fleet in Manila Bay on 12 June 1898. They were given in answer to Dewey's enquiry on the reasons for the presence of a large German naval force in spite of Germany's limited interests in the Philippines (Dewey 1913, 223–24). Later von Diederichs wrote that he could not recall the exact term used, but that he could have used a similar phrase, without any threatening intention, though. He admitted that his appearance might have aroused suspicion (Diederichs 1914, 254 ff.).¹

This article seeks to answer the following questions: What happened in the Philippines that led to the presence of such a large number of foreign men-of-war in Manila Bay in 1898? What were the motives for Germany's involvement in the Philippines? What links existed between the Philippine revolutionaries and Germany?

Germany, the United States of America and the Philippine Revolution

The outbreak of the Philippine Revolution at the end of August 1896 took the Germans in Manila by surprise. After some hesitation, German Acting Consul Spitz requested the dispatch of a warship in order to protect Germany's interests and her nationals in the Philippines. On 24 November 1896 the cruiser *Arcona*, under Lieutenant-Commander Becker, arrived in Manila. This only seemed to confirm rumors that Germany intended to acquire the Philippines. Moreover, it was said that three German nationals actively supported the revolutionaries. No hard evidence, however, could be found to support this assertion.

On 25 December, the cruiser *Irene*, with Rear Admiral Tirpitz on board, arrived at Manila Bay to relieve the *Arcona*. A few days later, the Spanish colonial government ordered the execution of José Rizal, who was falsely charged as being responsible for the Revolution. Rizal had studied in Germany and had many German friends. According to the Spanish, Rizal favored the acquisition of the Philippines by Germany. Shortly before Rizal's execution, his family went to the German consulate to plead for German intervention before the Spanish authorities. Tirpitz wrote that although doubts were cast over Rizal's guilt, this plea "of course could only be turned down" (PA AA R 19465 Tirpitz to Commanding Admiral, Hong Kong, 18 January 1897). The revolutionaries attempted to win Tirpitz over by asking for a German protectorate. But Tirpitz, in accordance with the official German position, did not respond affirmatively. Berlin believed that Spain would be able to defeat the revolutionaries and as long as no German interests were directly affected, there was no reason for an intervention. Thus, on 3 January 1897 the *Irene* left Manila.²

Due to internal tension between the leaders of the Revolution and a deteriorating military situation after some lost battles, the Filipinos tried to involve European powers in their struggle. On 29 January 1897, four Filipinos—José Maria Basa, A. G. Medina, Doroteo Cortes, and his son—appeared at the German consulate in Hong Kong. They handed over a petition addressed "To His Imperial Majesty, The Emperor of Germany." Consul Wilhelm Knappe refused to officially accept this petition because Germany had cordial relations with Spain. But he unofficially accepted it and sent it to Berlin together with his own detailed report.

The petition began with a lengthy but general description of the Philippines under Spain's unjust and cruel regime. Then Emperor Wilhelm II was asked to confer with the other powers in order to acknowledge the Filipinos' right to self-determination. The petitioners wrote, "The Philipinites [sic] will ever to be [sic] warmly grateful acknowledging the valuable assistance given them and indemnifying the expenses of the military expedition that be sent [sic] to the said Islands for the attainment of their just and humble request and granting immunity to the nation that renders such a generous and humanitarian [sic] protection."³

After reading this petition, Emperor Wilhelm boldly concluded, "The wish to come under German sovereignty is common. [. . .] I am determined to buy the Philippines at the first opportunity, or take them away

from the Spanish when their 'liquidation' comes" (Petition, Hong Kong, 29 January 1897 as annex in Knappe to Reich's chancellor, Hong Kong, 1 February 1897 with Emperor Wilhelm's marginalia). According to Zeus Salazar, it was this petition that prompted Emperor Wilhelm II to consider the acquisition of the Philippines from Spain. Furthermore, Wilhelm believed that there was a pro-German party in the Philippines. Foreign Secretary von Bülow, however, was less optimistic that Germany could acquire the archipelago. Thus, he persuaded the Emperor to accept a policy of compensation and to enter into negotiations with the power that would eventually occupy the Philippines. In the meantime, Berlin decided to wait for further developments. After the conclusion of an armistice between the Filipinos and the Spanish in December 1897, the situation eased for the time being. But with rising tensions between the United States of America and Spain in the course of 1898, the Philippines again roused Germany's interest (Kaikkonen 1980, 96; Z. Salazar 1983, 137).

As a background to the developments in the Philippines, we have to consider a change in Germany's policy. After Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, the young Emperor Wilhelm II felt free to pursue a "new course" (Neuer Kurs) in foreign policy. He strove to maintain Germany's position as a world power, but there was no comprehensive plan behind this idea of "world politics" (Weltpolitik). Germany simply demanded a say in all political world affairs. In order to implement such a policy, it was necessary to have a strong navy at one's disposal and to acquire colonies and/or naval stations; or to realign the boundaries of the already existing colonies. Since the end of 1894, Wilhelm had been demanding a foothold (fester Punkt) in China. On 14 November 1897, a German naval force under von Diederichs eventually occupied Kiaochow, a territory in Northeast China, and established a naval station in the town of Tsingtao. Thus, a first foothold was acquired and after the Reichstag's (German Parliament) approval of the first navy bill, the efforts for more overseas territories entered the next phase.⁴

In March 1898 the German consul in Hong Kong reported on American war preparations to attack Manila. Wilhelm II commented on this in a marginal note, "The Yankees are not allowed to do this for we must have Manila one day!" (Kaikkonen 1980, 96-97). This statement characterizes Germany's "world politics" quite well. There was no specific plan for the acquisition of naval stations, but only vague objectives. The motto of the day was simply to wait for the appropriate moment.

In April, Prince Heinrich, the Emperor's brother and commander of the Second German Cruiser Division, sent a telegram from Hong Kong to Berlin. It read, "German merchant from Manila explained to me in the most reliable way that the rebellion in the Philippines is justified and will be victorious and that the natives would like to be protected by another European power, particularly Germany" (PA AA R 19467 Prince Heinrich to Bülow, Hong Kong, 11 April 1898). Emperor Wilhelm, however, did not react this time. He believed that although Spain was not strong enough to quell the rebellion, she would be able to destroy the American fleet. Then the Philippines would fall on Germany's lap.

Admiral Tirpitz, then State Secretary of the Reich's Navy Office, supported Wilhelm's opinion of the strategic importance of Manila. He was in favor of a chain of naval stations, mainly in the West Indies and East Asia. According to Foreign Secretary von Bülow, it was he who advised Wilhelm to keep a strict neutral course because Bülow believed in the power of the United States (Bülow 1930, 219–22; Schüddekopf 1941, 59–60; Kaikkonen 1980, 97).

After Krüger, the German consul in Manila, reported that the lives of German nationals were threatened by the revolutionaries, the Emperor ordered the cruisers *Irene* and *Cormoran* to sail to Manila on 28 April 1898. Before their arrival, however, the Americans presented the European powers with a *fait accompli*. Their Asiatic Fleet under Commodore Dewey had completely destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on 1 May. This completely altered the political situation, particularly since U.S. intentions remained unclear. Political considerations in Berlin resulted in von Bülow's suggestion that in case Great Britain took possession of the Philippines, Germany should demand one of the main islands of the archipelago as compensation, by referring to Germany's important commercial interests. In a marginal note Wilhelm expressed his agreement. Then Bülow said that he thought it advisable to dispatch more ships to Manila, and Wilhelm again concurred. Such was the situation when Consul Krüger telegraphed from Manila on 12 May, reporting that the revolutionaries were in favor of a monarchy and showed a great affection for Germany. There were indications that they would offer the throne to a German prince.⁵

This information echoed the contents of Prince Heinrich's telegram of April and could have led to a very serious development if it were taken at face value in Berlin. However, Krüger seemed to be completely

ignorant of the situation in the Philippines. The offer of a throne, which had never existed in the Philippines, should have aroused the consul's suspicion. Bülow remained critical of Krüger's report and suggested that Germany act carefully. He developed three different scenarios.

The first option was to acquire colonial possessions directly. He rejected this idea because the German fleet was not strong enough and Germany would face severe opposition from the other maritime powers. The second premise was the division of the Philippines. This would be more realistic. The third idea was to secure the independence of the Philippines by maintaining the neutrality of the archipelago under the supervision of the maritime powers. Then Germany could observe further developments and seize the Philippines at the appropriate moment. This would be the best solution for Germany in this situation. In order to obtain more detailed information on the actual situation in the Philippines, Bülow suggested that Vice Admiral von Diederichs personally go to Manila. Wilhelm agreed and expressed his opinion that the Philippines should not come under the control of a foreign power without Germany receiving appropriate compensation. In effect, Wilhelm adopted Bülow's compensation policy.⁶

These considerations served as the basis for the dispatch to Manila Bay of the German East Asia Squadron under von Diederichs on 2 June 1898. Emperor Wilhelm's order read: "Sail to Manila in order to form a personal opinion about Spain's situation there, the population's mood, and the foreign influence on the political reorganization of the Philippines."

Moreover, he had to protect German interests in the West Carolines and Palau Islands. The Commanding Admiral impressed upon him the need to observe the strictest neutrality before all parties involved. These were the only instructions received by Diederichs.⁷

The order caused a certain uneasiness in Washington because true German intentions remained open to interpretation. American scholar Thomas A. Bailey concluded that the German fleet was not sent to the Philippines to enter into a conflict with the United States, but to enforce the German position to acquire the Philippines if the U.S. retreated. This interpretation makes sense in the context of the previous German policy of waiting for opportunities. But the appearance of such a large fleet in Manila Bay without clearly recognizable intentions led to a chain of German-American misunderstandings, which resulted in severe tension.

It all started with the arrival of the cruisers *Irene* on 6 May and *Cormoran* on 9 May. The Americans accused them of ignoring the exist-

ing blockade of Manila. Without any land assault forces and instructions from Washington, and in expectation of a Spanish relief fleet, Commodore Dewey was under enormous stress when on 6 June the German transport *Darmstadt* steamed into Manila Bay with 1,400 soldiers on board. The situation eased only after Dewey was informed that the transport was on her way to Kiaochow and just wanted to relieve the crews of the *Irene* and *Cormoran*. After 72 hours, the *Darmstadt* left Manila.⁸

On 12 June the *Kaiserin Augusta* with Vice-Admiral von Diederichs on board, sailed into Manila Bay. After the arrival of the *Kaiser*, his flagship, and the *Prinzess Wilhelm*, Diederichs had five men-of-war at his disposal with a fighting power greater than Dewey's. In this context, Diederichs' "I am here by the order of the Kaiser, Sir!" could indeed be interpreted as a threat to the Americans. In the next few days more misunderstandings occurred.

On 27 June the American armed customs cruiser *McCulloch* stopped the cruiser *Irene* and an officer boarded the German ship. Later, the American press reported that the *Irene* stopped only after a shot had been fired across her bow. The situation escalated further after the so-called "*Irene* incident." The ship received orders to explore Subic Bay on 5 July.

Captain Ernst Obenheimer's instructions were to evacuate those Germans who might be in danger after the revolutionaries' occupation of Olongapo, to ascertain Subic's suitability as a typhoon shelter for the German fleet and to explore the area's military and maritime potential. Subic had already been under surveillance as a potential naval base by the Spanish. Moreover, he was ordered to allow endangered Spanish women and children on board.

Off Isla Grande at the entrance to Subic Bay, which was then still under Spanish control, the *Irene* encountered the steamer *Filipinas* flying the flag of the revolutionaries. Obenheimer made it clear that he would not tolerate any act of war on the island while a German cruiser was present. The Filipino officer agreed and Obenheimer then offered the evacuation of any non-combatants from Isla Grande on his return journey. Not having found any Germans in Olongapo or Subic, Obenheimer returned to the island on 7 July and started with the boarding of non-combatants. In the meantime, the *Filipinas* sailed to Cavite, and her captain complained to Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the revolutionaries, that a German cruiser had interrupted his attack on Isla Grande. Aguinaldo informed Dewey about the German involvement. Dewey interpreted this

conduct as a breach of neutrality and dispatched two smaller men-of-war, the *Raleigh* and *Concord*, to the island. Entering Subic Bay combat-ready, the German *Irene* passed them while leaving the bay or, as was reported later, "had cut her anchors and escaped quickly."⁹

After Dewey complained to von Diederichs about several provocative movements of some German ships, Diederichs sent his Flag Lieutenant Paul von Hintze to Dewey's flagship *Olympia* with his replies. During this meeting, Dewey became more and more enraged and, according to Hintze, cried out, "Why, I shall stop each vessel whatever may be her colors! And if she does not stop, I shall fire on her! And that means war, do you know, Sir? And I tell you, if Germany wants war, all right, we are ready."

Later Dewey said that his threats had been successful because from then on, the German conduct improved. Diederichs, on the other hand, reported that he kept his temper because he did not attach much importance to these words spoken in a state of high emotional agitation. Actually, after a longer correspondence, German-American relations improved, although subtle tension could still be felt and, according to von Diederichs, one had to exercise the utmost caution in order to avoid further incidents. Due to more and more agitated reports in the German and American yellow press about the "*Irene* incident," Diederichs thought it necessary to send a telegram to Emperor Wilhelm saying, "Shots had never been fired. Apparently, there is a tendency to stir up America's feelings towards Germany."¹⁰

In Contact with Revolutionaries: A German Protectorate of the Philippines?

By establishing contact with Philippine revolutionaries, the Germans were partly responsible for contributing to the tense atmosphere. On the other hand, the Filipinos attempted to take advantage of German interest in their country. After a visit to Spanish Governor General Augustín on 13 June, von Diederichs instructed Consul Krüger to establish contact with the Philippine revolutionaries. He wanted to obtain information on the revolutionaries' opinions and plans.

Krüger arranged for a meeting with the governor of the province of Manila. This was also an opportunity to talk to other important persons close to Aguinaldo. Diederichs was sensible enough not to personally participate in these talks so as to avoid any possible misinterpretation. Instead, he sent his flag lieutenant and the consul.

In a top-secret message to Berlin, he reported that while the revolutionaries were previously in favor of a protectorate by a European power, it was now clear that they wanted to establish an independent government and only wanted to invite European powers to participate in the country's development. Their motto was "the Philippines for the Filipinos." But Diederichs believed that this was not necessarily detrimental to Germany. Germany's objective should be to maintain her reputation as an altruistic and able government because after the expected collapse of the Filipinos' self-rule, Germany could intervene on request. This idea again reveals Germany's policy of waiting for opportunities (PA AA R 19474 Diederichs to Commanding Admiral (top secret), Manila, 25 June 1898, also in: BA RM R 2/1855).

The German consul to Hong Kong, Wilhelm Rieloff, was in Manila at the end of June or the beginning of July, in order to obtain information on the revolutionaries' plans. Because of former good contacts, he was able to meet with Aguinaldo and his closest confidants. He reported that after the expulsion of Spain as well as the United States, the free Philippines would like to establish closer links with Germany. On 10 June the Philippine representative to London, Antonio Regidor, received a written authorization to go to Berlin and enter into talks with German politicians. Rieloff's opinion was to let the Filipinos alone, work against any intervention by other maritime powers and deepen the relationship between Germany and the Philippines. Emperor Wilhelm commented that Regidor must only be allowed to come to Germany after the Philippines' complete independence. Furthermore, he ordered this delicate affair to be kept top-secret.¹¹

Diederichs most certainly referred to Rieloff's talks when he reported about new developments on 1 July. Sources close to Aguinaldo said that it was possible that after their independence, the Filipinos could opt for a German protectorate. Diederichs believed that the revolutionaries sought to play the Germans against the Americans. Thus, Paul von Hintze, Consul Krüger, the former consul ad interim Spitz, and the consular secretary Klocke paid a visit to the revolutionaries' headquarters in Cavite on 3 July. There they met with Epifanio Suagil, a friend and confidant of Aguinaldo. Suagil pointed out that the Filipinos wanted to conquer Manila without any foreign help. Then they would declare independence, and Aguinaldo would surrender his dictatorial powers to the people. The final aim was complete self-determination.

In the meantime, Consul Krüger met with Felipe Buencamino, a member of Aguinaldo's government. He confirmed that Antonio

Regidor had been instructed to obtain information from Germany's highest echelons about the possibility of a German protectorate of the Philippines.¹²

Diederich's presence in Manila Bay, as well as his contacts with Filipino revolutionaries, had resulted in a more negative attitude among Filipino revolutionaries. They assumed that the reason for the large number of German men-of-war was to support Spain. "Therefore I must assume that my arrival [. . .] has not been favorable to the German cause." He concluded that Spanish rule could no longer be restored. He also believed that while the Filipinos strove for autonomy, they were not ready for it. After the conclusion of a peace treaty, they would declare their independence but would not be able to maintain it. Thus, there would be civil war and then an intervention. In case the Americans took over the Philippines, they would have to wage a war against the Filipinos. Diederichs continued that Germany, for the time being, did not have any moral or material claims which would justify its participation in the archipelago's government. Nevertheless, Germany should claim her share when the time was ripe to do so. Thus, Germany had to strive for the acquisition of some rights on the Philippines for they were rich and of military value. It would be best for Germany if the Philippines established herself as an independent country, acknowledged by all powers involved (PA AA R 19473 Diederichs to Commanding Admiral [secret], Manila, 2 August 1898).

As it became evident that the United States would retain the Philippines, the only viable option for Germany was to pursue her compensation policy and to keep open her options for the future. On 8 June, Foreign Secretary von Bülow mentioned possible areas which he considered to be of importance: the island of Timor in East Asia, the Sulu Archipelago and at least one other Philippine island, such as Mindanao, as well as the Carolines and Samoa in the South Sea. On 1 July Admiral Knorr presented the High Command of the Navy's standpoint on the question of naval stations abroad to the Emperor. Knorr concluded that the acquisition of naval stations, which were expensive, only made sense if Germany seriously intended to permanently exercise maritime supremacy. Never, however, should the opportunity to acquire areas which were of economic or political importance be missed because such an acquisition would be rendered almost impossible in the future. The question of the suitability of establishing a naval station only ranked second. Finally, the Navy High Command recommended the acquisition of parts of the Spanish East Asian possessions.

In the enclosed annex, reference was made to the Philippines and Sulu. An opportunity had arisen which made territorial acquisition possible. It was concluded that Germany could not make any claims on the main island of Luzon because other powers would not permit this. On the other hand, Mindanao, Palawan and Sulu were regarded as being suitable. In case it was not possible to acquire all these islands, only Sulu should be taken. The reason was that her inhabitants had called for German support against Spain several times in the past. On no other island, so the report continued, could things be settled as fast as in Sulu, and on which exclusive German interests existed. Although the Sulu Archipelago was not of any economic value at the moment, it was believed her economy would flourish under German rule. Moreover, there existed suitable ports, such as Port Dalrymple in the north of Jolo, or Isabela on Basilan island, which could be converted into naval stations (BA MA RM 2/1834 Knorr to Emperor, Berlin, 1 July 1898 and annex).

After the fall of Manila on 13 August 1898, von Diederichs' mission was completed and he departed with the *Kaiser* on 21 August, although some German men-of-war stayed in the Philippines until the early months of 1899. Now it was the politicians' turn to implement their compensation policy.

Germany focused on Sulu by falsely claiming that a Prussian protectorate of Sulu had existed since the Sultan's letter to the Prussian King in 1866. But as the United States had told Germany in no uncertain terms that she also wanted to retain the Sulu Archipelago, Germany had to focus on the other Pacific possessions of Spain. Finally, in secret negotiations, Germany was able to purchase from Spain the Carolines, Marianas (with the exception of Guam which was under U.S. control), and the Palau Islands. But even then the German government cherished hopes of acquiring Sulu. She offered one of their newly purchased islands in the Pacific as a cable station in exchange for a coaling station in the Sulu Archipelago. The United States, however, rejected this offer. Thus, the compensation policy as part of the German imperialism of opportunities came to an end.

Emperor Wilhelm's and Foreign Secretary von Bülow's policy towards prestige-oriented concepts had primarily been responsible for the establishment of Germany as a Pacific colonial power, while in the meantime the maritime-strategic concept had been altered because of the increasing influence of Admiral Tirpitz. The main strategy was now to expand the battleship fleet in home territories instead of waging a

cruiser war overseas, as this required a chain of naval stations. Ironically, immediately after the purchase of Spain's Pacific islands, these possessions were rendered obsolete from a military-political point of view.¹³

Imperialism of Opportunities

Neither Prussia nor the German Reich under Bismarck and Emperor Wilhelm II had a comprehensive colonial policy. This can be illustrated by taking into consideration the Philippines, in particular the Sulu Archipelago, and the general instructions given to Vice Admiral von Diederichs. The German Reich reacted more to the developments in the Philippines than it tried to shape them. But Germany never gave up the idea of establishing some kind of a colonial regime. The policy was to wait for opportunities in order to claim one's share through compensation. The reasons for this kind of policy were firstly, Bismarck's Europe-centered policy, and secondly, the non-existence of a conclusive program of world politics (*Weltpolitik*) under Wilhelm II. Germany demanded a say everywhere in the world, but did not have any clearly defined objective.

The case study of the German-American confrontation in Manila Bay in 1898 exemplifies this point. On balance, however, we can say that both governments endeavored to ease the tension. A war was not intended by either party. The tension arose due to a number of misinterpretations and misunderstandings by the men on the spot, such as Germany's alleged high-handedness in refusing to respect Dewey's blockade of Manila, the excursion of German officers within Spanish lines, a visit to Aguinaldo's headquarters or the clandestine evacuation of the Spanish governor-general on the *Kaiserin Augusta* on 5 August. Furthermore there were rumors of German intervention on behalf of Spain, the desire to hold on to some parts of the Philippines and even negotiations with the revolutionaries to establish a German protectorate. It soon became evident that Germany was trying to increase her prestige as a world power. Lacking a comprehensive plan, the motives which finally led to the dispatch of the German fleet remained quite obscure to the other foreign powers and, thus, potentially dangerous.¹⁴

Because of this policy, the freedom of action for those Germans and Filipinos who intended to involve Germany in Philippine affairs, though for different reasons, was quite wide. When analyzing these men on the spot, we have to differentiate between private and official ones. The first group included adventurer-merchants and -captains, the

latter ones military personnel and diplomatic representatives. Both involved the German Reich in Philippine affairs but for different reasons.

The members of the first group were mainly concerned with their individual benefit and acted on their own. Some of them even initiated—without official authority—political negotiations with the Sultan of Sulu. Because of the Spanish blockade, they evolved into key figures in the power struggle in the Philippines' far south. The higher the risk, the more profits could be expected. At the same time, however, they took advantage of the fact that in case of emergency, their nation would intervene diplomatically. The reason was that no nation, particularly not the newly emerging great power of Germany, would accept that her citizens were in jeopardy. This would have caused an extraordinary loss of prestige combined with commercial and political consequences because the principle that the flag protected the cargo was generally acknowledged. The diplomatic interventions in favor of the blockade-runners can be explained in this way. But their activities could only develop in a kind of political vacuum, since no colonial power had so far established her regime in the Sulu Sultanate. It was only after the European powers' spheres of influence had been worked out in the North Borneo-Sulu region that the sultanate was defeated and the activities of the blockade-runners came to an end (see my earlier article in *Philippine Studies* 50 [2002]: 395–415).

Men like Vice Admiral von Diederichs or Consul Krüger belonged to the group of official representatives. They were there on an official mission, but in some cases they acted for their own good. Acting irresponsibly, Consul Krüger reported to Berlin the alleged offer of the Philippine throne, which had never existed, to a German prince. Thereby he wanted to take part in world politics, a mission he could never accomplish due to his ignorance of the local situation.¹⁵ But his report contributed to the dispatch of the German East Asia Squadron to Manila. Von Diederichs appeared in Manila, but without any specific imperial orders. It was his responsibility to act according to his evaluation of the situation. It was only through the reasonable action of these men that the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and the United States was avoided.

On the other hand, the Filipino side attempted to involve Germany in Philippine affairs. The Sultan of Sulu tried to obtain German assistance by offering naval stations several times. Adventurer-captains acted as intermediaries in the communication to Berlin or London. After the outbreak of the Philippine Revolution in 1896, leading representatives of the revolutionaries requested the Emperor's support. Diplomatic

reasons, however, prevented him from accepting such an offer; and believing in widespread pro-German sympathies in the Philippines, he sought the acquisition of the archipelago.

In 1898 the Filipinos were on the verge of defeating Spain and had high hopes of gaining complete independence. But at the same time, it became more and more evident that the United States intended to take control over the archipelago. In this situation the revolutionaries developed a policy along two different tracks. On the one hand, they followed their path to independence, officially proclaimed on 12 June 1898. On the other hand, they tried to take advantage of the Germans' presence in Manila Bay. Antonio Regidor, their representative in London, was to determine Germany's attitude toward Philippine independence under a German protectorate or a closer relationship. This was in accordance with Germany's policy of waiting for opportunities. Berlin simply planned to wait for the collapse of an independent Philippines, which was self-evident according to German beliefs, and then to exploit the situation by offering "altruistic" support.

In this case, unrealistic Philippine and German ideas met. Thus, it is not amazing that both parties were eventually left empty-handed. The German policy of opportunities, which never materialized, was eventually a failure. The Filipinos, on the other hand, were not successful in winning an ally over to their side. Consequently, they remained on their own and finally lost their fight for independence against the United States.

Notes

1. For an English translation see, Wionzek (ed.) 2000, 1–36.

2. BA MA RM 3/2991 High Command of the Navy, Berlin, 4 November 1896; Wolff's Telegraphen Bureau, Berlin, 2 December 1896; PA AA R 19464 Knappe to Reich's chancellor, Hong Kong, 24 November 1896; Becker to Tirpitz, Manila, 25 November 1896 and 1 December 1896, English translation in Wionzek (ed.) 2000, 47–53; R 19465 Spitz to Reich's chancellor, Manila 1 December 1896; Becker, "Militärpolitische Schrift über Manila" (military-political report on Manila), Manila, 11 December 1896; Tirpitz to High Command of the Navy, Manila, 29 December 1896; Pohl 1902, 759–60, English translation in Wionzek (ed.) 2000, 39–46; Tirpitz 1919, 159; Kaikkonen 1980, 95; Z. Salazar 1983, 133–135; Wionzek (ed.) 2000, 39–40, 47–53; Schult 2000, 18 ff.

3. PA AA R 19465 Telegram Knappe, Hong Kong, 30 January 1897; Petition, Hong Kong, 29 January 1897 as annex in Knappe to Reich's chancellor, Hong Kong 1 February 1897 with Emperor Wilhelm's marginalia; Z. Salazar 1983, 131–39; Wionzek 1998, 942 ff.

4. Boelcke 1981, 243 ff.; W. Mommsen 1993, 139 ff.; Fesser 1996, 25 ff.; 45–48; Fröhlich 1997, 73 ff.

5. PA AA R 19468 Bülow to Ambassador to London, Berlin, 10 May 1898; to Emperor (secret), Berlin, 12 May 1898; R 19472 Krüger to Foreign Office, Manila, 12 May 1898; R 19473 Diederichs to Commanding Admiral, Manila, 10 July 1898 (activity report for May); Schüddekopf 1941, 60–61; Kaikkonen 1980, 98–99; Gottschall 1981, 41–46, 71; Schult 2000, 23.
6. PA AA R 19472 Bülow to Emperor, Berlin, 14 May 1898; Lepsius et al. (eds.) 1924, 15, No. 4146 Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Berlin, 18 May 1898; Gottschall 1981, 50; Guerrero 1984, 14–16; Schult 2000, 24.
7. PA AA R 19472 Commanding Admiral to Foreign Secretary, Berlin, 3 June 1898; Diederichs 1914, 253–254; Bailey 1939, 61; Winzen 1977, 88; Gottschall 1981 74.
8. PA AA R 19472 Obenheimer to Command Cruiser Squadron, Manila, 8 May 1898; R 19469 Holleben to Foreign Office, Washington, 13 June 1898; Pohl 1902, 760–62; Dewey 1913, 222–23; Diederichs 1914, 258–59; Tirpitz 1919, 103, 141, 159; Bülow 1930, 219–22; Bailey 1939, 61; Winzen 1977, 88; Kaikkonen 1980, 99; Gottschall 1981 54–55, 72–74; Schult 2000, 26–27.
9. BA MA R 2/1855 Diederichs to Commanding Admiral, Manila, 14 July 1898, including the correspondence attached; Pohl 1902, 763–64; Dewey 1913, 228–29; Diederichs 1914, 269–70; Gottschall 1981, 77–87; Schult 2000, 27–28.
10. BA MA R 2/1855 Diederichs to Emperor, Manila, 25 July 1898; Diederichs, Manila, 11 July 1898; Dewey to Diederichs, Cavite, 12 July 1898; Diederichs to Dewey, Manila, 12 July 1898; Diederichs to Commanding Admiral, Manila, 14 July 1898 and correspondence attached; Dewey 1913, 229–31; Diederichs 1914, 268–75; Gottschall 1981, 77–87; Trask 1981, 377–81; Schult 2000, 28–29.
11. PA AA R 19472 Rieloff to Foreign Office, Manila, 4 July 1898; R 19470 von Holtzendorff to Foreign Office, Berlin, 5 July 1898; Gottschall 1981, 122, Guerrero 1984, 18–20.
12. BA MA RM 38/43 Diederichs to Knorr, Manila, 1 July 1898; Diederichs to Commanding Admiral (secret), Manila, 4 July 1898 in, Boelcke 1981, 278–81; Gottschall 1981, 76; Wionzek 1999, 239 ff.; Wionzek 2001, 165 ff.
13. Bailey 1939, 76; Schüddekopf 1941, 57 ff.; Kaikkonen 1980, 102 ff.; Gottschall 1981, 116 ff.
14. Bailey 1939, 66–73; Pommerin 1986, 90; Wippich 1997, 518–25, Wionzek (ed.) 2000, xiv.
15. Friedrich von Holstein, privy councillor and most influential *éminence grise* of the Foreign Office, characterized him as being “less capable, but swotty.” Holstein to Hatzfeldt, 15 May 1898, in Rich 1963 Vol. 4, 67–68.

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