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The Discurso Politico del Gobierno Maluco of Fr. Francisco Combés and Its Historical Impact

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**The *Discurso Político del Gobierno Maluco* of
Fr. Francisco Combés and its Historical Impact
HUBERT JACOBS, S.J.**

In presenting to the world of scholars an unknown, forgotten, or hidden work in manuscript, one could call attention to its literary qualities, or to its linguistic peculiarities, or to the image of the author revealed by it. Instead, the present writer intends to offer Combés' *Discurso Político* of 1658 mainly as an historical document and source, described in terms of its historical effectiveness. He will ask: how does it fit into the historical and political framework of seventeenth century Manila? What position does it champion with regard to the Philippine and Maluku Islands? ¹ What does it reveal of their history in the period in question? Was it of any real influence on Philippine policy of those days?

**I. THE POSITION OF MALUKU IN 17th CENTURY
PHILIPPINE POLICY**

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In order to understand and interpret well the position of the Maluku area in the whole of Philippine administration and policy in the years between 1605 and 1662, i.e. between acquisition and abandonment, one has to know its background in the preceding historical phase of that area, namely in the Portuguese period.

1. Instead of the later Dutch and English plural "the Moluccas," we prefer to use the ancient and modern Malay name "Maluku." The people of Indonesia know only the word or name Maluku; the people of Maluku know only the name "Ambon."

From 1522 on, the Maluku world was controlled by the Portuguese. The first white men of that nation had arrived there as early as 1512, but not until 1522 was the fortress of St. John of Ternate erected on the island of that name. Ternate remained the only foothold and the centre of Portuguese activity, political and commercial, in that part of the world for more than fifty years. It was valuable for its exclusive product: the clove. The "captain" of the fortress was the highest authority, and the Muslim sultans of Ternate, Tidore, and Bacan (Bachian) professed themselves several times to be vassals and servants of the Christian king of Portugal.

This was a political move, all of whose consequences they were not likely to foresee; with it they gave to the captain a much wider power than they intended to yield. Conflicts grew. As elsewhere, so also here the Portuguese proved far more clever in winning an influential position than in patiently and systematically conserving and consolidating it. The sultans of Ternate became more and more refractory. After one of them, Hairun, was stabbed to death by a Portuguese hotspur in 1570, his son and successor, Baab Ulah, seized the fortress in 1575. But soon the Portuguese had new, if small, forts in Ambon (1576) and Tidore (1578). Yet with waning control, gradually less and less succoured by the viceroys of Goa, they managed to hold out there with difficulty until 1605. In that year they had to surrender both fortresses to the Dutch. That was the end of Portuguese rule in the Maluku area.

During the later period, 1575-1605, but especially after the union of crowns in the person of King Philip (II of Spain, I of Portugal) in 1580, more than once the Spaniards of the Philippines had evinced interest in the precarious position of their Lusitanian brothers in Maluku. Philip claimed the fortress of Ternate as his own, but the sultans had no thought of restoring it. At the period in question, however, no Spanish monarch could ever be imagined to tolerate such a refusal and act of disobedience. Now the strongest Spanish position nearest the disobedient and rebellious vassal was Manila. Sometimes, from sheer necessity, the Portuguese captains of Tidore, though not liking the Castilians and still less enthusiastic for the new king forced upon them, had asked for help from Manila.

Governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa was instructed by King Philip to come, if need be, to the rescue of his Portuguese

subjects in Maluku. So in 1581 he dispatched Lieutenant Francisco de Dueñas in a frigate to Tidore to establish first contacts and to reconnoiter the military situation. A series of expeditions followed: one in 1582 under Juan Ronquillo, another in 1584 under Pedro Sarmiento, one conducted by Juan Morón in 1585, a fourth composed of a powerful armada led by Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas in 1593, and finally one consisting of auxiliary troops under Juan Juárez Gallinato to meet and relieve the armada of the Portuguese admiral André Furtado de Mendonça in 1602. For some reason or other, all these expeditions failed to achieve their expressed purpose: the destruction of Ternate.

It took another four years before Spain was able to gather anew a mighty fleet in Philippine waters. With it Governor Pedro Bravo de Acuña sailed to Ternate, and in an attack of only one day, 1 April 1606, brought the fortress under Spanish control. Though in the beginning it was discussed whether the recaptured Ternate would come under the Portuguese or Spanish crown, the Castilian conquerers soon left no doubt who should control it. King Philip appointed a Spaniard, Juan de Esquivel, as captain of the fortress, and with a *Cédula Real* of 29 October 1607, he declared that Ternate should be under the jurisdiction of the governor of Manila.² This ruled out the Portuguese and saddled the Philippine authorities with the remote Maluku area for about sixty years.

B. MALUKU UNDER PHILIPPINE RULE

What at the outset was considered to be a clearcut victory and consequently the start of a complete and unchallenged control of the island region around Ternate by the Spanish crown, soon revealed itself as a rather unreliable and unsafe acquisition. The Dutch, already for many years at war with Spain, were on the

2. Francisco Navas, *Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las Islas Filipinas* . . . precedido de *Historia General de Filipinas* por el P. Pablo Pastells, 9 vols. (Barcelona: Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 1925-36), 5: no. 7508; Juan Grau y Monfalcón, *Memorial informativo . . . por la ciudad de Manila . . . sobre las pretensiones de aquella ciudad* . . . (Madrid, 1637), f. 6r. See John N. Schumacher, S.J., ed., *Philippine Retrospective National Bibliography, 1523-1699* (Quezon City: Ateneo University Press, 1974), p. 63, no. 313:

"Y porque aviéndose recuperado por las Filipinas, y teniendo en ellas el más cierto socorro, no pareció conveniente bolverlas a sujetar a la Corona de Portugal, ni a su Virrey de la India, que dista tanto dellas, por acuerdo de ambas Coronas y cédula Real de 29 de Octubre de 607 se mandó, que todo el Maluco estuviesse, como oy está, a cargo del Governador de Filipinas."

scene. One year earlier they had expelled the Portuguese from their forts of Ambon and Tidore. Though they had left in Tidore only a negligible garrison and were not present with any appreciable naval force in the Ternatan waters at the moment of Acuña's attack, they by no means intended to leave the promising and coveted clove area of Maluku to the Spaniards. Acuña conquered Ternate, but he did not sail southwards and take Ambon. Moreover, the energetic man died within three months after his martial exploit.

The Dutch, on the other hand, soon returned with numerous ships and in May 1607 they built a strong fortress on the eastern coast of the small Ternate island. From this base they were able to fight the Spanish-Philippine forces and to back the native rulers in their resistance against them. Thus the position of the Spaniards in the former Portuguese fort on the southwestern side of the same island became rather tenuous and extremely vulnerable.

Besides the fortress of Ternate that was their principal foothold, the Spaniards kept another smaller fort, Dom Gil, on the southern coast near the lake Laguna. On Tidore Island they had a fort, Tohula or Tahulo, south of the town of Tidore and near the sultan's palace, and a smaller one near the village of Marieko. The Dutch forts were: on Ternate, Malayu or Orange, Toloko, and Takome; on Tidore, one near the Spanish fort of Marieko; one on the island of Moti (Moutel), and three in Makian. This was the situation in 1619.

To keep the precarious military stronghold of Ternate the Manila governor was due to dispatch year after year a succour flotilla, the famous *socorro*. Until the peace of Westphalia of 1648 became known in the Far East, the *socorro* ships were regularly waylaid by the Dutch. Even when they were not impeded in reaching the Spanish fortress and in returning safe to the Philippines, they expended much money and manpower with little profit, as the clove trade was gradually more and more controlled by the Hollanders. After Westphalia, though no longer disposed to consider the Spaniards their enemies, the Dutch were in no way willing to cede a part of their clove monopoly to them. Ultimately the maintenance of Ternate became only a question of prestige for the Spaniards. But mere prestige without any economic advantage could not in the long run continue to be a motive of political action, the

more so when again and again this action implied onerous sacrifices of men and money. It is unnecessary to enter into details; instances of difficulties will be seen in what follows.

C. ECCLESIASTICAL AND MISSIONARY SITUATION

A word should be added on the ecclesiastical and missionary aspect of the question. The Portuguese always kept in their fortresses a vicar and some other priests, appointed first by the bishop of Goa, later by the bishop of Malacca. These vicars were not entrusted with mission work among the natives unless the captain of the fortress saw an advantage in the conversion of some of them.

With St. Francis Xavier the Jesuits had started the mission in 1546. After a few decades there were, outside the fort, more than 70,000 Christians, spread over several islands. When in 1605 the Dutch expelled the Portuguese from Ambon and Tidore, the few Jesuits accompanied the refugees to Cebu, to return in the armada of Acuña in the next year. For the first time a few religious of other orders settled down at Ternate. The situation, however, soon did not permit any mission activity outside the fort. Only the northern arm of Sulawesi (Celebes) and the islands of the Sangi archipelago offered some small opportunity to preach the gospel and to make conversions. In fact, the history of the mission in those years is the history of a slow and hopeless agony.

Strangely enough, from 1606 on, the vicars of the now Spanish garrison of Ternate continued to be sent by the bishop of Malacca and therefore to be Portuguese; likewise the few Jesuits working there belonged to the Province of Cochin, operating under the Portuguese *padroado*. Only the separation of Portugal from Spain in 1640 and the loss of Malacca to the Dutch in 1641 were able to change these attitudes. Yet prior to 1654 the Portuguese priests, vicar and Jesuits, were not replaced by Spaniards from the Philippines. Even then, the Maluku Church was not attached to a Philippine diocese. For the rest, during the entire period since 1606, the number of missionaries seldom surpassed three or four.

This is the historical framework within which the work of Fr. Francisco Combés must be placed in order to understand its true value.

II. THE AUTHOR, FR. FRANCISCO COMBÉS, AND HIS WRITINGS

Fr. Francisco Combés was born at Zaragoza, Spain, on 5 October 1620, and when not yet thirteen years of age he entered the Society of Jesus in the Province of Aragon on 25 May 1633. After the noviciate and years of study, he was designated for the mission of the Philippines, where he arrived in 1643. First he resumed studying theology at the Manila college and in 1645 he was ordained a priest. Up to 1654 he worked among Spaniards and natives in and around Zamboanga, becoming concerned more than once with the political troubles caused by some chiefs of surroundings tribes. He visited Jolo and Pangutaran, and on another occasion Dapitan and Iligan. Once, in 1646, he accompanied the socorro to Ternate in the capacity of a royal chaplain. From 1654 to 1656 his residence was at Cebu where he made his solemn religious profession on 2 July 1654. Then he was called to Manila to teach theology. After two years he was again assigned to direct pastoral work as rector of the Jesuit residence of Dagami on the island of Leyte, and, from 1662 on, at the Santa Cruz district of Manila. In 1664 he was again a professor of theology, and after scarcely two years was elected a deputy of the Philippine Mission to Rome. On the voyage, he died near Acapulco on 29 December 1665.³

To the later generations Fr. Francisco Combés became a man of a certain renown by his monumental *Historia de Mindanao y Jolo*. It was published after his death at Madrid in 1667, and again in an impressive re-edition by W.E. Retana and Fr. Pablo Pastells, S.J., in 1897. All bibliographers make mention of it.

Of his other writings, a great deal of uncertainty seems to prevail. The bibliographers Sotuellus, Gallardo, Leclerc, Retana, and Medina do not list any work besides the *Historia*.⁴ Uriarte-Lecina

3. For Combés, life, see Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la Provincia de Philipinas de la Compañía de Jesus* (Manila, 1749), p. 284v, no. 669; Horacio de la Costa, S.J., *The Jesuits in the Philippines* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 611; W.D. Retana in Combes-Retana, *Historia de Mindanao y Jolo* (Madrid: Viuda de M. Miñuesa de los Rios, 1897), Prólogo; Archivum Romanum Societatis Jesu [ARSI] Catalogs of the Philippine Province: Philip. 2, II and Philip. 4.

4. Nath. Sotvellus, *Bibliotheca Scriptorum S.I.* (Romae: Ex typographia Jacobi Antonii de Lazzaris Vareseii, 1676), pp. 220-21; Carlos Ossorio y Gallardo, *Ensayo de una biblioteca española II* (Madrid: Imprenta de M. Rivadeneyra, 1866), no. 1877; Ch. Leclerc,

give the most complete list of the other works.⁵ The printed writings are:

- *Disertación en defensa de la libertad de los Indios*, Manila 1657.⁶
- *Elogio* or *Encomio* of a discourse of D. Salvador Gómez Espinosa y Estrada, Manila 1657.⁷
- *Panegyrico Sacro* to the honour of St. Teresa, Manila 1658.⁸
- *Sermón predicado al Arcangel S. Miguel*, 1662 or 1663.⁹

The writings that remained in MS are:

- *Memorial al Gobernador de Filipinas, representándole los graves daños que se seguirán a las Cristiandades . . . de desamparar la fortaleza de Samboangan.*
- *Relación enviada al P. Provincial del estado en que se halla la Cristiandad de Mindanao.*

Several other bibliographers and authors, cited here, who deal with Combés's works, do not add anything to Uriarte-Lecina.

The foregoing exposition, incomplete as it may be, makes it clear that a thorough bibliography of Francisco Combés is still waiting to be compiled. That something is lacking is strongly suggested by Streit in his *Bibliotheca Missionum*.¹⁰ After so many

Bibliotheca Americana (Paris: Maisonneuve et Cie, 1878), no. 2009; W.D. Retana, *Epítome de la bibliografía general de Filipinas* (Madrid: Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino I, 1895), p. 9, no. 15; J.T. Medina, *Bibliografía española de las Islas Filipinas* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Cervantes, 1897), pp. 231-33. Consult also Jose Eugenio Uriarte, *Catálogo razonado de obras anónimas y seudónimas* III (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico "Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1906), no. 4074.

5. *Biblioteca de escritores de la Compañía de Jesús* I/II (Madrid: Imprenta Gráfica Universal, 1929-30), pp. 274-75. For the *Historia de Mindanao* he refers to the *Catálogo razonado* (see n. 4).

6. See also Combés-Retana, *Historia*, Prólogo, p. xiv; de la Costa, *The Jesuits*, pp. 623-24. According to Schumacher, *Philippine Bibliography*, no. 674, this *Disertación* is "undoubtedly" only a different title of the following *Encomio*.

7. Also in Carlos Sommervogel, ed., *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jesus* (Bruxelles: O. Schepens 1890-92), 2:1338; in Simón Díaz, *Bibliografía de la literatura hispánica* VIII (Madrid: Instituto de Miguel de Cervantes, 1970), p. 617; de la Costa, *The Jesuits*, p. 477; Schumacher, *Philippine Bibliography*, no. 674. The title of the printed text is *Encomio al Discurso Parenético, que con eloquente estilo i docta pluma escribió el Reverendo Padre Francisco Combés, Catedrático de Teología en la Universidad de la Compañía de Jesús desta Ciudad de Manila*. It numbers nine pages and is dated "en su colegio a 27 de Agosto de 657." It is praise of the *Discurso Parenético* of Lic. D. Salvador Gómez de Espinosa y Estrada, oidor of the Audiencia of Manila, written in 1657 against some abuses prevailing among the parish clergy. The MS of the *Discurso* is in ARSI, Philip, 11 ff., 293-352. It was printed in Manila in 1657. See J.T. Medina, *La imprenta en Manila* (Santiago de Chile: Impreso grabado en cosa del autor, 1896), p. 51, no. 82; also Schumacher, *Philippine Bibliography*, nos. 674-75.

8. Simón Díaz, Sommervogel, Combés-Retana (Prólogo), and Schumacher (no. 676) mention it as well.

9. Likewise in Simón Díaz and in Schumacher, *Philippine Bibliography*, no. 684.

10. Vol. 5 (Aachen: Franziskus Xaverius Missionsverein, 1929), p. 297, no. 897.

Spanish and Philippine bibliographers, this German Oblate Father surprises us by mentioning a *Relación de las Islas Filipinas*, and a *Discurso político de las Molucas al Ilmo. Sr. D. Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, Gobernador y Capitán general de las Islas Filipinas*, of 1654, as a MS coming from the pen of Fr. Combés. He indicates that there is a copy in the Biblioteca Real in Madrid (now the Biblioteca de Palacio), but he provides neither a location number of the MS, nor his source for this entry.

Unexpectedly, the riddle is solved by C.R. Boxer in his *Catalogue of Philippine Manuscripts in the Lilly Library*.¹¹ On pp. 36-39 he describes a codex containing *Obras Varias* of Combés.¹² The first two *Obras* correspond exactly with the writings mentioned by Streit. They are: *Relación descriptiva de las Islas Philipinas, sus calidades, yntereses, pobladores, costumbres, Gobierno y conquistas* (ff. 1-54), and *Discurso politico del gobierno Maluco i su conservación. Dedícase al Ilmo Señor D. Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, cavallero del ávito de Calatrava, del consejo de su Magestad, su Governador y Capitán general en estas yslas i pressidente de la Real Audiencia y chancillería dellas* (ff. 59-92).

The contents of this codex add at least five more titles to the bibliography of Fr. Combés. It is strange that no bibliographer had knowledge of this collection, but this may be explained by the fact that these MSS were looted by the British in 1762-64 and stayed in private possession, inaccessible and unknown to scholars until they were acquired by the Lilly Library.

Leaving aside the *Relación*, we will concentrate attention on the *Discurso*. On its ample title, Boxer has a surprising remark in a footnote: "The Lilly Library has another and better version of this *Discurso* with the dedication signed in the autograph of Francisco Combés, S.J." He could have written "enlarged version." Comparing the first version described by Boxer and the "better" one,¹³ we find that the former version is signed "En Antipolo a 15 de Mayo de 1654," while the latter has "En nuestro Colegio de Manila a 22 de Diziembre de 1658." The former is subdivided into five parts, the latter into six. This sixth part of the latter

11. Edited by the Asian Studies Research Institute as Occasional Papers No. 2 (Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1968).

12. Which is MS 21526,

13. We used a photocopy made from a microfilm.

version, titled *Apendiz*, points to occurrences that happened after 1654. But even in the preceding parts some events are recorded that took place after the first version was written, e.g., the adventures of the socorros sent to Ternate in the years 1656-58 (nos. 17-19). This reveals that the passages in question were added later to the first version.

Consequently it appears evident that in 1658 Combés rewrote and enlarged his *Discurso Político* of 1654. This is fully confirmed by the author himself writing in the dedication: "Este discurso me pareció ofrecer en esta ocasión a V.S. con la aprobacion que muchos entendidos le an dado, no por lograr el trabajo *que avrá cinco años acabé . . .*" (p. 6). He dedicated it anew to Governor Manrique de Lara, augmenting the text with new reasons borrowed from the events of the last four years. Apparently neither version was ever printed. From the indication of Streit it seems that the Madrid MS is a copy of the version of 1654. Since the version of 1658 is definitive and more complete, we will deal only with it.

III. THE MANUSCRIPT

The MS of the *Discurso político* that we use for this presentation is in the Manuscript Department of the Lilly Library of the Indiana University at Bloomington, Indiana, USA. It consists of a handwritten book of over a hundred pages, not paginated. (For practical use we numbered them in our photocopy for our own convenience, starting with p. 1 for the title-page and concluding with p. 112 for the last page).

The text is in Spanish. It is written by the same hand in a clear, regular, and even beautiful calligraphy, but with varying densities on different pages. On all pages there is a margin at the side, in which quotations or a kind of footnotes are often noted down.

The Discourse proper is preceded by a title page and by a preface of seven pages. The text of the lengthy title runs: "Discurso político del gobierno Maluco, y su deserción. Ofreciólo el P. Francisco Combés de la Compañía de Iesús, catedrático de prima de teología en su Colegio y Universidad de la Ciudad de Manila al Illustrísimo Señor D. Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, Cavallero del ábito de Calatrava, del Consejo de su Magestad, su Governador y Capitán general en las Islas Filipinas y Pressidente de la

Audiencia y Real Chanzillería de la Ciudad de Manila." Besides the text of the title the first page carries two handwritten notes: "De la Provincia de la Compañía de Jhesús de Philipinas," and "Fray Juan Agustín Morales." They were evidently added after the MS was finished and form no part of it.

The preface is entitled: "Al Ilustrísimo Señor D. Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, Cavallero del ábito de Calatrava, de Consejo de su Magestad, su Governador, Pressidente y Capitán general en estas Islas." At the end, on p. 9, it is dated: "En nuestro Colegio de Manila, a 22 Diziembre de 1658," followed by the autograph signature of the author: "Beso la mano de V.S. Su más umilde servidor i capellán, Francisco Combés."

The *Discurso* proper runs from p. 10 to p. 112. At the top of the first page an abbreviated title appears: "Discurso político del gobierno Maluco y su deserción."¹⁴ It is divided into six chapters or parts of divergent length, each indicated by the symbol §. Another division into small sections is numbered consecutively throughout the entire text, the six chapters containing a total of sixty-one numbers.¹⁵ To give a clear idea of these divisions, the following outline may be useful.

Chapter 1, nos. 1-20, pp. 10-37.

Chapter 2, nos. 21-26, pp. 37-53.

Chapter 3, nos. 27-36, pp. 54-73.

Chapter 4, nos. 37-39, pp. 73-81.

Chapter 5, nos. 40-45, pp. 82-90.

Chapter 6, nos. 46-61, pp. 90-112.

That the author not only signed the preface but likewise controlled the entire text written by an amanuensis, appears from many, mostly small, corrections and additions made throughout it. At times this is the case with geographical and other proper names with which the copyist may have been less familiar. So, for example, Combés had to correct S. Juan de Jolo to S. Juan de Tolo (no. 8), and Sanbastian to Sanboangan (no. 14). In no. 39 he added in the margin a phrase skipped by the amanuensis, and once, in no. 54, he corrected himself by changing the name of D. Fernando de Bovadilla Gatica into "Francisco de Esteybar, governador de las fuerzas de Sanboanga." These emendations, generally

14. It should be noted that in the second version Combés passed from "conservación," to "deserción," that is, from calling in question the maintenance of Maluku to asserting positively that it should be deserted.

15. The text of the version of 1654 is not divided into numbers.

DISCURSO POLITICO
DEL GOBIERNO

MALVCO, Y SVDESERCION,
ofreciolo el P. Francisco Combes de la
Compañia de Iesus, Catedratico de
Prima de Teologia en su Colegio, y
Vniuersidad de la Ciudad de
Manila.

AL ILLVSTRISIMO S^{RO}

D. Sabiniano Manrique d'elara Cavallero
del Abito de Calatrava, del Cons.^{to} de
su Magd. su Gov.^{or} y Cap. Gen.^l en
las Islas Filip.^{as} y Pres.^{te} de
la Aud.^a y R.^{ta} Chanz.
de la Ciudad de

Manila

Al P. Fr. Combes
Al P. Fr. Combes



Fr. Juan Aguirre

not important in themselves, corroborate the originality and trustworthiness of the text.

Summarizing: we have at our disposal an original text, signed by the author, revised by himself, and accurately dated.

IV. LITERARY QUALITY OF THE DISCURSO

In order to obtain a better judgment of the *Discurso*, it may be useful to consider at least some of its more conspicuous literary qualities.

The style of Combés is far from clear and simple. He likes artificial turns, affected combinations, studied and subtle concepts. Spanish experts who inspected this text felt inclined to associate the style with some tendencies in Spanish literature known as *conceptismo*, *culteranismo*, *gongorismo*. While Gallardo describes his style as "dición limada y castiza,"¹⁶ de la Costa qualifies it as "the most involuted baroque style."¹⁷ The unpleasant result is that many passages of his argument resist being understood clearly and quickly; some sections are extremely obscure.

That Combés was an educated man, also in the field of literature, is shown by his quotations from more than twenty-five authors, classic, early Christian, and contemporary. Usually he gives the title of the cited work and eventually the Latin text, sometimes with book, chapter, or paragraph, in the margin. His pagan authors are: Aristotle, Cicero, Euripides, Herodotus, Livy, Ovid, Plato, Pliny the Younger, Tacitus, and Terence; the Christians are: Argensola, Balbo "poeta," Baronius, Bulengerus, Jean Chokier, Chrysologus, Dio Cassius, Francesco Guicciardini, Lactantius, Maffeo, Mariana, Márquez, Salvianus, Sidonius Apollinaris, and Famianus Strada. Beside these authors mentioned by name and often by work, he quotes some pointed pronouncements of Antonio Pérez, "the unfortunate secretary of Philip II," of the Conde de Lemos and of a Conde de Villam. de (Villamonte?); in addition, he cites the *Ley Julianus* and two enigmatic titles, *Annales italici* and *De bellico apparatu*.

16. *Ensayo* II, no. 1877.

17. *The Jesuits*, p. 477.

V. THE IDEA OF THE DISCURSO AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

A. MAIN LINES

The thesis of the dissertation is: every reason of state that guides the policy of the Spanish government of the Philippines, forces upon it the conclusion that it should withdraw the garrison and give up the fortress of Ternate in Maluku.

The six chapters of the dissertation present those reasons successively, i.e. they enuntiate a political reason that seems to compel the government to maintain Ternate, and then they prove that the reason in question does not hold under the actual circumstances.

1. The first reason regards the advantages and profits Spain may expect of Maluku, above all in the clove trade. Combés argues that these profits could never be secured, not even by the use of arms.

2. The second reason deals with inflicting losses on the enemy, i.e. on the Dutch. But in reality, the Dutch are steadily growing in maritime control and as a trading power. They make the natives their allies and laugh at the Spanish efforts.

3. The third reason derives from the duty of protecting the vassals and friends, especially Tidore. But actually the kings of Tidore always sabotage the alliance with the Spanish crown, their policy being merely a policy of treason based on self-interest.

4. The fourth reason demands of Spain not to relinquish Ternate for the sake of military prestige. But what in time of war would be an avowal of defeat, in peace may appear a prudent policy, especially since maintaining that remote fortress risks enfeebling the whole State of the Philippines.

5. Two further objections are presented. First, if maintaining Maluku is so useless and expensive, why do the Dutch not abandon it? The reason is that they have in mind profits and gain exclusively, whereas Spain is acting from idealistic motives.

The second objection is that as soon as the natives of Ternate and Tidore are no longer kept in check by the Spanish fort, they will fall upon the Philippines.

Therefore Manila should at least keep a modest garrison of soldiers at Tidore to assert the Spanish rights. The answer is that such an unpretentious citadel will not be able to cope with the difficulties nor to prevent the enemy from making its advances.

6. In the Appendix added later on, Combes shows that the events of the past four years (1654-58) only confirm his demonstration.

B. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT

Having presented a general resume of the contents and some leading ideas of the *Discurso*, we will now go further into some of Combés's arguments and factual assertions.

The Preface. Combés starts his Preface by extolling the courage and evenness of temper shown by Governor Manrique de Lara in good and bad, in prosperity and ill fortune. One of the worst things to be supported continuously by the Manila government is the task of maintaining remote Maluku. This added responsibility acts as a heavy drain on the governor's glorious projects and conduct. The duty to conserve it is a dread danger to the Philippines. There is no middle ground between the damage of sustaining it and the detriment of losing it. As the peace made with Holland has freed the resolution to abandon it from the blot of infamy, he writes this treatise in favour of its desertion.

The public treasury of the Philippines is not only exhausted but also in debt. New Spain sends too little money and too few infantry. The greater part of both is swallowed up by the annual socorro to Ternate, which, moreover, is damaged many times either by storms or by the Dutch, Ternatan, and even Tidorese attacks. Lastly, there is not much chance of making any profit from the clove trade. From these facts Combés asks in conclusion: is it right that, not having any hope of an advantage, we hold peoples that realize their own expectations to our detriment?

Many of the ideas put forward here are developed more fully in the dissertation proper.

First Chapter. From the day that, in 1580, the crowns of Spain and Portugal were united, Maluku became a heavy burden for the Philippines. Just at the time that Gonzalo Ronquillo¹⁸ had to fit out expeditions against Brunei and Cagayan, he saw himself forced to send Juan Ronquillo with a relief fleet to the Portuguese in the fortress of Tidore.¹⁹ When President Santiago de Vera²⁰ had enough trouble with the Pampangos and Tagalogs, he had twice to come to the aid of the Maluku Portuguese, under Pedro Sarmien-

18. Governor of the Philippines, 1580-83.

19. See Francisco Colín, *Labor evangelica*, nueva ed. por el P. Pablo Pastells, 3 vols. (Barcelona: Imprenta Litografica de Henrich y Compañía, 1900-1902), 2: 167-68. (Hereafter cited as Colín-Pastells.)

20. Governor of the Philippines, 1584-90.

to²¹ and Juan de Morón respectively.²² The expedition of Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas²³ resulted in failure because he was murdered even before his powerful armada left Philippine waters.²⁴ Perhaps this was good fortune because just at that time defenseless Manila received the suspicious visit of some Chinese mandarins. As these examples show, the help given to Maluku always risked weakening the defense of the Philippines.

Neither the profits, nor the Christian Church founded in Maluku by St. Francis Xavier, ever fulfilled expectations. For forty-nine years the socorro to Ternate entailed yearly an expense of one hundred thousand ducats, not to speak now of the ambitious expedition of Pedro de Acuña.²⁵

Nor could the reputation for grandeur of His Spanish Majesty be preserved because the care of these three small pieces of land and of three low sea-bastions²⁶ drew attention away from strengthening his empire. Spain was no longer respected by the native peoples, as was shown by the Chinese and twice by Brunei under Francisco de Sande²⁷ and Gonzalo Ronquillo. In Maluku the Spaniards had to withdraw from San Juan de Tolo²⁸ and to abandon its flourishing Christian community. They were not able to give help to the province of Manado,²⁹ nor to the Catholics of Kalongan³⁰ when they were martyred for the faith. The islands of Moro³¹ and Meao³² refused obedience.

21. See Colin-Pastells, 1:171-72.

22. Ibid., 3: 32-40; Antonio de Morga, *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*, nueva ed. por W.E. Retana (Madrid: Librería General Victoriano Suarez, 1909), p. 555. Hereafter cited as Morga-Retana.

23. Governor of the Philippines, 1590-93; Morga-Retana, pp. 559-60.

24. Colin-Pastells, 1:600-602.

25. Governor of the Philippines, 1602-1606.

26. A disparaging reference to Spanish controlled Maluku.

27. Governor of the Philippines, 1575-80.

28. This was a former Christian village in North-Halmahera, situated between present-day Galela and Tobelo. Prior to 1606 it was always called only Tolo, and was known as the principal town of the entire Moro region and the centre of the Moro mission. See *Documenta Malucensia* I, Hubert Jacobs, S.J. (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Jesu, 1974), p. 753; and Colin-Pastells 3:266-67.

29. Situated in the northernmost tip of Sulawesi (Celebes).

30. Kolongan, on Great Sangi Island, was located in the north on the western coast. It was one of the three "states" of the island and had accepted the Christian faith as early as 1568. (See *Doc. Mal.* 1:536).

31. "Moro" was the name of the northeastern region of Halmahera which was called Morotia, and it included the island off the coast whose name was Morotai. Consult *Doc. Mal.* 1:737-38.

32. The islets of Mayu and Tifore, between Halmahera and North Sulawesi.

There could be no reasons of state to further the particular interests of the vassals or of the garrison of Maluku. For the garrison soldiers lived in hardships, only the captain being able to enrich himself by some clove trade.

The king of Tidore had the insolence to forbid his subjects to embrace the Christian faith and to sell cloves to the Spaniards. He had it proclaimed "a vista del socorro y a ojos de los nuestros" (and I heard it myself, Combés says, revealing that he sailed to Maluku at least once). The king wanted control of the sale of cloves and sold them either at too high a price to the Spaniards, or for his own interests to Makasar, or even secretly to the Dutch of the Malayu fortress.³³ The so-called advantages of Maluku have been paid for dearly with blood, hardships, fears, illness (beriberi), and death. The socorro of Pedro de la Mata,³⁴ when returning, had thrown forty men into the sea; another, captained by Juan Camacho de la Peña,³⁵ had thrown overboard two or three daily. The socorros usually filled the hospitals of Zamboanga, Iloilo, and Manila. And they did not bring the cloves to which the king of Spain is entitled. This is illustrated by instances of the socorros from 1645 to 1658.

Second Chapter. But, on the other hand, should one not act against the effrontery of the Dutch? It is a good reason of state to sacrifice money and troops in order to inflict losses on the forces of the enemy.

This could not be achieved in Maluku. The kings of Ternate have inherited a deep hatred against the Portuguese and Spaniards; they took the Portuguese fortress,³⁶ gave hospitality to Francis Drake,³⁷ and joined their forces to those of the Dutch.³⁸ It is the Dutch to whom they sold their cloves and whom they helped by all possible means, followed in this by their feudal vassals, the

33. The Dutch fortress on Ternate was called "Fort Orange," but because it was built in 1607 near the village of Malayu, it was often indicated by the latter name. It was on the eastern coast, whereas the ancient Portuguese, later Spanish, fortress was at the southwestern side, near the present-day Kastela.

34. Pedro de la Mata Vergara, sargento mayor, afterwards general; on him see Combés-Retana, *Historia*, pp. 289 and 721.

35. Also mentioned in Colln-Pastells, 3:722.

36. That is, the fortress of Ternate, in 1575. See *Doc Mal.*, 1:705.

37. In November 1579.

38. The Dutch first appeared at Ternate in 1599.

rulers of Makian and Jailolo.³⁹ Unimpeded, the Dutch could then avail themselves of Batachina,⁴⁰ Mayu, and Tahulandang.⁴¹ So the Spanish opposition only strengthened the natives' resistance and alliance and caused the Dutch to be more on their guard; they have three forts on Ternate, as many on Makian, and others in Jailolo and Batachina.

One has to consider the forces, the war potential, and the general state of the Philippines as a separate member of the Spanish monarchy. It needs to be aided by the *socorro* from New Spain, and this arrives only once a year, is mostly deficient in bringing the necessities, and carries only young boys instead of trained soldiers. Its galleons are the same that were dispatched earlier from Manila; they overburden the shipyards with work. With such means the Philippines has to cope with the control and the defense of the sea. Spain does not keep fleets in the Pacific Ocean, and New Spain is not able to send a sufficient number of strong men-of-war. The Philippines needs at least six galleons constantly: two sailing to New Spain, two coming back thence, and two more to secure the *socorro* of Maluku, not to speak now of the trade with China which sustains the country, and of the needs of self-defence.

Diego Fajardo⁴² had three galleons built in the Philippines, but lost another three by shipwreck. The Dutch, on the contrary, have plenty of ships with which they rule the waves, so that even some naval misfortunes cannot enfeeble their fortresses. In spite of the prophecy full of promise of Fr. Antonio Marta, S.J.,⁴³ the capture

39. Makian is one of the Maluku Islands strictly speaking, a little south of Tidore. Jailolo is a town on the western coast of Halmahera, once seat of a sultan, who, however, had to submit to Ternate, as the ruler of Makian had to do as well.

40. Batachina is a name no longer used, but formerly was applied rather vaguely to western Seram (Batachina de Muar), to northern Sulawesi, and to Halmahera. Combès seems to use it for the northern part of Halmahera (Batachina do Moro), the other part being called Jailolo.

41. An islet due north of Sulawesi, between Sulawesi and Siau, and belonging to the Sangi archipelago.

42. Governor-general of the Philippines, 1644-53; see Combès-Retana, *Historia*, p. 708.

43. An Italian Jesuit, Visitor and Superior of the Maluku mission, who arrived there in 1587 and died in 1598. For his life, see *Doc. Mal.*, 2:36*-38*. For his letter to Dasmariñas of July 1591, see Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, *Conquista de las Islas Molucas al Rey Felipe III nuestro Señor* (Madrid, 1609; 2nd ed. Zaragoza: Imprenta del Hospicio Provincial, 1891), pp. 188-92. Also see *Doc. Mal.*, 2:304-9, especially the "prophecy" on p. 305, no. 1.

of Ternate did not result in a lasting increase of trade, nor in winning new vassals, nor in a larger number of fortresses. The Dutch are the lords of the spices; they fix the prices at their pleasure. And having spent so much money in order to maintain a small part of the clove trade, the Spaniards have to buy the spices at great cost afterwards from the Dutch in Europe.

Third Chapter. But does one not have the duty to assist and protect his vassals and allies, in this case, the king of Tidore? For this king, being an old enemy of Ternate, harboured the Portuguese,⁴⁴ giving them hope of recapturing the lost fortress. This inspired the Portuguese General André Furtado de Mendonça to make an attempt.⁴⁵ When Pedro de Acuña seized the fort he found the friendship of Tidore still extant. History furnishes many examples of aid given generously by governments to their harassed allies. How could Spain do less with respect to its ally Tidore?

The answer is that the king of Tidore has always been deficient in appreciating this benefit. He showed himself quite lukewarm when asked to give assistance to the fleet of Juan Juárez Gallinato⁴⁶ who came to relieve the expedition of Furtado. Under the cloak of friendship the king of Tidore only intended to deceive the Spaniards. As soon as he saw the siege of Ternate raised by Furtado, he made peace with its king. His was the policy of self-interest and of deceitful friendship. "His respect is fear and his love is selfishness."⁴⁷

After Acuña's victory over Ternate, the king at once trespassed upon it by occupying several places of the Ternatan lands, not reckoning with the rights of the Spanish Majesty. The best thing that can be obtained from Tidore is "a dangerous neutrality."

44. In 1578 the king of Tidore offered place for a fortress on his island to the Portuguese, who after the loss of Ternate in 1575 had withdrawn to Ambon.

45. He sailed from Goa in a powerful fleet in May 1601, brought Ambon again under Portuguese control in 1602 but failed to conquer Ternate. On him, see C.R. Boxer and Frazao de Vasconcelos, *André Furtado de Mendonça* (Lisboa: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1955).

46. On him, see Morga-Retana, p. 542; Combès-Retana, *Historia*, p. 746. On this expedition, see Colln-Pastells, 1:204-5; 2:349-54.

47. It is quite significant that a judgment of the same tenor about his double-dealing attitude is expressed in a Dutch missive of 1639: "The king acts friendly towards the Dutch, but he cannot be trusted; he is only out for his own advantage." See *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs en Raden aan de Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, ed. W.Ph. Coolhaas, 6 vols. ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, Grote Serie, 1960), 2:25.

Acuña who at first intended to join the two crowns of Ternate and Tidore on the head of the latter's king, soon changed his mind and chose a different form of government for Ternate.

When the anti-Spanish rebellion broke out in Jailôlo, the commander of Maluku, Juan de Esquivel,⁴⁸ summoned the king, according to the conditions of vassalage, to assist him with people and ships; the king made many difficulties and excused himself with many pretexts.

The later kings were not a whit better. King Kaicil Naro⁴⁹ leagued with the Dutch, and when deposed by the commander of Ternate, Pedro de Heredia,⁵⁰ he fled to their fortress. In his place Heredia put Kaicil Mole in the belief that he could be relied on.⁵¹ But as this ruler did not desist from stirring up the Tidorese against Spain and from fortifying himself with Dutch help, he was punished and stabbed to death by order of another commander, General Pedro de Mendiola.⁵²

His successor was King Kaicil Saidi,⁵³ son of Naro, who had been imprisoned with his father and was freed by the Spaniards. He proved anything but grateful, being worse and more insolent than his predecessors. On three conditions he had been recognized as

48. First Spanish commander of the recaptured fortress of Ternate, 1606-1609. See Morga-Retana, p. 534.

49. In the not very sure list of Tidore sultans offered by F. S. A. de Clercq, *Bijdragen tot de Kennis der Residentie Ternate* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1890), he is called Ngara Malamo (p. 158); in other Dutch sources, Ngarolamo. He began reigning in 1626-27 as successor of Mole (Molé Madjimoe in Clercq, p. 155). *Kaicil* is the title of royal princes.

50. Commander of Ternate, 1623-36. He had been appointed in Spain in 1620, stayed in Manila in November 1622, and sailed to Ternate in the next year. He is called almirante. See in Combés-Retana, *Historia*, p. 95; see also Colfn-Pastells, 1: Index, p. 55).

51. This Mole is also called Gorontalo (less correctly Borontalo) in other sources and authors. Clercq (p. 159) suggests that he reigned 1633-53, which cannot be correct. Pastells, writing from sources but not always indicating them, reveals that Heredia's overbearing policy of deposing Naro and enthroning Mole-Gorontalo did not find full approval in Manila. (*Historia General*, in *Catálogo*, 8: cclj).

52. He succeeded Heredia as commander of Ternate, 1636-40. This judicial murder of Kaicil Mole-Gorontalo was carried out by the sargento mayor Francisco Hernández in the king's court at Tidore, in August 1639. See Pastells in *Catálogo*, 8: cclj; and *Gen. Miss.* 2:26. The intention of the Spanish authorities was that Kaicil Naro should be re-enthroned, but he had been executed by Sultan Hamja of Ternate in early 1639 (*Gen. miss.*, 1:536).

53. Clercq (p. 160) calls him Magiaoe, but in note 4 Also Saida and Sa(h)idi. His suggestion that he began reigning in 1653 is not correct; he must have succeeded Mole-Gorontalo soon after the latter's death, i.e., in 1639 or 1640. This is confirmed by Combés in this *Discurso* (no. 34). See also *Catálogo*, 8, no. 17760 (1643) and 9, no. 18980 (1650). For 1649 he is called king of Tidore in a letter of 26 March (Madrid, Archivo Histórico Nacional. *cod.* 368 b f. 718v).

king: 1) that he should give military assistance to the Castilian forces when requested to do so; 2) that he should sell cloves to Spain exclusively; 3) that he should permit anyone who wished to become a Christian. He violated all three of them. When the Dutch lay in wait for the socorro to destroy it, and Lorenzo de Olaso⁵⁴ requested his help, he did not show up. And when the crew of this socorro, before returning, decided to demolish the fort of Marieko⁵⁵ on Tidore Island as being no longer of any use, the king offered help, it is true, but as soon as the work had started he left it entirely to the Spaniards. He issued proclamations that on pain of death nobody could sell cloves to the Spaniards, and without consulting the commander of the fortress he started negotiations with Ternate in public, a behaviour that even the Dutch disapproved of.⁵⁶

Still more impudent was his attitude towards the Christians. The Catholic king of Kalongan, a vassal of Spain, was attacked and persecuted by a rebellious neighbour.⁵⁷ The king of Tidore sustained the latter with soldiers and Muslim preachers, approving the cruelties with which the Kalongan Christians were oppressed. He went so far as to confer the title of king on the rebel and to crown him in the mosque of Tidore, assuming for himself the rights of an emperor. He continued his insolences against the commanders of the garrison of Tidore, Esteban de Ugalde,⁵⁸ who, not enduring them, tore down the mosque, and Juan de Zabaleta.⁵⁹ Finally he began a war against Ternate on his own

54. D. Lorenzo de Olaso Achotegui. See Combés-Retana, *Historia*, p. 724; Colin-Pastells, 3:810, n. 1 (In vol. 1, Index, pp. 116-17 he is mentioned twice: under Ocho-tigui and under Olaso). He was commander of Ternate fortress 1642-44.

55. Marieko was a village on the western coast of Tidore Island toward the south. The Spaniards had a fort there called "Marieco el Grande." The Dutch captured it in 1613 but soon dismantled it. In 1618 the Spaniards sent an expedition to erect a new fort near the town of Marieko. See Colin-Pastells, 3:266.

56. Combés quoted the Dutch saying: "Nosotros al Rey de Ternate, nuestro sujeto, no le consentiremos tales resoluciones, ni se le dará mano para que sin nosotros tenga pláticas con nuestros enemigos, por no dar lugar otros intentos" (no. 34).

57. Kalongan, (Calonga, Kolongan), see above, n. 30. That the Christians of this realm needed to be defended against neighboring kings (who sometimes sided with Ternate and the Dutch) is witnessed by Francisco de Montemayor y Mansilla: "Calonga . . . adonde avia un presidio con diez o doce soldados españoles solo para defender a estos dos pueblos cristianos de las ymbaciones de los moros de la misma ysla." See Colin-Pastells, 3:814.

58. A sargento mayor; see Combés-Retana, *Historia*, p. 724 under the name Esteban Orella de Ugalde; also de la Costa, *The Jesuits*, p. 443.

59. A captain; see Combés-Retana, *Historia*, p. 746.

authority. In that way he passed from neutral to being an enemy. Therefore no longer has Spain any duty to protect this vassal.

Fourth Chapter. A fourth and last reason of state to keep the fortress of Ternate could be found in military prestige. It seems that withdrawing one's forces and leaving the battle field to the enemy amounts to declaring oneself defeated.

This would be true if Spain were at war. But did not Diego Fajardo give up the fort of Jolo as a tactical measure in time of peace and without loss of honour? ⁶⁰ The same consideration applies to Maluku, now that peace has been made. In view of the weakness of the Philippine military and naval resources, and, on the contrary, of the wealth of ships owned by the Dutch, it is wise and honourable to foresee the risks and to withdraw from some places. It is a bad reason of state to prefer the accidental to the principal. It is foolish to give aid to Maluku and to neglect the defense of the entire Philippines. This is illustrated by some critical situations that arose in the islands at the time of Diego Fajardo and Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera.⁶¹ Let the governor recall the galleons from Ternate and use them for saving his own archipelago.

Fifth Chapter. For the Dutch, the only reason of state to keep Maluku is gain. Do the expenses for ships and fortresses allow them such a gain? Yes, because they only have in view to secure the spice trade and to monopolize it, fixing the prices and widely extending their business. For them Maluku is not simply the only and last aim of their voyages, but it becomes an occasion, a jumping-board, for sailing every year to many other countries, e.g., the Malay lands and Formosa.⁶²

The policy of the Spanish Majesty, on the other hand, is generous, in a true sense royal, always in the grand and disinterested manner, his magnanimity never being besmirched by "mecánicos empleos." His expenses find no recompense other than the gratitude of his vassals. His ships sail to Ternate without trading in other ports or venturing into off-the-track battles. If he would see to loading his ships with merchandise appreciated and coveted by these native peoples and exclude all particular merchants

60. On this loss of the Joló fortress, see *ibid.*, libro séptimo, pp. 424-530.

61. Governor General of the Philippines, 1635-44. *Ibid.*, p. 711.

62. The Dutch occupied part of Formosa from 1624 to 1662.

from the trade, as the Dutch do, doubtless his skill would answer the expectations, but "ni esto lo consiente la decencia, ni lo toleraría la piedad."

Another objection against abandoning Ternate altogether is this: once the brake of the fortress has been taken away from them, the peoples of Ternate and Tidore would throw themselves on the Philippines, inflicting heavy losses. And in case the peace were broken, the Dutch would support them. "It is better to lock them up in their own house so that they cannot disturb us in ours." Therefore some have proposed to retreat from Ternate but to leave a modest fort and garrison on Tidore island.

This will be of no use. Such a garrison will not deter either "Moors" or Dutch from despising it. The king of Tidore will behave as he did during the siege of the Portuguese fortress by the Dutch:⁶³ he took no sides and waited to see who would be victorious.⁶⁴ Nor would such a small garrison suffice to keep the Ternatan and Tidorese greed in check, as can be seen from some examples of measures taken by Sebastián Hurtado against some rulers of Mindanao and Bwayan.⁶⁵ "We should either have a terror-inspiring fortress or not have a fortress at all."

A more useful defense against the Ternatan raids is the fortress of Zamboanga.⁶⁶ The king of Ternate is not such an inexperienced soldier that he will risk penetrating into the Philippine Islands with such a strong and well-armed fortress at his back.

The Spanish presence in Maluku cannot bridle the enterprises of the Dutch. They arrive with information and spies gathered among the fugitives at Jakarta.⁶⁷ To escape a miserable life, the soldiers of the fortress often flee to that of the Dutch, in some years as many as fifty.⁶⁸ Should one keep forts for the benefit of the

63. In 1605.

64. He was urged by the Dutch commander Cornelis Bastiaensz to expel the Portuguese from his island, but he played the innocent. See *Doc. Mal.*, 2:701-2.

65. See the Libro Quinto of Combés-Retana, *Historia*, pp. 268-348, where Buhayen signifies Bwayan.

66. On the westernmost tip of Mindanao. As eager as Combés was to get rid of Ternate, equally tenacious was he for maintaining the fortress of Zamboanga. See Combés-Retana, *Historia*, pp. 618-19: "La salud de las Islas solamente consistía en tener guardado el puesto de Samboangan"; see also Combés' *Memorial* mentioned *supra* among his writings.

67. Batavia, at present Jakarta.

68. "Mas destes [400 almas de conficao] cada dia se vão pera os moros ternates, apertados da grande fome que todos passamos, e este anno se forão mais de 40, e esta hida não se lhes pode impedir." See Fr. Andrea Simi, S.J., Ternate, 13 February 1617, in ARSI, *Goa* 17 f. 186r.

Dutch and be a military training-school for Jakatra, meanwhile neglecting the defense of the Philippines?

Sixth Chapter. In this chapter, which he later added to his dissertation, Combés seems to be less rigorous in his line of thought. He calls it an *Apendiz* and intends to corroborate his thesis by means of the more recent political events of peace-time. After a complicated theory on the value of facts as a source of political resolutions, and having summarized in brief the principal ideas of the *Discurso*, he continues with the following argument.

As the experiences of the past war-time have taught what a dangerous handicap Maluku has been for Manila and how little profit it yields in recompense for so many losses, it is wise to foresee what it could be in the future. Now, though there is peace, Maluku's disadvantages are more rigorous than its menaces in war-time ever were. With the Dutch, peace is a disguised war, more profitable to their interests while being more injurious to the Spanish.

When the States-General in due course are better informed of the bad behaviour of their captains, will they not take measures and introduce better conditions of peace? This is very doubtful because the Dutch reports will always be colored by the greed of the East India Company; this will result in government measures favouring the Company's interests.

The selfish intentions of the Dutch became particularly patent when the king of Ternate, Don Pedro, died.⁶⁹ The Dutch enthroned Mandarza⁷⁰ although nearly all the Ternatan lands paid homage to his brother Kaicil Calomata.⁷¹ Mandarza's adherents were only some people of Malayu and those of Makian, whereas Calomata was accepted in Jailolo and Batachina, by the Alifuros and even by the prominent men of Malayu. The latter asked for

69. This was King Hamja, who in 1606, still a prince, had been carried off to Manila together with his father Sultan Said Berkat. In Manila he became a Catholic and was baptized D. Pedro de Acuña. He actually ruled Ternate 1627-48. His policy was a shrewd seesaw motion between Dutch and Spaniards, and between Catholicism and Islam. See Francois Valentyn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien*, 5 vols. (Dordrecht-Amsterdam: Joannes van Braam & Gerard onder de Linden, 1724-26), 1 b:255.

70. Mandarsah, 1648-75. See Clercq, p. 159.

71. Or "Kalamata." When forced into exile, he wandered about in Seram, Makasar, Butung, Buru, and was often quite embarrassing to his brother Mandarsah and the Dutch authorities. See Valentyn, 1 b 83, 88, 256, 285, 288, 298-99, 303, 315-25.

help of Governor Diego Fajardo who, however, excused himself from giving it because of the state of peace.⁷²

When Manrique de Lara had succeeded Fajardo, there was an anti-Dutch rebellion of the Ternatans and the Ambonese, assisted by the King of Makasar.⁷³ The Dutch lost a good number of their forts and in the town of Ambon they were already on the verge of embarking with their wives and abandoning the island. As the king of Tidore had joined the rebellion without Spanish consent, Manrique de Lara imprisoned him as a peacebreaker.⁷⁴ This put an end to the revolt. One of the results was that Mandarza kept the throne of Ternate and Calomata had to leave the country.

In this way the Dutch owed the maintenance of Maluku and Ambon to the generosity of Governor Manrique de Lara.⁷⁵ How did they show appreciation for this? At the death of King Saidi of Tidore,⁷⁶ vassal of Spain, when the people had already paid homage to his son Kaicil Mole⁷⁷ as their legitimate ruler, the Dutch pushed forward Kaicil Golofino,⁷⁸ son of King Naro. Golofino lived at the court of Ternate, and with the help of Dutch forces entered Tidore. This split the Tidorese into two parties: Golofino was followed by the towns of Toloa and Tidore, whereas Kaicil Mole found very few adherents. This was Dutch ingratitude, the more so because when Kaicil Saidi attacked the Dutch without the consent of the Spanish commander, and showed up in the fortress with a number of Dutch heads, the ap-

72. Not without some acrimony and with much optimism Combés writes: "Respetando el señor Don Diego [Faxardo] las paces, no admitia el obsequio, pudiéndolo establecer tan poco costoso, que sin enpeñar la millca española, con solo el nombre de la protección i algun socorro de municiones, se podfa prometer todo el inperio Maluco" (no. 50).

73. On the first phase of this rebellion of 1650, in which a younger brother of Mandarsah and Kalamata, Prince Manilha, was proclaimed king, see Valentyn, 1 b 285-91; H.J. de Graaf, *De geschiedenis van Ambon en de Zuid-Molukken*, Franeker: T. Wever B.V., 1977), pp. 114-17. The rebellion left a long train of unrest. The sole victorious party in the end was the Dutch.

74. For a short time, in 1654. The Dutch explained this as a typical example of Spanish insincerity. See Schumacher, *Philippine Bibliography*, no. 660.

75. An opinion not shared, of course, in any way by the Dutch.

76. On 7 January 1657.

77. This is already the third Kaicil Mole (see above, nn. 51-53), son of Saidi and grandson of Mole Madjimoe, as is mentioned further on. He did not reign.

78. As sultan of Tidore he changed his name to Saifudin, 1657-89. See Clercq, p. 160. Fr. Miguel Pareja, S.J., writing in 1671, qualifies him as "enemigo obstinado nuestro"; see Archivo General de Indias [AGI] Seville, *Filip.* 11 ramo 10 no. 125; ARSI, *Philip.* 12 ff. 55-59; and Pastells called him "mortal enemigo de los españoles" (Colin-Pastells, 3:812).

plause he received was that he was punished with imprisonment. Now this Dutch-backed Golofino offered to cut down all clove trees on Tidore, in keeping with the policy the Dutch had managed to bring about on Ternate by Mandarza.⁷⁹ For the cloves of Ambon Island are sufficient for the Dutch trade and interests. And so they introduced an enemy king in Spanish Tidore and robbed the Castilians of their cloves. In peace, therefore, the Spanish position was made worse than in war.

One cannot rely any more on the natives; rather they become an increasing danger to the Spaniards. So when the socorro happens to fail, the resident Spaniards have nobody to assist them in their needs since the socoro cannot be repeated in the same year.

In past times the mutual hostility between Tidore and Ternate rendered the former loyal to Spain. Now the peace and the interference of the Dutch have made them both fraternize among themselves and oppose Spanish rule. The Dutch contend: 1) that they stand aside, and 2) that the natives are free to defend their rights. The first affirmation is a lie, and the second would be true only if the natives had not been bound by the peace-treaties.

Further, the Dutch also stirred the Mindanao people to rebellion against the government of Manila and to resume the murderous raids on the Philippine islands. When the commander of Zamboanga, General Francisco de Esteybar,⁸⁰ out at sea met with a Dutch vessel under whose protection a Mindanao fleet was sailing, he was pounded by its artillery. Some vain efforts to come to negotiations and some further shelling induced the general to capture the vessel and to take captive twenty Dutchmen. These declared juridically that they had been forced by the captain against their own will to fire at the Spanish fleet.⁸¹

The peace tied the hands of the Spaniards and reduced the succour sent from New Spain, but it increased the freedom and the power of their enemies. The Tidorese are so deeply attached to the Dutch that they ruined their own country and people by

79. This was the sole aim pursued by the East India Company in all the troubles and wars. It concentrated the clove cultivation on Ambon Island, extirpating the clove trees on all the other islands by means of the ill-famed *hongí* expeditions.

80. On him, see Combés-Retana, *Historia*, p. 708; Colin-Pastells, 3:736; Valentyn, 1 b 305, 311, 370.

81. Combés-Retana, *Historia*, pp. 580-81.

cutting down the clove trees. "Imagine if we Spaniards had done this!" Nobody can any longer touch the Dutch clove trade.

Then Combés repeats the story of the kings of Tidore, adding some new details, but apparently also committing some errors, mixing up names and showing gaps in his knowledge (as will be discussed below). He also repeats that the disloyalty of Tidore releases Spain from the obligation of protecting it, and that the annual *socorro* to Ternate puts an unbearable weight on the government of Manila.

There is no need, he says, to speak of religion, since all the most pious hopes are shipwrecked on the hardness of the native heart. It should be added that many Mardicas, who in war-time were always loyal to His Majesty and to Catholicism, resorted to the Dutch when they no longer found sustenance in the present time of peace.

As the Dutch are concentrating the entire clove cultivation on Ambon Island, the presence of Spain in Maluku is increasingly risky. For no longer being able to sell cloves to the Spaniards, the Tidorese do not want them as their lords. They want to follow the example of the king of Makasar. Once he was the poorest ruler of the entire Orient, having at his disposal only rice, though it is also true that he was not a vassal to any European king. At present, by means of commerce, he has become the richest. Once his money consisted in some handfuls of rice, to-day he coins it in gold.⁸² The Tidorese want commerce without admitting any Europeans outside a trading agency.

VI. SOME REFLECTIONS

A. COMBÉS AND THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWAL

Fr. Combés was not the first to champion the cause of withdrawing the Spanish forces from the Maluku area. As early as 1612 voices were raised against the unrewarding duty pressed upon the Manila government to preserve and defend Maluku. Antonio de Morga, in a discourse of 1615, definitely brought forward the question of giving it up. He still considered this undesir-

82. Under the rulers Pattingaloo and Sultan Hasan Udin, and especially after the fall of Malakka in 1641, Makasar knew a great political and economic revival.

able on account of the profits of the clove trade and because of the threat of the Dutch who, once lords of Maluku, could directly attack the Philippines.⁸³ The Jesuit Provincial, Fr. Gregorio López, however, wrote to Father General Claudio Acquaviva in 1612: "These Philippine Islands are being impoverished and the cost of living therein increased by the conquest of the Moluccas and the subsidies of men, munitions, and supplies sent thither annually. The enormous amount of goods taken out of this realm to be consumed in the Moluccas represents a severe drain on its resources."⁸⁴

As a royal chaplain Combés had had personal experience of the *socorro* to Ternate in 1646. This made him especially attentive to the adventures of subsequent *socorros*. They often resulted in heavy losses of ships, manpower, and financial resources. Economically they were a debacle. Practically they often were not able to relieve the sufferings of the poor soldiers of the garrison, to fortify the military force of the Spanish crown, and to give it an imposing position with regard to the Dutch and the sultans of Ternate and Tidore.

The very *socorro* of 1646 in which Combés was present, was a striking example. It consisted of two galleys, a Japanese vessel (called *cho*), and four sampans rowed by Chinese. Only one galley, i.e. the flag-ship, and two sampans returned safely to the Philippines. The flag-ship had been knocked about to such an extent that it was never able to sail again. The *cho* was lost near Basilan Island where seven Dutch ships waited on lookout for the flotilla. The Dutch also destroyed two of the sampans, while the other galley encountered a storm that threw it on the coast of Negros, drowning most of the crew.

In 1652 the relief flotilla was composed of two galleons and one galley. Before reaching Ternate the oarsmen of the galley rebelled, killed the foot-soldiers, and sailed away to CochinChina. On the way back the greater part of the crew of both the galleons died from beriberi. Combés gives other similar instances. With the ill-fated *socorros* sent to Ternate it would have been possible not only to subject the entire Philippine archipelago but also to hispanicize all its peoples: "españolizar las naciones."⁸⁵

83. Morga-Retana, p. 352.

84. See a more extensive quote in de la Costa, *The Jesuits*, pp. 342-43.

85. No. 19.

But granted that the fortress of Ternate and some forts in Tidore were mainly a financial and military loss for the Manila government, why did Fr. Combés meddle with this question? Was it the task of a Jesuit to write a discourse on purely political matters?

Was his judgment so much esteemed and so highly valued by the experts in politics, the governor, and the members of the Audiencia, that he perhaps had been requested to write down his judgment for withdrawal? Was he a personal friend of the governor to whom, in fact, he dedicated his essay? Was he perhaps his confessor? We do not know.

A personal tie seems indicated in no. 57 where he depicts the annual fright and despair of the Manila authorities at the time the Ternate socorro had to be put in readiness. Once Marinque de Lara felt so oppressed that having dispatched the flotilla he declared: "If I knew that I had to send off another socorro, I would lose all hope." Such words give the impression of a confidential and familiar relationship. But for the rest we just do not know enough of Fr. Combés to give a satisfying answer to the queries mentioned above.

In this question, however, one should not overlook the fact that, according to the views of the Spanish monarchy at the time both the civil and ecclesiastical officials were servants of the king, equally bound to give any possible support to his empire and politics. As civil functionaries often interfered in Church matters, so not infrequently ecclesiastics had quite a bit to say on political business and secular administration. In this respect Fr. Combés had many predecessors and imitators and does not merit too severe strictures. Since in the remote colonies the priests made up a large proportion of the men with some university education, they were often consulted and justifiably spoke on many issues not directly belonging to their spiritual profession.

The present-day reader cannot help becoming impressed by the Father's argumentation. He feels constrained to credit Fr. Combés with knowledge of the facts and expertise in political thinking. The reasons of state alleged by him, as well as his criticism, appear solid and plausible. But, as it was noted above, they were not originally his own; they rather were repetitions and applications of ideas that had circulated for some decennia. They are the more

understandable if one considers the fact that time and again there were parties, both in the colony and in Spain, recommending the complete abandonment of the unprofitable Philippine archipelago as a whole.

B. COMBES AND THE MALUKU JESUIT MISSION

At first it seems strange that Fr. Combés pays so little attention to the religious consequences and to the mission aspect of his proposal. If the Spaniards abandoned Maluku, the Jesuit missionaries would surely have to relinquish their flock. What the situation would be like can best be seen from the example of Ambon where, from 1605 on, the Dutch East India Company had chased off the priests and forbidden any exercise of Catholic worship.

In no. 5 the author points, by the way, to St. Francis Xavier, first Jesuit in Maluku, and, confusing Maluku with Malacca, has him shake off the dust from his shoes. After that he puts only some rhetorical questions: what spot of Maluku earth was ever occupied by a Christian church? Which towns were distinguished by the cross? The suggestion that churches were never built and crosses were never erected in that area is historically incorrect.

No. 58 takes the reader again to the mission question. Neither in wartime nor in peace, Combés asserts, is religion any reason for maintaining the Ternate fortress, for the main obstacle to any conversions is the hardness of heart of the natives. In time of peace there is a special reason for withdrawing, since not finding sufficient sustenance, even the Mardicas now have recourse to the Dutch. It was they who in the wars were always loyal to the Spanish Majesty and to Catholicism.

Combés could have indicated the miserable situation of the Maluku Jesuit mission. There were only two or three Spanish missionaries who in 1654 had taken over from the Portuguese Fathers. The superior had his seat in the Ternate fortress, but was not able to do any real mission work, i.e., to make conversions among the natives. Since the garrison had its own secular vicar or parish priest, and, further, a few Franciscans were living there too, especially taking care of the hospital, he must have felt rather superfluous. Only the island of Siau and, from it, some parts of the Sangi and Talaud Islands, and perhaps at times the Manado area in N. Sulawesi, offered an opportunity for real

mission activity. At most, two Jesuits were available for this mission, although the Franciscans also joined intermittently in the work. And that was all.⁸⁶

Some other features of the situation should be considered. The Philippine Jesuit Mission could use all its members very well in its own residences and works — it had no extra manpower to be sent elsewhere. Moreover the Philippine Jesuits did not have traditional ties with the Maluku Church which had always been under Portuguese rule. Besides, their attention began to be directed rather to the possibilities of a new mission in the Ladrones Islands which could become truly Spanish since there were no Muslim sultans nor heretical Dutch there to thwart the work.

As was mentioned above, it seems strange to see a Jesuit appealing to the governor to withdraw completely from Maluku and, consequently, to give up and destroy an old mission of his fellow Jesuits. Yet Combés may have been right. His “reasons of state” for abandoning the area appear convincing, and what this entailed for the weakened and prospectless Catholic mission in an area wholly dominated by Muslims and by Protestant Hollanders, no longer seemed of real importance.

C. HISTORICAL IMPACT OF THE DISCURSO

Before concluding this essay, two questions should still be considered. Is the *Discurso político* of Fr. Combés of interest for the historian — does it contain unknown historical facts? Secondly, did it produce a real effect on the policy of the Manila government?

First of all, it seems important that this work, written from a Philippine point of view, views directly and explicitly the Maluku area and the Maluku question. No other writing of some size appears to do so. In Spanish-Philippine essays or reports of the seventeenth century, the Maluku region is always only an appendage, something mentioned “by the way” and after many topics of

86. For Franciscans in Maluku in the 17th century, see Lorenzo Pérez, OFM, “Historia de los misiones de los Franciscanos en las islas Malucas y Célebes,” in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 6 (1913): 45-60, 681-701; 7 (1914): 198-226, 424-46, 621-53; and Achilles Meersman, OFM, *The Franciscans in the Indonesian Archipelago* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1967), especially pp. 55-113.

greater importance. In this respect Combés's discourse may prove almost unique. It is sufficient to read Chirino, Colín, Murillo Velarde, and Juan Delgado to see this point.

Combés wrote his essay not as an historian but as a politician. He does not base his work on written sources, nor is he bent on giving accurate historical descriptions of events, or furnishing exact dates. The knowledge of facts which he uses as starting points for his argumentation is of the kind which any intelligent observer might have. Only for the earlier years does he lean heavily on Argensola. Perhaps not many of these facts and events are unknown and new. Some may be less known only because the rich source material of the Seville archives has not yet been fully exploited let alone been published. As to the Maluku history, three particulars seem to merit special consideration.

First, the annual socorros to Ternate from Manila. Those of 1646, a preceding one (of 1645?), of 1652 and of 1656-1658, are mentioned definitely and with some details about their commander-in-chief and the adventures of the ships (nos. 14-19). It is doubtful whether the historiography is aware of such particulars; consequently the *Discurso* might prove a precious source in this respect.⁸⁷

Second, the knowledge of the Spanish commanders of Ternate fortress from 1606 to 1663, and of their activity. Was their list ever available in a well-founded and trustworthy way? Combés's discourse mentions six of them: Juan Esquivel, Jerónimo de Silva, Pedro de Heredia, Pedro de Mendiola, Lorenzo de Olaso, and Francisco de Esteybar, though the last one only as commander of Zamboanga. In his *History of Mindanao*, however, Combés reveals that Esteybar was recalled from his post in Ternate to the command of the Zamboanga forces in 1656.⁸⁸

The most striking news in the discourse seems to be the judicial execution of the king of Tidore by the Spanish commander Pedro de Mendiola, at a moment very critical for the Spanish control. For the king allied himself with the Dutch and was about to strengthen his own fortress, quite near the Spanish fort, with artillery which the Dutch had already supplied precisely for this purpose

87. The *Generale Missiven*, published recently by W. Ph. Coolhaas, sometimes contain interesting details on socorros that arrived at Ternate.

88. Combés-Retana, *Historia*, p. 572.

(no. 33). Being a vassal of the king of Spain, the king of Tidore proved a true traitor; consequently his execution is always presented as a lawful punishment. He was executed in his own palace of Tidore by the sergeant-major Francisco Hernández, with the consent of the Tidorese people (no.56). This must have happened in 1639. But Combés seems little sure of the name of the king that was executed as will be shown below.

Third, the names and the chronology of the Tidore rulers in the seventeenth century. A reliable and proven table of these sultans has never been made; anyone who tries, meets with several difficulties. Mounting the throne, the rulers often changed their names. The succession happened nearly always under pressure sometimes from the Spanish, sometimes from the Dutch, local commanders. This often resulted in splitting up the people into two opposite factions. Thus, as soon as a new king was installed, a competitor came popping up, and a political and military tug-of-war started until one of the two was generally recognized. In very brief time the other was forgotten though he might have been reigning for several months. Sometimes a sultan was simply dismissed by the Spanish commander because he favoured the Dutch. Officially and by treaties, the Tidore sultans were vassals of the Spanish crown and had to trot in the Spanish harness. Even if they tried to escape this lot by allying themselves with the Dutch, this by no means meant that they were content to trot under the Dutch yoke. Such a situation resulted in a non-transparent policy on the part of the rulers, in a good deal of partiality on the part of the Spanish, as well as the Dutch informers, and consequently in not a few riddles for the later historian.

There seems to be no Spanish-Philippine historian dealing expressly with these kings. Some useful indications can be found in the *Catálogo*.⁸⁹ Among Dutch historians the best hope is Valentyn, but he fails to fulfill these expectations. He frankly declares never to have seen a complete list, jumps from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century and from 1527 to 1627, and after that knows only that in a certain year a certain sultan was reigning, not being aware that a certain "Gnarilama" and a subsequently mentioned "Ngano" are one and the same person.⁹⁰ In his work on Ternate,

89. Vols. 7-9.

90. See Valentyn, 1 b 106.

Clercq gives the names of the Tidore sultans, but evidently he does not base himself on sources, has no idea of the complicated nature of some successions, and relies too blindly on the scarce and arbitrary indications of Valentyn.⁹¹

Only patient work of collecting and comparing loose statements found in Tiele's *Bouwstoffen*, in the *Dagh-Register* of Batavia, and in *Generale Missiven*,⁹² could help put together the little pieces required to complete the whole jig-saw puzzle. In this effort the *Discurso* might prove a useful help.

Combés speaks of the kings of Tidore in nos. 33-35, 52, and 56. The names he gives are Mole (1), Naro, Mole (2), Saidi, Golofino, and Mole (3). The first Mole is the one who ruled 1599-1627.⁹³ Naro is Ngaro-ma-lamo, or Ngarolamo for short, who in 1627 succeeded Mole when Prince Gorontalo was passed over. In 1634 Naro was dismissed by Pedro de Heredia; he fled to Ternate, and in his place Gorontalo was enthroned. It is this latter ruler whom Combés calls Mole and who in 1639 was killed by Pedro de Mendiola, as mentioned above. In nos. 52 and 56 Combés is quite apodictic in asserting that the king stabbed to death by Mendiola was Naro. This may not be correct. The error could be explained by the circumstance that in the same year 1639, some weeks or perhaps months earlier, this Naro was likewise murdered by order of the ruler of Ternate with whom he had taken refuge.⁹⁴ Since Combés wrote almost twenty years later, he may have confused the names.

The next sultan was Saidi, son of Naro. He was enthroned in 1640 and reigned until his death in January 1657. Clercq knows him as "Magiaoe," but mistakenly puts the beginning of his reign as late as 1653.⁹⁵ From the fact that our author asserts twice that Saidi was restored to his kingdom (no. 34 "restituyeron"; no. 52 "restituyendo") it is clear that this king had to defend his rights against a competitor. This was Golofino, put forward by the followers of Gorontalo and by the Dutch. Golofino, more correctly

91. Clercq, pp. 155-60.

92. P.A. Tiele, *Bouwstoffen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanders in den Maleischen Archipel*, 3 vols. ('s-Gravenhage: Oud-koloniaal Archief, 1886-95); *Dagh-Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia*, 29 vols. (of several years between 1624 and 1681, ed. by various authors), Batavia-'s-Gravenhage, 1887-1919; also the *Generale Missiven*, 6 vols., noted above in nn. 47 and 87.

93. In Clercq, p. 155, he is identified as Mole Madjimoe.

94. Tiele, *Bouwstoffen*: on Gorontalo, 2:382-83, on Naro, 2:380-81.

95. See Clercq, p. 160.

Kolofino, seized his opportunity at the death of Saidi in 1657. Supported by the Dutch Kolofino ruled out Saidi's son whom Combés again calls Mole, the third of this name, and he reigned as Sultan Saifudin until 1689.⁹⁶

Summing up: our author knows six names of rulers or claimants to the throne of Tidore in the seventeenth century. Three of them he calls Mole. His second Mole is commonly known as Gorontalo, but Combés does not use this name. While speaking of his death, he confuses Mole-Gorontalo with Naro.

Therefore, concerning the sultans of Ternate, the *Discurso* furnishes some names and information, but obviously nothing new; they are much better known, especially from Dutch sources.

For the mission history of the island of Sangi Besar, whose sources are particularly scarce, uncertain, and often inconsistent, the information given about the Christians of Kalongan, and about the interference of the king of Tidore, seems to have a certain importance.

D. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DISCURSO

The last question to be answered is: was Combés essay of any real effect and influence upon the policy of Governor Manrique de Lara and the Manila Audiencia?

It is very well known that in 1662, only four years after the definitive version of the *Discurso*, the governor ordered the garrison of Ternate to be withdrawn and the fortress to be dismantled. But the strange characteristic of this decision is that it was taken on account of a motive entirely different from any reason of state adduced by Combés. The governor came to his drastic resolution in an atmosphere of terror and perplexity caused by unforeseen threats. The man behind the threats was Koxinga (or Coseng, Kuesing), a Chinese sea-robber who had managed to create a personal empire in the Chinese coastlands and Taiwan (Formosa).⁹⁷ On 21 April 1662, Koxinga wrote a letter to Manrique de Lara, ordering him to submit and to pay tribute, and threatening a destructive invasion in case of a refusal. One month later the Manila

96. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-63.

97. Murillo Velarde, *Historia de la Provincia*, bk. 2, chap. 13, nos. 640-47; Combés-Retana, *Historia*, pp. 610-22; Charles J. McCarthy, S.J. "On the Koxinga Threat of 1662," *Philippine Studies* 18 (1970): 187-96.

authorities resolved to strip their garrisons not only from Ternate, but also from Zamboanga, Iligan and Calamianes. As strongly as Combés had spoken in favour of the withdrawal of Ternate, so now with equal fierceness he condemned the withdrawal from Zamboanga.⁹⁸ The rigorous measures of Manrique appeared unnecessary because the Koxinga threat collapsed before becoming an actuality. But the harm was irremediable. It meant the definite end of Spanish control in the Maluku area.⁹⁹

From these circumstances one could be inclined to infer that Combés's writing was not the cause of the removal of the Ternatan garrison. Yet it could be asked if it did not influence the governor to toy with the idea. It seems scarcely plausible that this idea was suddenly born at the very moment of Koxinga's threat.

VII. EPILOGUE

The *Discurso politico* of Fr. Francisco Combés can throw new light upon the person and activity of this young Jesuit, on his authorship and on his bibliography. When he finished the enlarged version he was only thirty-eight years of age. His essay reveals something special about the relations of an ecclesiastical servant of the king to the civil authorities. As an historical document it furnishes a wealth of information concerning the political and military situation of the Philippines in the seventeenth century and the contemporary political ideas and views. It gives a full picture of the continuous tensions existing between the Philippine government and the Maluku region which it had been forced to take on its shoulders.

More especially it illustrates the uninterrupted and intricate triangular conflict between the Spaniards, the Dutch, and the local sultans of Ternate and Tidore in the Maluku area, and how this conflict continued and even grew worse after the peace of Westphalia had officially reconciled the Iberians and the Hollanders. The Dutch seventeenth century policy in Maluku has often been severely criticized, even by Dutch historians; this essay,

98. Consult Combés-Retana, *Historia*, p. 619.

99. On the Christians of Spanish Ternate who preferred to go into exile to the Philippines instead of living under Muslim yoke in their own country, see Vicente L. Rafael, "From Mardicas to Filipinos: Ternate, Cavite, in Philippine History," *Philippine Studies* 26 (1978): 343-62.

written from a Spanish-Philippine angle, strongly confirms and sanctions these strictures. It reveals the unscrupulous East-Indian Company policy that aimed only at monopolizing the clove and nutmeg trade and that was always disposed to trample down the clear clauses of the treaties and the recognized rights of the Spanish monarchy and of the native states and rulers.

In concluding this paper we express the wish that soon an historian (of the Philippines?) may endeavour to make ready an excellent edition of the *Discurso*, i.e. to prepare a critical editing of the Spanish text, accompanied by a trustworthy English translation, and provided with the needed commentary in an introduction and in footnotes. It would surely be worthwhile.

*Jugacion, que no obligaba a sujecion sin embargo
que a penas, sino que cemas. Rescacion, que sin a
pensar de algun bien, aguarde como a que se
las seys en nuestro mal!*

*Dignas V. de me mi pueracion, y co-
fada con la rucera, allaca V. una pofia que
sino mintio, cuando al pases lada, mantia nualta
paxpiedad, mena podes fides suresidad, cum-
do rentable con la coesion de la racion de
Maluco, nualta aduvidad. T. i. p. gualta so-
no no obligaban a pueracion incoesion en
tenes dudar, cuando no iona: se pueracion en
seguen legal, ma fuerza condan cuando yo
seguen con la coesion, por que ella sea declarada
de la. El que V. si no los a sures de midio-
ro, los dades, que lo pueracion, quon de la feli-
cidad de V. et. en rito Colegio de Manila
a 22. de Diciembre de 1658.*

Fr. M. de S.

Fr. M. de S. Serv. i Capellan

Fr. Combés